Protecting Volunteer Firefighters and Emergency Responders Act

Floor Speech

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Mr. MERKLEY. Mr. President, I rise to address legislation before us, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, which sets up a deliberate process for congressional review of a final nuclear agreement with Iran. The United States, our citizens, our President, and probably every Member of the Senate and House stand united in our commitment to prevent Iran from securing a nuclear weapon.

Nuclear proliferation is a huge danger to human civilization on our planet. The more nations that possess nuclear weapons, the more opportunities there are for misunderstandings between nations to trigger first use of a nuclear weapon. The more nations that possess nuclear weapons, the more opportunities there are for failures in command and control to result in the unintended use of a weapon.

The more nations that possess nuclear weapons, the more opportunities there are for terrorist groups to gain acquisition of a weapon. Certainly, the possibility of Iran possessing a nuclear weapon poses special security concerns. The Middle East is being torn asunder by longstanding conflicts and challenges. If Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, then other nations like Saudi Arabia are likely to also seek to secure a nuclear weapon.

Moreover, in the fervent rivalry between Shia Islam and Sunni Islam, which brings powers into bloody and extensive conflict from Syria, to Yemen, to Iraq, there are abundant scenarios that could generate potential use of a nuclear weapon, either through misunderstandings or misguided perceptions of military advantage. None of us will ever forget that the Government of Iran has put forth a steady stream of invectives against our close ally Israel calling for her destruction.

Iran's possession of a nuclear weapon would pose a very real threat to the existence of the State of Israel. For all of these reasons, Americans are united. Our 100 Senators are united in believing it is imperative that Iran does not secure a nuclear weapon, but the question we must debate and resolve is, Which strategy is most effective to achieve this outcome? There are three basic options: a negotiated dismantlement of Iran's nuclear weapons program with an intrusive inspection and verification regime to ensure Iran is keeping its word; second, a reliance on indefinite extension of tough multinational economic sanctions in hopes that will continue to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program; third, a military option designed to destroy critical components of Iran's nuclear weapons infrastructure. Of these options, for reasons I will explain in due course, the first is the far superior option. To understand this set of possibilities, however, we have to understand the current situation. The United States has imposed sanctions against Iran since 1979.

Many of the sanctions Iran faced in that time from 2008 were unilateral. These sanctions, however, were largely ineffective. Iran's trade with the United States was diminished, but sanctions had little overall effect because Iran was able to continue trading through other nations.

President Obama, coming into office in 2009, saw this clearly. He recognized the importance of enforcing existing U.N. resolutions, passing stronger ones, and convincing our allies to go beyond those resolutions and truly tighten the web of restrictions on Iran's trade and finances. The result was coordinated with the P5+1--France, United Kingdom, Germany, United States, Russia, and China.

These multilateral sanctions have come about in several phases. In 2010, Congress enacted a series of sanctions targeting Iran's banking and oil sectors. In 2011, section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 was passed. In 2012, we passed the Iran Threat Reduction Act and Syria Human Rights Act.

In 2013, we passed the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act. Those sanctions--the American sanctions--and the multilateral sanctions have had an enormous impact on the economy of Iran.

Their crude oil exports fell from around 2.5 million barrels per day in 2011 to about 1.1 million barrels per day at the end of 2013. Trade between Europe and Iran plunged. It plunged from almost $32 billion in 2005 to about $9 billion today. Iran's economy has taken a huge hit. Iran's current President was elected on a platform of negotiating with the goal of alleviating the enormous economic impact created by the sanctions.

The sanctions have accomplished their intended goal. They have brought Iran to the negotiating table in search of an agreement based on a simple, straightforward formulation. Iran will forgo a nuclear weapons program if the international coalition will, in return, lift its devastatingly effective sanctions.

That is the background to the negotiations underway today between Iran and the P5+1. But when these negotiations got into full motion, they were not just about talking, they agreed on a set of conditions to free and, to some degree, reverse elements of Iran's domestic nuclear program, not waiting until the conclusion of the negotiations but as a condition of the negotiations.

This Joint Plan of Action or JPA that Iran and the P5+1 agreed to has a substantial number of elements. I will mention a few. First, Iran has to refrain from any further advances of its activities at three critical nuclear facilities: at the Fordow underground uranium enrichment facility, at the Natanz underground commercial scale uranium enrichment facility, and further activity at the Arak heavy water reactor that could--that reactor could, when completed, produce plutonium that could be utilized in a bomb.

Second, Iran, in this Joint Plan of Action, has agreed to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, with additional information about its nuclear programs, as well as access to sensitive nuclear-related facilities, to which Iran's IAEA safeguards agreement does not require access.

Third, and again as a condition of the negotiations, Iran agreed not to produce 20 percent enriched uranium. That is a form of uranium--uranium hexafluoride or enriched uranium--in Iran's stockpile that has caused the most concern. Fourth, Iran has agreed to fully eliminate its existing stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium by diluting half of that stockpile to uranium hexafluoride, containing no more than 5 percent of uranium 235, and converting the rest of the material to a uranium compound unsuitable for further enrichment.

These conditions, in effect as I speak on the floor of the Senate, have not only frozen Iran's nuclear program during the negotiations, they have also given the P5+1 coalition members enormously improved understanding of Iran's nuclear program. That understanding of Iran's program has increased the ability of the P5+1 to shape a framework for a final agreement designed to block all the possible pathways to a nuclear weapon.

There are four Iranian pathways to a bomb. One pathway is to utilize fissile material from the Fordow underground uranium enrichment facility. This is the secret uranium facility--formerly secret uranium facility--built deep underground beneath a base of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, massively reinforced with concrete and steel to enable it to withstand most bombing assaults.

The second pathway is to utilize fissile uranium made in the Natanz underground enrichment facility. The third pathway is to utilize, at some future point, plutonium processed from spent fuel at the Arak heavy water reactor. I say at some future point because this reactor is still under construction. The fourth pathway is to utilize covert operations to acquire or to make sufficient fissile material for a bomb.

On April 2, last month, Iran and the P5+1 coalition announced a framework for a joint comprehensive plan of action on Iran's nuclear program intended to address and block all four of these pathways to a bomb. Now, as reported by the State Department, I am going to review a few of those details of this framework. These are essentially the bones of the agreement that have to be fleshed out in the weeks to follow.

Let's talk first about the Fordow, this deep underground, massively reinforced, formerly secret uranium enrichment facility. Iran would repurpose Fordow for peaceful nuclear research. Iran would not retain any fissile material at this installation. They would not enrich uranium at this facility. Iran would remove approximately two-thirds of the centrifuges. The remaining centrifuges and related infrastructure would be placed under IAEA monitoring.

Let's turn to Natanz. Here are a few of the restrictions to the second pathway--second possible pathway for an Iranian nuclear weapon. Iran would remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them under IAEA monitoring for 10 years. Iran would engage in limited research and development with some of its advanced centrifuges according to a schedule and parameters agreed to by the P5+1.

Iran would use only its less-efficient first-generation centrifuges to enrich uranium at Natanz, a process that would be closely monitored. Beyond 10 years, Iran would abide by its enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA under the addition protocol, resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.

Let's turn to the third pathway. That is the possibility of plutonium secured from nuclear fuel used at this heavy water reactor. To block this pathway to a nuclear bomb, Iran would agree to ship all of its spent fuel out of the country and to not build a reprocessing facility for such nuclear fuel.

Iran would redesign and rebuild its heavy water reactor in Arak based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1.

The original core of that reactor, which would enable the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, would be destroyed or removed from the country, and Iran would not build any additional heavy water reactors.

Finally, the framework provides major design--provides high confidence that Iran is not employing covert operations to develop a bomb. This is the fourth pathway, the covert pathway.

Under the agreement, the IAEA would have regular access to all of Iran's nuclear facilities, including Natanz and Fordow. Inspectors would have access to the supply chains, starting with the uranium mines, the uranium milling. They would have continuous surveillance at the uranium mills. They would have continuous surveillance of Iran's centrifuges.

In addition, all of the centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz would be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.

Iran and the P5+1 would establish a dedicated procurement channel for Iran's nuclear program to monitor and approve the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual-use materials and technology.

Iran would be required to grant the IAEA access to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.

Iran would implement an agreed set of measures to address IAEA's concerns regarding the possible military dimensions of its program.

Many of the framework elements I have just described are to last 10 years. Some have a lifetime of 15, 20, or 25 years under this initial framework. So this framework, as many have pointed out, does not lock into place all of these elements for an eternity. But by building a deep cooperation, consultation, and coordination over a 10-year period, we create the best possible chance of forging a long-term enduring agreement that will preclude the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

The challenge now is to take this framework as articulated by the State Department and generate detailed agreement language. That will not be an easy task. Already, you can tell the complexities from just the elements I have mentioned on each of these four pathways.

Earlier, I noted that while Senators are united in believing we must prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb, there is disagreement over the best strategy. I have laid out the main elements of the negotiated strategy, but in addition to the negotiated verified dismantling of Iran's nuclear program, there are two other options that are widely discussed.

One option that has been articulated by Members of this Chamber and others would be simply to end negotiations and try to continue with an intensified, multilateral sanctions regime. It is important to note, however, that if you end negotiations, it means an end to the measures that are currently in place, measures in place today as I speak on this Senate floor. It would mean an end to the freeze on construction of the Arak reactor; an end to the negotiated elimination of stockpiles or the modification of the 20-percent enriched uranium; an end to the inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities and infrastructure, which has enabled us to learn so much about their activities.

Moreover, without any interim agreement on inspections, Iran could decide to vastly expand its nuclear program--an outcome that is in direct contradiction of the security interests of the United States and our allies.

Furthermore, there is no guarantee that if the United States ends negotiations, multilateral sanctions would survive. If our partners in the P5+1 believe the United States has deliberately undermined the success of the negotiations, the partners may very well be unwilling to maintain and enforce a strong, multilateral sanctions regime. And that is not just speculation. Representatives from Britain, France, and Germany have conveyed strong concerns that to undermine the negotiations to withdraw could fracture the international coalition that has made the sanctions effective.

Where are we, then? Without effective multilateral sanctions, Iran would have achieved its top negotiating objectives. Its economy would improve, and the pressure to make concessions on nuclear activities and international monitoring would evaporate.

In short, pursuing aggressive sanctions as an alternative to negotiations could have disastrous consequences, with our major objectives undermined, Iran's economy improved, and Iran's nuclear program unleashed--an outcome that would further degrade international security.

The third option discussed in this Chamber is to destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure through military force.

Advocates for the use of force point to Israel's 1981 attack on Saddam Hussein's Osirak reactor in Iraq and Israel's 2007 destruction of a Syrian reactor. Advocates for this military option paint a picture in which a small group of American bombers conduct limited strikes using bunker buster bombs. Thus, they argue, the United States could easily break key links in a nuclear fuel cycle and set Iran's program back by 3 to 5 years.

This simplistic analysis is way off the mark. Military experts paint a very different picture. I encourage all of my colleagues to read the analysis prepared by the Center For Strategic and International Studies entitled ``Analyzing the Impact of Preventive Strikes against Iran's Nuclear Facilities,'' revised September 10, 2012. This analysis recognizes that a competent campaign would involve many complicated offensive and defensive elements. Here are a few of them: an extensive strategy to diminish Iranian anti-aircraft radars, missiles, and batteries; an extensive strategy to destroy Iran's ballistic missiles and other weapons Iran could use in a retaliatory strike; an extensive strategy for the direct assault on Iran's nuclear facilities; extensive refueling and supply logistics; a rigorous strategy to prevent Iran from shutting down the Strait of Hormuz; extensive strategies to protect neighboring Gulf States and Israel from retaliatory fights; and a huge effort to defend against asymmetrical attacks on American assets throughout the world.

That is just a modest list of the complexities of the military option. I again encourage folks to read the analyses by serious military analysts. Hopefully you get the picture. There is nothing quick, nothing easy about a military option.

Moreover, retaliatory threats to the United States and our allies might come from sources other than Iran. Attacks by Shia groups or a nation sympathetic to Iran are a possibility.

One thing is clear: The course of war is messy and unpredictable. What we can be sure of is that in the chaos and complexity of war, there will be significant detrimental developments. We know this because it is true of virtually every war ever fought.

Our recent history provides more than enough evidence that, once unleashed, a military option that looks simple in the beginning can be very difficult to control and very costly.

Ask yourself this question: Which American leaders thought that our efforts to eliminate terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and destabilize that nation's government would lead to a 14-year occupation, thousands of deaths, a huge number of life-debilitating injuries, and the loss of vast national treasure exceeding $1 trillion?

Ask yourself this question: Which American leaders thought that attacking Iraq to eliminate phantom weapons of mass destruction would shatter that nation, strengthen Iran, and unleash ISIS?

In addition, the military option has a substantial risk of increasing rather than decreasing Iran's determination to acquire a nuclear weapon. Iranian leaders, after attack, might well decide it is their top national priority to acquire nuclear weapons no matter the cost so that neither the United States nor any other nation would dare to attack Iran in such a fashion again.

So if the United States chooses a military option, it is most likely committing to a cycle of war as Iran rebuilds a nuclear program in the future with more steel, more concrete, and more depth underground.

So let's return to the three options before us.

A negotiated and verifiable agreement for Iran to dismantle its nuclear program promises the possibility of achieving our core security objectives without a massive cost in terms of lives, injuries, and treasure. It addresses uranium, plutonium, and covert pathways to a bomb.

Compare this to the second option: ending negotiations and resuming the toughest possible sanctions. Under this option, there is a substantial possibility that the multilateral coalition will fracture, ending multilateral sanctions, with the additional disadvantage that all the uranium nuclear programs that are frozen or diminished under the current negotiating process will be free to operate again.

Let's turn to the third option. The third option will be extraordinarily expensive in blood and treasure. It could generate a cycle of warfare that would diminish rather than enhance the security of the United States and our allies. This is an option that could motivate Iran and other nations not to give up their nuclear programs but to redouble their efforts to secure a nuclear weapon.

So the single-best option, if achievable, is a negotiated, verifiable agreement for Iran to dismantle its nuclear program. Thus, we in Congress, we in the Senate Chamber, should do everything possible to increase the likelihood of this option succeeding.

One valuable role of this Chamber and of the House is to articulate the need to have key elements of an agreement well designed. My colleague from New Jersey was raising a series of questions. These are the types of questions the State Department negotiations will be paying close attention to so that when an agreement is delivered for our consideration, there will be strong answers.

We need ironclad assurances about the dismantlement, storage, and control of key materials and equipment; rigorous and enforceable boundaries on any ``research'' nuclear program; extensive and effective inspection protocols; and strong snapback provisions in the event Iran breaks its obligation.

We need an orderly process in which to conduct this assessment of an agreement to confirm that it meets these standards. Such a coherent congressional process has several advantages. First, it strengthens our President's hand in negotiation. The President and his team must strive to get all key elements nailed down, knowing they will be reviewed by a sometimes skeptical Congress. Second, such a review strengthens the agreement as an enduring framework that will provide the transition to the next Presidency. This can contribute confidence that phased implementation will be honored by both sides and help generate the momentum necessary to hammer out the final agreement.

Thus, I support the bill reported out in the Foreign Relations Committee unanimously on April 14 and currently under debate before the Senate. This bill gives Congress the right to review the agreement and classified and unclassified versions of a verification report Secretary Kerry must provide to Congress. It gives Congress the right to disapprove of the agreement. It requires the President to provide important information to Congress, including evidence of material breaches of the agreement, of Iran's involvement in acts of terrorism, Iran's violation of human rights, and advances in Iran's ballistic missile capabilities.

In addition, the President must certify that Iran has not materially breached the agreement or, if they breached, they have cured that breach; that Iran has not taken any action that would advance its nuclear weapons program; that the suspension of sanctions is both appropriate and proportionate to Iran's efforts under the agreement and vital to the national security interests of the United States; and that the agreement does not compromise in any way our enduring commitment to Israel's security.

Congress shaped the sanctions regime that put the pressure on Iran and forced them to the negotiating table. It is logical, therefore, that Congress should be involved in making sure the results of these negotiations fully serve the security interests of our Nation and our allies. What we must not do, however, is turn this bill, this structure, or appropriate and valuable congressional review into an instrument designed to undermine or poison the success of the negotiations in order to pave the path for war.

I will oppose the adoption of any poison pill amendment designed to undermine the viability of the negotiations. What is at stake is much bigger than the ordinary day-to-day politics of this Chamber. The content of any final agreement with Iran is of profound significance to the national security of the United States, the national security of our allies, and to international peace and stability.

I urge my colleagues to carry the weight of this responsibility, of this topic, of this process, this concern over nuclear proliferation--and particularly, proliferation that could put a nuclear weapon in the hands of Iran--and to keep our eyes on the prize.

I urge my colleagues to work together in partnership with our President to develop and implement a tough, verifiable end to Iran's quest for nuclear weapons.

Thank you, Mr. President.

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