National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016

Floor Speech

Date: June 3, 2015
Location: Washington, DC

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Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the fiscal year 2016 national defense authorization bill, which was recently reported out of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

I want to begin by commending the chairman, Senator McCain, for his extraordinary leadership. I also want to reflect--because both the Presiding Officer, the Senator from Alaska, and I had the privilege of being with Senator McCain in Vietnam last week--that to recognize firsthand the heroic service of CDR John McCain is to recognize an extraordinary individual whose service, whose sacrifice, whose valor, whose fidelity to the principles of our military and to our Nation are virtually unique. But more important than that, it is to recognize that after observing the horrors and brutality of war, as few people have, he was able to summon the courage and the capacity to bring two countries together. Without Senator McCain's active participation--not alone but absolutely essential and perhaps the most essential part--the Government of the United States and the Government of Vietnam would not have diplomatic relations today. We would not have been at a university in Vietnam listening to young people talking about their future--a future that is not clouded by war but has the opportunity for peace and prosperity, working with us and working with the world community.

I can't think of any historical examples of individuals working so hard to defeat each other, then so hard to embrace each other, save, of course, General Grant and General Lee. But I know the Senator would be offended by being compared to two West Point graduates, so I will simply say that he has made historic contributions to this country in so many ways. It is no surprise that he has taken the leadership of this committee and made a remarkable contribution. His vision to engage us in a strategic dialogue with some of the most sophisticated and experienced individuals in the country--Henry Kissinger, Madeleine Albright, and a host of others--gave us the perspective to begin to look at the issues we face in a much more comprehensive and a much more thoughtful way. I have had the privilege of serving on the committee for many years. No one has done that. No one has set the stage so well. And then to bring our DOD witnesses together in that context of both the strategic vision and the operational budgetary requirements was absolutely incredible. All of this has made us better prepared on the committee to write this bill which is before us today.

(Mr. SASSE assumed the Chair.)

Let me also take a moment to thank the professional staff on both sides of the aisle. Their willingness to work together to tackle the hard issues has been the key to this authorization bill. I thank them in advance because their work has just begun. The hours they will spend over the next several days to go through the significant number of amendments--all of that will be unnoticed by many but appreciated certainly by me, the chairman, and all of us on the committee. Thank you.

As the Senator from Arizona pointed out, this is basically a good bill. It has many provisions that were requested by the Department of Defense. It has many necessary reforms. The chairman has highlighted many of them. I think it will further our national security in many dimensions, and most importantly it will provide the training, equipment, and support our men and women in uniform deserve. I will try to focus on some of these important developments.

However, there are some provisions in this bill that cause me concern--indeed, grave concern. One problem, I fear, is the familiar, oft-debated, and very complicated challenge of Guantanamo. While we have had some very carefully crafted compromise language in the bill, there are other provisions that reverse progress, particularly on the overseas transfer of detainees.

We have a number of individuals who have been vetted for overseas transfer--not to the United States--that is not appropriate at this moment--but overseas. I think we have to continue that effort to repatriate these individuals outside of the United States, in areas in which their security and their activities can be appropriately monitored. I will spend a few more minutes--and in a few minutes, I will discuss an amendment that I may propose with respect.

Despite all of these good provisions, however, I was ultimately unable to vote for the bill. After working closely and sincerely, with the leadership of the chairman, I am reluctantly unable to vote for the bill because at the heart, the funding mechanism to provide a significant portion of the resources--$39 billion--is, I think, an unsustainable aspect of the legislation.

As the Senator pointed out, the legislation before us does not end the Budget Control Act's arbitrary caps on spending, and, as he also said, every major military official, every major senior defense official came and told us: We have to end the Budget Control Act caps and the prospect of sequestration. We have not done that.

What the bill does is adopt a device--some have said a gimmick--that uses the overseas spending account to fund base activities of the Department of Defense. As I have indicated and as the chairman has suggested, the one request consistently received--in fact, just a few days ago, the commander of the Pacific forces indicated the same thing--is to end sequestration. We have not been able to do that.

What the President's budget did is he sent up a request for $38 billion above the budget cap levels in the base--not overseas defense spending but in the base. He requested $50.9 billion for contingency operations, overseas operations. We have been funding overseas operations since 9/11. This funding was designed to do what it suggests in the title. We have forces deployed overseas in combat, in contact with our enemies--Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere--and this funding was to provide for those forces and indirectly for our supporting mechanisms, but the key was to support these forces overseas.

Now what we have done--and it was done because we were unable to eliminate the budget caps under the Budget Control Act--is we have taken this OCO account and we have grossed it up dramatically.

This approach has several problems. First, it doesn't solve--in fact, in some cases it complicates the DOD's budget problems. OCO, as I said, was created and should be used for war costs only. OCO has limits and restrictions. There are very strict rules that have to be followed. It is not flexible funds that can be moved around at will.

Defense budgeting needs to be based on a long-term military strategy, which requires the DOD to focus at least 5 years ahead. OCO money is 1-year money. It is just this year. There is no commitment statutorily that it will be available. There is no presumption, because it is in the base, that it will be the starting point of discussions for the next budget. Frankly and obviously, we cannot fight a multigenerational war with 1-year money. And we are in a multigenerational conflict. It has been more than a decade since we started our efforts in the wake of 9/11,

and we have challenges that will not resolve themselves in a year. To adopt a major part of our budget, roughly $39 billion, as one-time--supposedly--funds is not a wise, sensible, and appropriate way to fund our security going forward.

Another aspect is it doesn't reduce the deficit; it adds to the deficit. This is all deficit funding, so this is not a way to avoid tough decisions about how we are going to deal with our deficit.

It also does not reach other vital aspects of national security that are housed in domestic agencies which are also critical for our national defense--the FBI, Homeland Security, the Coast Guard. All of these agencies contribute dramatically to our national defense. In fact, particularly with the threat of ``lone wolves''--and that is increasingly more of a concern to all of us--these agencies play an even more significant role in our overall national security. When you are talking about a national security strategy, it is not just the Department of Defense; it is the Department of State and it is engagement overseas.

Again, as we were in Vietnam, we were talking to the Defense Minister, and one of his key priorities is a project to eliminate toxins in Bien Hoa airfield, an airfield we used extensively in Vietnam. To him, that would be a hugely significant indication of our support for their efforts. That is not funded through the Department of Defense; that would be principally funded through the AID. And you could go on and on.

The approach we offer in the bill does not go to the heart of the problem that faces the Department of Defense and every other Federal agency, and that is the BCA caps and the steep cuts that will come into effect if sequestration is invoked. That is the heart of the matter. I offered an amendment in committee to address this problem, and unfortunately it failed. That was one of the reasons I reluctantly--very reluctantly--chose not to support the bill, because there are so many, as the chairman indicated and as I will indicate, important provisions in this bill.

What I tried to do was to say: Let's leave this money on the books, but let's fence it off until we can fix the real problem, which is the Budget Control Act and sequestration, which affects defense and nondefense alike.

In the context of this floor debate, I hope to be able to once again rejoin that issue and ask my colleagues to recognize the heart of the matter--not the consequences affecting defense but the heart of the matter, which is the Budget Control Act.

As I said, this is a bill with many laudatory provisions reflecting in large part bipartisan cooperation. Some of them have been discussed by the chairman, but I would also like to mention them.

The bill provides key funding and authorities for the two major U.S.-led coalition operations: the mission in Afghanistan and the counter-ISIS coalition in Iraq and Syria. Critical to both of these operations are our efforts to build the capacities of our partner nations.

With regard to Afghanistan, the bill includes the full $3.8 billion requested by the President to support the Afghan army, police, and other security forces fighting to secure the hard-fought gains of the past decade and to ensure that Afghanistan does not once again become a safe haven for Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups seeking to attack America.

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The bill would also increase the total number of visas for the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program by 3,000, providing a path to safety for Afghans who have put themselves at risk by serving as translators or otherwise helping our coalition efforts.

For coalition efforts against ISIS, the bill provides additional funding for training and equipping the Iraqi security forces and other associated forces in Iraq, including the Kurdish Peshmerga and Sunni tribes, who are confronting the threat of ISIS in heavily contested Anbar Province and in other parts of Iraq. It includes $80 million for the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq. It also provides an additional $600 million for the Syria Train and Equip Fund, to build the capabilities of a vetted, moderate opposition to fight ISIS in Syria. Additionally, $125 million is authorized to reimburse Lebanon and Jordan for operations that help secure their borders against ISIS.

The bill includes funding for an initiative to expand the U.S. military presence and exercises in Eastern Europe, reassuring allies and countering the threat of hybrid warfare tactics like those used by Russia in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The bill also authorizes additional military assistance for Ukraine--including lethal assistance--to build the capabilities of Ukrainian security forces to defend against further aggression and ceasefire violations by Russian-backed separatist forces.

With respect to counternarcotics, which is another national security threat, the bill expands an existing authority to permit counternarcotics assistance to the Governments of Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia. This expansion would allow for additional nonlethal assistance to those nations as they combat illicit trafficking in the region. In Latin America, the bill would provide assistance to support the unified counterdrug and counterterrorism campaign of the Government of Colombia. This assistance remains a key element of our bilateral security operation in Colombia and enables the commander of SOUTHCOM to provide critical enabling support upon request.

The bill also provides an additional $50 million to address unfunded priorities identified by SOUTHCOM, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as maritime interdiction support operations in Central America.

As the chairman indicated, the bill adds over $400 million in additional readiness funding for the military services across all branches, Active, Guard, and Reserve.

These increases will provide resources for crucial programs aimed at improving our military readiness in many areas, including depot readiness, flying operations, cyber training, reducing insider threat attacks, behavioral health counseling, and other important programs.

With respect to our nuclear deterrence, the committee bill fully authorizes the program for modernizing our triad of sea, ground, and airborne platforms. The last B-52 was produced in the 1960s, and by the time the Long-Range Strike Bomber, its replacement, begins to be fielded in the mid-2020s, the B-52 will be flown in some cases by the grandchildren of its first pilots.

Turning to the undersea deterrent, the current Ohio-class submarine, which will ultimately carry upward of two-thirds of our strategic arsenal, is to be replaced by the Ohio replacement submarine. If we are to maintain a sea-based deterrent, the current Ohio fleet of 14 subs must be replaced starting in 2027 due to the potential for hull fatigue. By then, the first Ohio sub will be 46 years old--the oldest submarine to have sailed in our Navy in its history.

Now, the third aspect of our triad--those of our land-based ICBMs--will not need to be replaced until the 2030 timeframe. We have authorized a concept development for replacement of this most responsive leg of the triad which acts as a counterbalance to Russian ICBMs.

As Secretary Carter noted in his confirmation hearing, our nuclear deterrence forms the bedrock of our defense policy. This is an essential mission which must not be neglected.

In the area of technology and innovation, I am pleased this bill takes a number of steps to ensure that DOD has access to the most innovative minds in the private sector and to strengthen DOD's in-house laboratories. It significantly increases funding for university research programs as well as authorizing $400 million to support Secretary Carter's efforts to identify and fund new technologies that will help offset the advancing military capabilities of peer nations, invest in technologies such as lasers, unmanned systems, and undersea warfare.

The bill also supports the DOD's laboratory enterprise by improving their ability to attract and hire the world's best and brightest scientists and engineers. These labs help DOD act as smart buyers and builders of the most advanced weapon systems on the planet and are often underappreciated for their endeavors.

It also improves their ability to build world-class modern research infrastructure, encourages them to hire selected students from friendly foreign nations, and strengthens their ability to partner with industry, allowing small businesses to have access to the great intellectual property coming from DOD labs, as well as access to their research and technical equipment. I believe these policy changes and funding increases will continue to strengthen the technological dominance of our military forces while reducing the costs to build and maintain weapon systems in the future.

There are also specific recommendations on hardware programs that will help the Department to improve management and cope with shortfalls, such as providing an additional 12 F-18 Super Hornets for the Navy and an additional 6 F-35B aircraft for the Marine Corps. These aircraft will help deal with the Department of Navy shortfall in strike fighter aircraft.

It adds $800 million in Virginia-class advance procurement to provide flexibility to begin building Virginia-class boats with the enhanced payload module as soon as that version is ready for production and to help mitigate pressure on shipbuilding funds coming from the Ohio-class replacement program.

It accelerates several other ship programs, including amphibious assault ships, the dock landing ship replacement, the next afloat forward staging base, the new salvage ship/fleet tug replacement, and the landing craft utility replacement.

As the chairman indicated, this bill also includes critical authorities for our men and women in uniform. They are the heart and soul of our military. All the equipment in the world, as sophisticated as it is, will not make the difference that the young men and women who wear the uniform of the United States make each and every day. So this bill includes a 1.3-percent pay raise for most servicemembers, the reauthorization of over 30 types of bonuses and special pays to encourage enlistment and reenlistment in the military, and funds to provide health care to the force, retirees, and their families.

Notably, this bill includes important benefit and compensation reforms either requested by the Department or recommended by the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission that helps to ensure the long-term viability of the all-volunteer force.

For example, the bill includes a new retirement system for servicemembers joining after January 1, 2018, as recommended by the Commission, which grandfathers in the current force. For most servicemembers, this new system will provide a greater benefit at less cost to the government and will address perhaps the grossest inequity of the current system, as highlighted by the chairman--the fact that 83 percent of all servicemembers leave military service with no retirement benefits at all. This is especially challenging, difficult, and in some cases even galling for those who have deployed multiple times and leave the service simply because they cannot endure the strain any longer. We essentially ask them to choose between retirement benefits or their mental health or the unity of their family. Under the new system contained in our bill, anyone who completes 2 years of service will be eligible to walk away with something.

Notably, the bill does not include the overall TRICARE system recommended by the Commission. We have heard from the President with respect to TRICARE and agree these recommendations require more study. These reforms are vital. In a budget-constrained environment, with hard spending caps, it is critical we strike the right balance between a military compensation package that provides a high quality of life for military families and training and modernization funding that provides a high quality of service and a ready force.

As senior Department officials have testified, if we don't have enough money to provide our troops the latest technology and the training they need, we are doing them a disservice. When we send them into harm's way under these conditions, that disservice quickly translates into a breach of trust.

The Department has assumed approximately $1.7 billion in savings in its 2016 budget relating to these benefit proposals and $25.4 billion over the entire FYDP. The committee supported these proposals and has redirected that funding to readiness and modernization accounts to restore those deficits. Difficult choices need to be made and this bill makes them. We might not yet have it perfectly right, but as we move through the legislative year, we will continue to work to ensure that we pay our servicemembers a fair wage while delivering the training and equipment necessary to succeed.

This bill begins a process, long overdue, for reviewing different options, for example, for providing the commissary benefit to our servicemembers--another important aspect of quality of life. Included in one of these options is at least the consideration of privatization. I understand some Members may have some difficulty supporting these provisions, but the bill simply requires a number of studies to generate and evaluate new ideas, and a pilot program to test them, without requiring the actual privatization of the system. This is an experiment which I think is worth conducting, and I believe the chairman's leadership on this point was extraordinarily valuable.

The bill also addresses the Department's management of its civilian workforce in two ways--one of which I agree with and one of which I will raise some questions. We have long heard from the Department that it lacks certain authorities to effectively manage its civilian workforce. This bill includes new authorities which will enable civilian managers to more effectively retain their best performing employees while divesting their poorest. These reforms, while painful for some, are sensible and necessary.

However, this bill also mandates a management headquarters reduction of 7.5 percent in 2016 and 30 percent over 4 years. I am concerned that such deep, and at this point generalized, cuts to the civilian workforce may create more problems than it will solve. I am hoping we can take a more careful approach to headquarters reform and look forward to working with my colleagues on this issue as we move through the floor and through the conference to final passage.

Again, as the chairman highlighted, this bill also contains roughly 50 provisions on acquisition reform, and I commend the chairman for his efforts. The provisions will help streamline acquisition processes, allow DOD to access commercial and small businesses, and improve the acquisition workforce. They build on the successes of the reforms led by Chairman McCain and Chairman Levin in the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009.

I did have concerns about one provision in this area, and I thank the chairman for working with me to address it. I am sure we will be continuing this discussion of acquisition reform throughout the year and in the future. I expect the Department of Defense will have concerns over some of the provisions as well, so I look forward to working with the chairman and soliciting the best advice from acquisition experts in the government and industry so we can continue to improve our stewardship of taxpayer dollars and deliver the best technologies to our fighting forces.

Now, let me turn to an area of concern which the chairman has highlighted and on which I may be offering an amendment; that is, Guantanamo. Over the past few years, the Senate Committee on Armed Services has led the way on Guantanamo-related issues, giving careful consideration to our detention policies and finding bipartisan solutions.

In certain ways, this bill continues that tradition of bipartisan progress on Guantanamo issues. For example, it includes the authority, carried in our bill over the last 2 years, for the Secretary of Defense to approve the temporary transfer of Guantanamo detainees to a military medical facility in the continental United States to provide medical treatment in a life-threatening emergency, when that treatment cannot be provided on-island without unreasonable or excessive cost. The detainee would be required to return to Guantanamo at the conclusion of the medical treatment.

Most importantly, the bill contains a provision that would clear a path for closing Guantanamo, including the option of bringing detainees to the United States for detention, civil trial, and incarceration. Under this approach, the current prohibitions on Guantanamo transfers to the United States would remain in place until the President submits to Congress a detailed plan on the disposition of these detainees and Congress votes, under expedited procedures, to approve that plan. If Congress approves the plan, the bans on transfers to the United States would be lifted and the President would have the authority to implement this plan for closing Guantanamo.

I particularly want to thank Chairman McCain and Senator Manchin, who worked closely to craft this compromise, which was approved by a significant vote in the committee--19 to 7. This is an example of bipartisan work at its best.

At the same time, on other Guantanamo policies, I must note they take us backward. This is particularly the case with regard to overseas transfers of Guantanamo detainees--not transfers into the United States but to third countries. In the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Act, the committee's bipartisan efforts resulted in real progress on overseas transfers, granting the Secretary of Defense more flexible and streamlined authorities for overseas transfers of detainees, consistent with our national security interests and with measures to substantially mitigate the risk of Guantanamo detainees reengaging in terrorist activities.

Unfortunately, the bill before us today would undo that progress and reimpose restrictions which date back to 2013 that include a burdensome checklist of certifications that the Secretary of Defense would be required to fulfill for any overseas transfers and a prohibition on transfers to any country where there was a prior case of detainee recidivism.

These provisions make it nearly impossible to transfer Guantanamo detainees overseas to a third-party country. In fact, during the 3 years these certifications were previously in place, no detainees were transferred under these certification restrictions. During this period, a total of 11 detainees were transferred out of Guantanamo overseas, 6 under an existing national security waiver and 5 under an exception for court-ordered transfers. This is a fraction of the over 30 detainees who have been transferred under the more recent 2014 transfer authority.

These backward-looking restrictions on overseas transfers create an unnecessary roadblock for disposing of the 57 detainees currently at Guantanamo who have been approved for overseas transfer, most of whom were approved nearly 5 years ago.

My hope is that we can work with our colleagues across the aisle to craft a compromise that brings us more in line with present law.

Finally, I wish to discuss more in-depth the reason I was unable to support the committee's bill and why I think we need to have a very serious debate on the underlying financing of this legislation.

Our national defense decisions should be based on actual needs, not on spending caps and ways around the spending caps that don't change the BCA but simply use a device--some have labeled a gimmick--to get us money, not to fix the fundamental problem but to get us money.

The President's fiscal year budget 2016 requested $38 billion above the Budget Control Act spending caps. Senator McCain and I wrote a letter to the Budget Committee that also asked to go above those budget caps because we understand the best approach is to put within the base funding of the Department of Defense those functions which are essential, not just to the year-to-year operations but to the long-term operations of the Department of Defense and to our long-term national security. The President requested this $38 billion be authorized as part of the base budget.

The request from the President also contained--as Presidential requests have contained since 2001-2002--OCO funding; OCO funding being for those unique, we hope, one-of or at least yearly expenditures that we have to make with respect to current operations overseas. That is why this is called the Overseas Contingency Operations. For some time now, the President and all of our Secretaries--Secretary Carter, Secretary Hagel, Secretary Gates, Secretary Panetta, and Secretary Hagel--have implored Congress to end the damaging effects of the Budget Control Act's sequester and spending caps. However, this bill, following the budget resolution, does not clearly address the BCA issue. Instead, it turns to this OCO fund. This mark transfers $39 billion from the base budget to the Overseas Contingency Operations budget, leaving the base at, surprisingly, the BCA level, and it raises several concerns. I mentioned these concerns, but let me mention them again.

First, adding funds to OCO does not solve, and actually complicates, the DOD's budgetary problems. Defense budgeting needs to be based on our long-term military strategy, which requires DOD to plan at least 5 years ahead. When you are doing technology innovation, when you are investing in programs that are not going to come off the shelf in 6 months, you can't rely on 1-year money. It doesn't provide DOD the certainty and stability it needs. It has to have money in the base.

This instability can undercut the morale of our troops and their families. If vital programs are subject to year-to-year appropriations, if they are not considered to be the norm, if they are not where we begin but are sort of put in at the end, that affects the morale and confidence of our military.

It also affects our defense industry partners. If their funding is in the category of Overseas Contingency Operations, that is less certain to them than money that is in the base and will likely remain in the base for 5 years or beyond that they need.

Then, the second aspect of this is that our national security is more than just the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense is critical. Ask Americans: Where does our national defense come from? Well, it is those men and women in uniform. That is absolutely true. But we need domestic agencies. We can't defend the homeland without the FBI, which is funded through the Department of Justice, which will not have access--direct access--in the way we are proposing, to OCO or the Transportation Security Administration that screens individuals coming in or Customs that additionally screens people or the Coast Guard. All of these are in the Department of Homeland Security.

Furthermore, without adequate support for the State Department, then we can't present the kind of comprehensive approach overseas to national security issues that are essential to success. Gen. James Mattis, whom the chairman and I both know, said: ``If you don't fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.''

There is a symbiotic relationship between our diplomatic activities, our national defense activities, our law enforcement activities, and our Treasury activities, because if we are truly to interrupt these terrorist networks, we have to go after their financing. That is done through the Department of Treasury. This whole-of-government approach to national security has to be recognized, and it is not recognized if we allow the Budget Control Act to continue to be operational on the nondefense side but avoid it on the defense side because we have access to the overseas contingency fund.

Also, I think we are going to see going forward, as we have seen before--and we are saying this OCO funding is for 1 year. But I think we are doing a little bit of a wink-wink, don't worry; we are not going to pull $40 billion out of the Defense bill in the 2017 budget. We couldn't do that. What we are doing, though, is we are sort of inviting the ingenious use of OCO funding in the years ahead, and I think we will see increasingly more esoteric and exotic things in OCO funding because that is where the money is.

If you have a program that you need to get funded and it has a connection to Defense--and in some cases doesn't even need to be Defense. Senator McCain and I were chatting at the hearing about the significant amount of medical research run through the Department of Defense. One reason is because there was money available back in the 1980s for defense spending that wasn't available on the domestic side, and that funding found its way into Defense.

So I think there are several reasons we have to take a different approach. My approach in the committee was, I thought, straightforward. The President recognizes we need these resources for national defense. We recognize we need the resources for national defense, but I believe we should budget honestly and directly, and initially that was our approach in the Budget Committee. Let's put it in the base, and let's take the President's $50 billion--which is the best estimate by the Department of Defense of what we really need for overseas contingency--and let's do that.

So my proposal is certainly just to fence the additional OCO funds until we could, in fact, collectively, as a Congress--what we have to do and what so many people on both sides have argued--until we could repeal, reform, modify, extend the Budget Control Act, much as we did through the great efforts of Senator Murray and Congressman Paul Ryan, which gave us the head room to actually pass legislation--not just the Department of Defense but other agencies--that allowed us to continue the work of the government and allowed us to protect the Nation. My proposal in committee did not succeed, but I would renew that request.

I think we have made great progress in the legislation. I think the last step is to get us to a position where we have essentially recognized that the BCA caps and sequestration have to be eliminated.

I would conclude by commending the chairman for all he has done to get us here, but, second, to repeat what has been said to us by every military leader. What is their first request? It wasn't for more OCO money. Their first request was to eliminate the BCA caps, eliminate the threat of sequestration. I think we have to do this, and I think we can start this process now. In fact, I would say that if we don't start this process now, if we don't send a strong signal--and my proposal would send that strong signal--then I am afraid we will just be victims of the calendar. Before we get to the BCA, we will have tough choices to make about this bill that we don't have to.

So I urge consideration when the amendment comes up.

I yield back to the Chair.

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