Providing for Congressional Disapproval of a Rule Submitted by the National Labor Relations Board- Veto

Floor Speech

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Mrs. FISCHER. Thank you, Madam President.

NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

I rise today to discuss the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Many of my colleagues have spoken at length about some of their concerns, which I share. Today, however, I would like to discuss my concern about the administration's increasing reliance on the idea that sanctions can be snapped back into place in the event that Iran violates an agreement.

In its press release on the framework agreed upon earlier this month, the White House stated:

If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.

On April 11, 2015, President Obama stated:

We are preserving the capacity to snap back sanctions in the event they are breaking any deal. ..... And if ..... we don't have the capacity to snap back sanctions when we see a potential violation, then we're probably not going to get a deal.

A week later, at a press conference with the Italian Prime Minister, President Obama played down the question of whether Iran would receive immediate sanctions relief and insisted snapback provisions were more important. He said:

Our main concern here is making sure that if Iran doesn't abide by its agreement, that we don't have to jump through a whole bunch of hoops in order to reinstate sanctions. That is our main concern.

I agree with President Obama's goal. Who wouldn't want harsh measures reinstated the moment Iran fails to comply with this agreement? The problem is that reality is far more complicated than the simple phrase ``snapback'' suggests.

In a Washington Post column last week, former CIA Director Michael Hayden, former Deputy Director General of the IAEA Olli Heinonen, and Middle East expert Dr. Ray Takeyh laid out the long and circuitous path that any action to reinstate sanctions on Iran would have to take. Their conclusion? That it could take an entire year or even longer to simply confirm that Iran has actually violated its obligations and navigate the bureaucratic process necessary to restore the sanctions on Iran.

A recent article in the Wall Street Journal by Henry Kissinger and George Shultz made a similar point. In it, they write:

Restoring the most effective sanctions would require coordinated international action. In countries that had reluctantly joined in previous rounds, the demands of public and commercial opinion will militate against automatic or even prompt ``snap-back.''

Some may argue that past history is irrelevant and that the negotiations will produce a new process, allowing for a quick restoration of the sanctions regime. Such a process would still be far from automatic since significant time would be required to confirm Iran's violation, but recent comments by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov made clear that this idea is not in the cards. Speaking last week on the idea of snapping back sanctions, he stated: ``This process should not in any way be automatic.''

He went on to say that decisions on this matter should be taken in accordance with the procedures of the U.N. Security Council through voting in the Council and through the adoption of the appropriate resolutions. We must also bear in mind that sanctions take time to have effect.

The United States has had sanctions on Iran since 1979. One could argue that the heavy sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table--they began back in 2010. But even in that case it took years to create enough economic pressure for Iran to even sit down with negotiators. The idea that we will be able to swiftly reimpose sanctions and that those sanctions are going to swiftly cripple the Iranian economy and that they are going to force Iran to change its behavior--I believe that is simply implausible.

The point is the practical reality of this issue is much more complicated than the talking points suggest. To me, this underscores the importance of getting a good deal with Iran. It demonstrates why a bad deal is so much worse than no deal at all. It took many years to build the global sanctions regime that brought Iran to the negotiating table. The fact is that it can be dismantled much faster than it can be rebuilt.

We cannot afford to overlook key provisions or pretend that the precise terms of this agreement are of lesser importance. Of all the tools we can use to influence Iran, sanctions relief is the most important. It should only be provided as part of a deal that is clearly in American interests. The security of our country, our families, and the possibility of a nuclear Middle East hangs in the balance.

There will be no simple snapback if this agreement does not hold. We need to be honest with the American people and not rely on unrealistic notions to justify any deal with them.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

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