National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016

Floor Speech

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Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to discuss my amendment No. 1521 to fence all funding above $50.9 billion in the account for overseas contingency operations until budget caps on both defense and nondefense have been raised. My amendment specifically recognizes the need for these resources, but it objects to the way this OCO fund is being used as a way to circumvent the Budget Control Act. It does so, I think, on a very sound ground that over the long run will be beneficial to the Department of Defense and to everyone who is engaged in the defense of the United States.

We debate and vote on many issues in the Senate. While all of the issues are important, occasionally we must face an issue that could truly change the course of our Nation because the consequences of our actions are often not known for years. The votes may be very difficult when they are taken, but they are very important.

One example of such an issue is Iraq. Thirteen years ago, the majority of the body--79 Senators from both parties--voted to go to war in Iraq. I did not vote in favor of the war. In fact, I spoke against it. I think the outcome could have been very different back then if we had more of a debate about the true costs and the long-term costs, the thousands of lives lost, and the countless wounded--some with invisible scars--if we had thought the United States would be on a war footing for over a decade and American taxpayers would be on the hook for trillions of dollars and that we would perhaps even contribute by our actions to new threats we are facing today.

Back then it was implied and sometimes stated that opposing the Iraq war meant you didn't support the troops or were weak on national security. I think the intervening years have shown that to be inaccurate.

We are hearing echoes of that rhetoric again: If you don't support this version of the NDAA, then you don't support the troops or terms like ``taking this bill hostage.'' That is just not the case.

Since 2005, Senate Republicans voted against cloture on the NDAA, the National Defense Authorization Act, 10 times, and over that same period, they cast votes against final passage of the NDAA on the Senate floor 8 times. Sometimes it was because of policy differences, such as ending ``don't ask, don't tell.'' Other times it was over something like gas prices at the pump or other issues. But I don't think anyone has ever done it to be unpatriotic.

We can't change history, but we can certainly learn from it. We can't see into the future, but we know we must plan for it, and we must pay for it by making strategic investments today. This debate really boils down to this: What is the most effective way to provide for our national defense? I don't think inflating the overseas contingency operations, OCO, is the way to go because it complicates rather than helps the Pentagon's budgetary problems. It doesn't allow the military to effectively plan for the future.

We need to replace the senseless sequester with a balanced approach that keeps America safe and strong at home and abroad. When it comes to the defense budget, Congress should adhere to the same standards of honesty, transparency, and discipline that we demand for our troops. But right now there is a serious disconnect in the OCO mechanism of this bill, and Congress needs to step up and fix it.

The President's fiscal year 2016 budget request for defense was $38 billion above the 2011 Budget Control Act, the BCA--their spending caps. The President requested this $38 billion be authorized and appropriated as part of the annual base budget so they could be part of the Defense Department's funding, not just for 1 year, as OCO is, but in the budget for an indefinite period of time.

The request also contained $50.9 billion for the OCO account, meaning funding for truly war-related expenses and not enduring base budget requirements. However, this bill, following the lead of the majority's budget resolution, does not address the BCA's damaging impacts on defense and nondefense. Instead, it turns to a gimmick.

This bill initially transferred $39 billion from the base budget request by the President to the OCO budget, leaving a base budget conveniently below the BCA levels in order to avoid triggering automatic reductions for sequestration. The funding shifted to OCO is for enduring requirements of military services, not direct war-related costs and not those costs generated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. It includes flying hours for aircraft, steaming days for ships and submarines, and all training that supports the ``National Military Strategy.'' These are not appropriate OCO expenses. These are the expenses of the Department of Defense facing the long-term challenges and maintaining the long-term capabilities of the U.S. defense forces.

Some have said we should avoid subjecting defense spending to the budget control caps through this OCO approach for a year while a deal to revise or eliminate the BCA caps is negotiated. I couldn't disagree more, because if we used this approach--this gimmick--for 1 year, it would be easier to do it next year and the year after and the year after that, ensuring an enduring imbalance between security and domestic spending. Using OCO in this way is completely counter to the intent of the BCA, the Budget Control Act.

The BCA imposed steep cuts to defense and nondefense spending to force a bipartisan compromise. This approach unilaterally reneges on that bipartisan approach. Rather than generating momentum for a permanent solution to sequestration, this approach essentially exempts defense spending from the BCA caps and releases all pressure to find a solution that provides similarly for domestic spending priorities.

The President's defense budget request placed the needed funding in the base where it should be and provided for the OCO funds for contingencies overseas that exist today. The budget resolution and the bill before us met the President's request for overall funding. This is not a question of whether the President asked for a certain amount of money and my Republican colleagues are asking for more. What they did is essentially say: We are not going to technically--and I emphasize ``technically''--violate the BCA account. We are just going to move more money into OCO.

So we can stand up with a straight face and say: Well, BCA applies across the whole board. Every government agency is subject to the same tight limits that the Budget Control Act imposes. But, of course, the truth is that through the use of OCO those limits don't apply to the Department of Defense.

It is particularly startling when you look at the President's request for domestic agencies. He asks for $37 billion for all of the other domestic agencies above the BCA cap. Without that money they are going to have a very difficult--indeed, perhaps impossible--challenge of meeting the basic needs of the American public--needs that every colleague in this Chamber recognizes. Some might disagree with them, but they recognize that we need to support education, as we have done for decades through the Title I Program. We need to support people--our seniors, particularly--through senior housing programs. In every State, in every community, that has to be done. But if we follow this path, it will be harder and harder for nondefense agencies to do this.

What we have created is a huge loophole through the BCA for defense. Again, let me remind you, the President and my colleagues on the other side are not arguing about the resources necessary for defense. They have picked the same number. But what they have done on the other side is funded that--not straightforwardly, not recognizing that we have to deal with this--instead by using this gimmick.

If it remains in the bill, I believe this approach will be a magnet for nondefense spending in future years. Not only will we become addicted to OCO spending, many interesting things will find their way into the OCO account.

For example, in fiscal year 1992 Congress added funds to the Defense bill for breast cancer research. At the time, spending was subject to statutory caps under the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. This is the follow-on to the Graham-Rudman-Hollings act of 1985. What we had done was to establish caps on discretionary domestic spending, but there were no similar caps on the other side. That is precisely what the effect of this proposal is today.

The initial funding led to the establishment of the Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs or CDMRP. Every Senator is familiar with this important program. I would suspect every Senator has stood and said: Yes, that research on breast cancer is so important; that research on other diseases is so critical and so important. It has strong bipartisan support.

Each fiscal year Congress authorizes and appropriates hundreds of millions of dollars to the CDMRP for cutting-edge and critically essential medical research areas. In fact, since 1992, CDMRP funding has received over $13 billion. While this program is funded through the Defense bill, and the program is managed by the Army, the Department of Defense does not execute any of the money itself. It is a competitive grant process, and proposals are subjected to stringent peer and programmatic review criteria. DOD acts as a passthrough because, back then, the only way you could get this done was because there were no caps effectively on defense spending. I would suggest that is going to repeat itself over and over if we start on this path.

That is why we can look today and say we have these pressing crises all across the globe, and it is true. But if we go down this path, we will see these types of developments. Again, I am a strong supporter of medical research. These programs have saved countless lives. I will support the funding in this bill. I think it is a way that we have established to deal with these programs. But we should recognize that it came about not because it was the most logical place to put medical research funding, but it was a budgetary precedent, just like this approach today, and it will be replicated.

Looking forward 10 years, I would suggest that you will see lots of meritorious programs that bear less and less connectivity to our overseas operations included in OCO, if that is the way we choose to get around the BCA. And that is what this bill is doing.

There is another point I would like to add. Moving this funding from the base budget to OCO has no impact on reducing the deficit. OCO and emergency funding are outside budget caps for a reason. They are for the costs of ongoing military operations or responding to other unforeseen events such as natural disasters. To suddenly ignore the true purpose of OCO and to treat it as a budgetary gimmick or slush fund to skirt the BCA is an unacceptable use for this important tool for our warfighters.

Just to highlight how this OCO approach skews defense spending, consider the amount of OCO in relation to the number of deployed troops. You can ask someone on the street: Are these overseas funds used to support our forces overseas? There has to be some relationship between the number of our forces overseas and our OCO spending. Well, let's see. In 2008, at the height of our Nation's troop commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, there were 187,000 troops deployed. We spent approximately $1 million in OCO funding for every servicemember deployed to those countries. Under this bill, we would expend approximately $9 million in OCO for every servicemember who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, roughly 9,930 military personnel. We are doing a lot more than spending for OCO in this bill--deliberately a lot more. We are doing what we used to do and what we should do in the base budget of the Department of Defense.

It circumvents the law, the BCA. It is not fiscally responsible, and it is not an honest accounting to the American public. If years ago, with 187,000 troops, our OCO costs were about $1 million per troop and now we are at $9 million, something is askew.

Adding the funds to OCO does not solve--and in some cases complicates--the DOD's budgetary problems.

As Army Chief of Staff General Odierno said:

OCO has limits and it has restrictions and it has very strict rules that have to be followed. And so if we're inhibited by that, it might not help us. What might happen at the end of the year, we have a bunch of money we hand back because we are not able to spend it.

The defense budget needs to be based on a long-term military strategy, which requires the DOD to focus on at least 5 years in the future. A 1-year plus-up to OCO does not provide DOD with the certainty and stability it needs when building a 5-year budget. As General Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified, ``we need to fix the base budget ..... we won't have the certainty we need,'' if there is a year-by-year OCO fix.

Defense Secretary Carter added that raising OCO does not allow the Department of Defense to plan ``efficiently or strategically.''

Adding funds to OCO is a managerially unsound approach to what should be a multiyear budget process. As the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Allyn said:

The current restrictions on the employment of OCO will not allow it to be a gap-filler that is currently being proffered to offset the reduction in our base budget that is driven by the current proposals that are before Congress. In order to meet the needs of our Army, it must have greater flexibility ..... it must be less restrictive and must enable us to sustain and modernize as we go forward.

This instability undermines the morale of our troops and their families, who want to know their futures are planned for more than 1 year at a time, and the confidence of the defense industry partners that we want to rely on to provide the best technologies available to our troops.

Abuse of OCO in this massive way risks undermining support for a critical mechanism used to fund the incremental increased costs of overseas conflicts. We have to have a disciplined system for estimating the cost and funding the employment of a trained and ready force.

The administration has indicated that legislation implementing the majority's budget framework will be subject to veto. As Secretary Carter has said, this approach is ``clearly a road to nowhere. I say this because President Obama has already made clear that he won't accept a budget that locks in sequestration going forward, as this approach does, and he won't accept a budget that severs the vital link between our national security and our economic security.''

When we talk about national security, true national security requires that non-DOD departments and agencies also receive relief from BCA caps. The Pentagon simply cannot meet the complex set of national security challenges without the help of other government departments and agencies, including State, Justice and Homeland Security. In the Armed Services Committee, we have heard testimony on the essential role of other government agencies in ensuring that our national defense remains strong. The Defense Department's share of the burden would surely grow if these agencies are not adequately funded as well.

There is a symbiotic relationship between the Department of Defense and other civilian departments and agencies that contribute to our national security. It has to be recognized that a truly whole-of-government approach requires more than just a strong DOD.

The BCA caps are based on a misnomer--that discretionary spending is divided into security and nonsecurity spending. But Members need to be clear: Essential national security functions are performed by government agencies and departments other than the Defense Department.

According to the Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, General Kelly:

We do not and cannot do this mission alone. Our strong partnerships with the U.S. interagency--especially with the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Departments of Treasury and State--are integral to our efforts to ensure the forward defense of the U.S. homeland.

Retired Marine Corps General Mattis said: ``If you don't fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.'' General Mattis' point is perhaps best illustrated in the administration's nine lines of effort to counter the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL, which 83 percent of Americans think is the No. 1 threat to the United States. Of the administration's nine lines of effort, only two--which are security and intelligence--fall squarely within the responsibilities of the Department of Defense and intelligence community. The remaining seven elements of our counter-ISIL strategy rely heavily on civilian departments and agencies.

For example, No. 1 is supporting effective governance in Iraq. No amount of military assistance to the Government of Iraq will be effective in countering the ISIL threat in Iraq if the Abadi government does not govern in a more transparent and inclusive manner that gives Sunnis hope that they will participate politically in Iraq's future. We need our diplomatic and political experts in the State Department to engage with Shia, Sunni, Kurd, and minority communities in Iraq to promote and build reconciliation in Iraq and build the political unity among the Iraqi people needed to defeat ISIL. That is not strictly a Defense Department issue.

No. 2, we have to build partner capacity. The coalition is building the capabilities and capacity of our foreign partners in the region to wage a long-term campaign against ISIL. While the efforts to build the capacity of the Iraqi security forces and some other foreign partners are funded by the Defense Department, the State Department and USAID are also responsible for billions of dollars in similar activities and across a broader spectrum of activities. Under the Republican plan, none of the State and USAID programs will be plussed-up. Their unwillingness to address this gap is a threat to our Nation's efforts to combat ISIL.

No. 3, we have to disrupt ISIL's finances. ISIL's expansion has given it access to significant and diverse sources of funding. Countering ISIL's financing will require the State Department and the Treasury Department to work with their foreign partners and the banking sector to ensure that our counter-ISIL sanctions regime is implemented and enforced. These State Department and Treasury Department efforts are deemed to be nonsecurity activities under the BCA caps and, under the Republican approach, our efforts to disrupt the finances of ISIL may be hampered. It is also notable that the Office of Foreign Assets Control and the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence in the Treasury Department are also characterized as nonsecurity activities under the BCA caps.

The Republican funding strategy not only means that our counter-ISIL efforts will be hampered, so too will our efforts to impose effective sanctions against Iran, Sudan, and individuals who support their illicit activities also be affected.

We have to continually expose the true and brutal nature of ISIL. Our strategic communication plan against ISIL requires a truly whole government effort, including the State Department, Voice of America, and USAID. The Republican approach to funding our strategic communication strategy is a part-of-government plan, not a whole-of-government plan.

We have to disrupt the flow of foreign fighters. They are the lifeblood of ISIL. Yet key components of the Department of Homeland Security would be facing cuts under the Republican budget proposal, undermining efforts to disrupt the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq. Without the efforts of our diplomats prodding our foreign partners to pass laws or more effectively enforce the laws on their books, the efforts of the coalition to stem the flow of foreign fighters will never be successful.

My colleague Senator McCain pointed out the huge refugee crisis. Again, our first agency typically to respond to refugees is USAID--the United States Agency for International Development--and other State Department agencies. We will not be able to effectively deal with that issue if those budget caps are imposed on USAID and other agencies. Those refugee camps are one of the breeding grounds for the foreign fighters who flow back into the conflict zone.

Unless we adopt a much broader approach, unless we do something other than simply plus-up defense, we will not achieve true national security. Of course we have to protect the homeland. While a small portion of the Department of Homeland Security is considered security related, under the BCA, the vast majority of the Department falls under the nonsecurity BCA cap. This further demonstrates that the Republican plan is a misnomer. It is an effort to play a game of smoke and mirrors with the American public. The agents at the Department of Homeland Security who are on guard, the DEA agents who pick up intelligence about threats to the Nation--all of them vitally contribute to our national security, but they will be treated distinctly different than our military if we adopt the approach that is included in this Defense authorization bill.

I talked about the refugee crisis. Virtually none of the activities that support our humanitarian efforts in the region are considered security activities. Military commanders routinely tell us that the efforts of State, USAID, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance are critical to our broader security efforts. This is particularly true from a counter-ISIL campaign.

Again, those refugees who are flooding into the countries adjacent to Syria and to Iraq have to be dealt with not only on humanitarian grounds but also as potential sources of foreign fighters. That is going to require a whole-of-government approach, not simply using OCO to beef up our defense spending. Taken together, the Republican plan could compromise our broader campaign against ISIL and deprive significant elements of our government of the resources needed to do the job to protect the American people.

The men and women of our military volunteer to protect this Nation and are overseas fighting for our ideals, including good education, economic opportunity, and safe communities. Efforts to support all of those goals will be hampered unless civilian departments and agencies also receive relief from the BCA caps.

I had the privilege of commanding a paratrooper company at Fort Bragg, NC. We fought for many reasons, including to give people a chance in this country--not just to protect them from a foreign threat but to give them real opportunities here.

By the way, our servicemembers and their families rely on many of the services provided by non-DOD departments and agencies. For example, the Department of Education administers Impact Aid to local school districts, where children of servicemembers go to learn. The Department of Agriculture supports the School Lunch Program, from which troops and their children and their families benefit. The National Institutes of Health supports lifesaving medical research, including by contributing to advanced efforts on traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress, and suicide prevention. The Department of Health and Human Services runs Medicare, which provides health care for retirees and disabled individuals, and Medicaid, which provides services to parents, including military parents with children with special needs.

Failing to provide BCA cap relief to non-DOD departments and agencies would also shortchange veterans who receive employment services, transition assistance, and housing and homelessness support.

Not only does this approach fail to support, potentially, our servicemen through schooling and through other aspects, our national security is also inherently tied to our economic security. Secretary Carter made this very clear. He said the approach that is being proposed disregards ``the enduring, long-term connection between our nation's security and many other factors. Factors like scientific R&D to keep our technological edge, education of a future all-volunteer military force, and the general economic strength of our country.''

Where will we get the soldiers of the future who have the skills and the training and the expertise if we are underinvesting in the basic education for all of our citizens?

My amendment would keep the pressure on for a permanent solution to the BCA caps and sequestration by requiring that the BCA caps be eliminated or increased in proportionally equal amounts for both security and nonsecurity spending before the additional OCO funds are available for obligation or expenditure.

Let me again emphasize that we are not taking away these funds. We simply say what I think makes a great deal of sense: Until we develop an approach to BCA that allows us to provide for a comprehensive defense of the Nation and to invest in the economic health of the Nation, then these funds will be reserved. Once we do that, then automatically all of the funding that is included in this bill will become available to the Department of Defense.

We have heard colleagues on both sides of the aisle talk for years now about the need to resolve the BCA, to end sequestration. Every uniformed servicemember who came forward, every chief of service said their No. 1 priority was to end sequestration, end the BCA. This bill does not do it; it sidesteps the issue. We can no longer sidestep the issue. We have to engage on this issue. I think we have to move promptly and thoroughly and thoughtfully forward to resolve the BCA.

The legislation I have proposed recognizes the need for these resources but also recognizes the overarching issue: Unless we are able to effectively modify or eliminate the BCA, our comprehensive national security will be threatened, our economic progress will be threatened, and our aspirations for the country could be thwarted.

My amendment seeks to implement, by the way, a sense-of-the Senate that is already in the bill, and it clearly states that sequestration relief should include equal defense and nondefense relief. We have made--and I commend the chairman for this--a statement--without an effective means of implementation. It is a statement, an aspirational goal, that we should fix BCA and relieve defense and nondefense spending. I think that is an important statement, but my amendment makes sure we go further and provide an action to do this.

I believe very strongly in this amendment. I believe it is relevant to the consideration of this bill. I believe it goes to the heart of the most important questions we face in the country today: How do we provide for the comprehensive defense of the Nation? How do we invest in our people so that we will continue to be strong? I think if we do not provide this type of mechanism to start this discussion on the BCA and hopefully promptly complete it, then we will be missing not only a historic opportunity, we will be locking ourselves into a road that will leave us less secure in the future, less productive, and less strong as a nation.

Let me remind people that the stated purpose of the bill is ``to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 for military activities of the Department of Defense.'' We have to begin this appropriations process by recognizing that the BCA will not help us going forward, and we must move to modify or repeal it.

With that, I will close simply by saying again that if we continue these caps going forward, it will harm our military readiness. Our national defense should be based upon long-term needs. They should be reflected in a transparent, forthright budget that puts the money in the base, provides contingency funds for true contingencies overseas but does not turn things upside down and make our contingency funding really the heart of the bill in so many respects.

We have to work together. We have to make sure every Federal agency can benefit because every Federal agency contributes to the country. So I strongly urge my colleagues to vote for this amendment, to begin this dialogue, and to move forward, the sooner the better.

I yield the floor.

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