Protecting Volunteer Firefighters and Emergency Responders Act

Floor Speech

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Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I rise to speak in favor of the Corker-Menendez bill. I thank Chairman Corker for his kind words and for the opportunity to work together on something, in what I believe to be the best traditions of our committee and the Senate. I thank my ranking member, Senator Cardin, for being a great facilitator at the end to help us get over a number of challenging issues, to a point of unanimity on the committee, and to Senator Menendez, whose long-term interest on this issue has been so consistent and so helpful and whose work on this particular piece of legislation was critical.

I believe Senator Corker began, and I want to begin as well, with a condolence to the family of Dr. Weinstein, a Marylander who--the announcement today about his death in Afghanistan in a drone strike sort of reminds us of the stakes that are involved in these kinds of issues. When we are talking about American military action or about diplomacy around a nuclear weapons program, it is not a bill we are talking about, it is not a concept we are talking about, we are talking about human lives; that even in the best of circumstances there will be days like today when there will be sad news and Americans who are in harm's way because of the dangerous nature of the world--and I feel like the announcement today about Dr. Weinstein--our condolences to his family should remind us of the seriousness of our obligation.

Senator Cardin started with that great wisdom of Senator Vandenberg that ``politics stops at the water's edge.'' Now, we probably all know that was never 100 percent true. I know a little bit about some of the challenges Jefferson and other Virginians had early. There is always politics, but there is a core wisdom to that principle, a very important wisdom.

Of course, we are going to battle because we see things differently, and people seeing things differently can sometimes get to a greater understanding. That is what we hope to do. But the reason politics should stop at the water's edge is because we want to send a unified message to our allies as they depend on us. We need to send a unified message to our adversaries about our intentions.

But I would say in a personal way, because of maybe representing the Commonwealth of Virginia, we have to send a unified message to the men and women in our armed services who serve, who are serving in battlefields, who are serving in theaters of military operations around the world. When we are contemplating decisions about something so big that could potentially lead to war--we just deployed Virginia-based ships like the Theodore Roosevelt to Yemen to potentially check Iranian ambitions vis-a-vis the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Those are Virginians, many from other States, who are deployed on those ships.

We owe it to those who are serving and risking their lives to try to be as nonpartisan as we can, so they know they are not serving just because one party thinks they should or the other party thinks they should, but the missions they are undertaking are missions of national consensus. I feel that very strongly. That is why I am so gratified this bill now reaches the floor on a fundamental matter in a bipartisan way.

With respect to our negotiations with Iran, there was a view out there on the table that if Congress wanted to be involved, it must be because we are against diplomacy. In the committee I said that notion was offensive to me. There were those even who suggested that those who wanted a congressional oversight role were prowar, which was highly offensive and insulting.

I am prodiplomacy. I supported the President's commencement of these negotiations in November of 2013. I think America has a wonderful diplomatic tradition where we have been able to achieve a lot when diplomacy is done right.

I actually think the negotiation period from November 2013 to today has produced tangible benefits for the United States, our allies, and the world because Iran has rolled back its stockpile of 20-percent enriched uranium. They have allowed inspections they didn't allow before. And even nations and leaders who were skeptical about whether the negotiation would work have admitted to me: Maybe I shouldn't have been skeptical. The negotiation period has produced some benefits.

In the framework announced on April 2, I see some items I like and I see some other things I have some deep questions about. But a commitment by Iran, for example, to roll back uranium stockpiles from 10,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms--just a fraction of what would be necessary to produce even one weapon--would be very positive.

But I say all that just to say that as a prodiplomacy Senator, as someone who would love to find a negotiation that would work to a positive end, I believe strongly that a congressional review role of a matter such as this is necessary, it is helpful, and it is something, frankly, that the American public deserves. It is necessary for the reasons that have been described.

Now, a President, under article II powers, has significant ability to conduct foreign policy and even strike agreements without congressional approval. There are many things a President can do in the foreign policy sphere without congressional approval.

But this is fundamentally a negotiation about what Iran must do to get out from under sanctions that Congress has constructed, that Congress has imposed, and that Congress has perfected and approved over the years. If that is the negotiation, there is no way to have an ultimate deal about the unwinding and eventual repeal of a congressional sanctions statute without congressional review. So Congress is necessary to this deal.

Second, congressional review is helpful. It is helpful for the negotiators, as they are in this final chapter, to know that they must negotiate to their very best because they will have to sell this deal to Congress as the elected representatives of the American people. That is a helpful discipline for our negotiators. It is helpful for the Iranians who want to get out from under congressional sanctions to have some sense of how Congress might ultimately look at this deal.

Put yourself in the Iranian shoes. We want them to make huge concessions, not modest ones. But what is their incentive to make big concessions to get out from under congressional sanctions if they have no idea what Congress will likely do? We have put a process in place that will give them some sense of what Congress would do in an orderly way, and that will be an incentive, I believe, for larger concessions.

Not only is this review bill necessary, not only is it helpful, but it is what the American public expects and deserves. I think we have all been looking at the way the American public has been reacting to this negotiation.

The American public is like all of us. They are deeply worried about an Iranian nuclear weapons program. They are like all of us. They would love it if we could find a diplomatic end to the Iranian nuclear weapons program. They are like all of us. They are skeptical about whether Iran will follow an agreement, and they overwhelmingly believe that if there is an agreement, it should be an agreement that Congress approves.

Why do they think Congress should approve it? Is it because we have fantastic approval ratings? Absolutely not. We don't have great approval ratings. But, the American public says: In our anxiety about whether we can trust Iran on a deal, we will feel better if both the executive and the legislative have looked at this deal and concluded--like you would try to get a second opinion from a doctor on something that was very important--that it is a good deal for our country and our national security. They are going to feel more comfortable, given the natural anxiety they have about Iranian compliance.

That is why this bill is so important.

Finally, I want to talk about how the bill got here because I do think there is a lesson for the floor activity on the bill but also for the body, more generally.

This bill was filed in original version in 2014, and I did not sign onto it.

Our chairman, Senator Corker, and I were in the Middle East in January with five other Senators, in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Israel.

As we returned after a set of discussions with governmental leaders, military leaders, civil society, and political leaders about many topics, including the Iranian negotiation, Senator Corker, a friend, sort of challenged me a little bit: Hey, you are the guy who likes to say that Congress needs to play a role. I have been pushing hard for Congress to play a role in an authorization of military force against ISIL. If that is what you think, why aren't you on this bill about congressional approval of a deal with Iran?

I said: You are absolutely right congressional approval, but there are some aspects of the bill I don't like.

The chairman said to me: Then, fine, you rewrite it or propose amendments, and let's see if we can work together.

So I did and others did, and we put our best good-faith proposals down on the table. We found a listening ear, a staff, and a set of Senators on both sides of the aisle who were willing to try to exercise that congressional approval role--but do it in the right way, not the wrong way.

When we filed this bill on September 27, there were two Democratic original sponsors and two Republican original sponsors. Then there were five additional Democratic cosponsors and five additional Republican cosponsors.

So from the very day this bill hit the floor, we were trying to build it in a bipartisan way to show that the Vandenberg maxim, although it is not as true even when it was stated and it certainly is not as true today as we would like it, still had some power. And we wanted to show the body that we could do it in a bipartisan way so that our allies, our adversaries, and our troops would see that we could act in a bipartisan way on something so important.

There were steps between the filing of the bill and the Foreign Relations Committee action that threatened to push the bill off of the bipartisan rails into partisanship in ways that might have served the short-term purpose but that would have probably killed the bill. The chairman and others made sure that did not happen.

So when we got to the vote in the Foreign Relations Committee--and it went from 2 plus 2, to 7 plus 7, and eventually, 19 to zero--we carefully worked at every step along the way to make this bipartisan and, hopefully, to send an example on the floor that this is what it should be. Robust debate and amendment, of course, is what this body is about. But we want to make sure that review of this most important matter is done in a way that is careful, prompt, and deliberate, according to rules that all can respect and all can understand.

I conclude with thanks to my colleagues on the committee, to the leadership of the chair--both as the original drafter of the bill, then as the drafter willing to entertain other ideas, and then as the chair of this committee, trying to bring this to a productive place.

I thank Senator Cardin for his great role in helping us bridge differences and, especially, for his communication with the White House. The White House threatened to veto this bill, but Senator Cardin, probably better than most, was able to listen to the concerns and then try to respond to the concerns in a way that we could make the bill productive.

This matter is so important that we just cannot tackle it in any way other than trying to follow--the best we humanly can--that Vandenberg maxim. I hope, as we get into deliberations on the floor next week, that this would be the spirit of all the colleagues who tackled this most important matter.

I yield the floor.

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