Energy and Water Development and Relaed Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016

Floor Speech

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Mr. Chairman, let me begin by saying that I strongly support programs and operations that are funded by the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation section of the underlying bill.

Keeping loose nuclear materials--especially from places like the former Soviet Union states--out of the hands of America's enemies is one of the most important duties of the Department of Energy and the Federal Government as a whole. That being said, Congress has the obligation to set requirements and criteria for every dollar of taxpayer money that we spend, especially funds that are sent or used overseas. In fact, my colleagues on the Appropriations Committee already exercised this judgment with an additional provision in their bill that is very similar to the amendments that I will be offering today.

Section 307 of the underlying bill specifically prohibits any DOE nonproliferation funds from being used to enter into new contracts or agreements with Russia, sending a strong signal to Mr. Putin and others that there are real consequences for their irresponsible and destabilizing actions of the last few years.

My amendment adds this section to the end of the bill:

``None of the funds made available in this Act under the heading `Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation' may be made available to enter into new contracts with, or new agreements for Federal assistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran except for contracts or agreements that require the Islamic Republic of Iran to cease the pursuit, acquisition, and development of nuclear weapons technology.''

If the last line of my amendment sounds familiar, it should. It is the very same language that Congress defined as total disarmament of Iran's weapons of mass destruction program when it passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010. That bill passed the Senate by a vote of 99-0 and in the House 408-8, and only two of the Members who voted ``no'' on that bill still serve here in Congress today.

There is a lot to be worried about in President Obama's deal with Iran, but two serious concerns trump all of the others:

First, how will Iran properly deal with and dispose of 14,000 centrifuges

and 9,700 kilograms of highly enriched uranium that they are supposed to give up?

And if they are serious about not pursuing a bomb, what are they planning to do with the 6,000 centrifuges and 300 kilograms of uranium that they get to keep under this deal?

On the first question, the Web site Vox, hardly a rightwing outlet, says that the disposal of these materials is an open question and that the negotiators punted on how to safely and effectively remove this material from Iran. Given that fact, there is every reason to believe that the DOE nonproliferation account could be used for this purpose.

The second question is even more troubling than the first. Michael Morrell, former Director of the CIA, said back in February that ``the potential Iran nuclear agreement would limit Iran to the number of centrifuges needed for a weapon but too few for a nuclear power program,'' a statement verified as ``true'' by PolitiFact.

Iran's leaders have repeatedly said they have no interest in developing a nuclear weapon, and over the years, they have made that promise to the international community to gain relief from crippling economic sanctions. I don't trust Iran, but even if I did, I would still say that we follow President Reagan's charge that led us to victory when facing another nuclear foe: trust but verify.

Let me be clear. If Iran proves that they are serious about giving up all of their nuclear ambitions, I fully support using DOE nonproliferation assets to get their nuclear materials safely out of that country. Why, I would write a check myself to make sure that my grandkids don't grow up in a world where loose Iranian nuclear material makes its way to the black market or into the hands of terrorists.

But Iran can't have one without the other. That is why my amendment will make sure that, if DOE signs a contract with Iran to help remove nuclear material from Iran, it will also stipulate that they are giving up all efforts to build a bomb.

This is a commonsense amendment that reiterates the position of Congress and the promises made by President Obama's negotiating team. I urge a ``yes'' vote, and I reserve the balance of my time.

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My amendment is similar in nature to the one just offered, and I want to ensure that my strong support for the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program and the good work of the committee to properly fund it is, once again, reflected in the Record.

Mr. Chairman, I offer this second amendment to the Energy and Water Appropriations bill to make clear to Iran and to the world that the complete, intrusive inspections of all Iran civil and military sites are nonnegotiable and must be part of any deal with Iran.

My amendment adds this section to the end of the bill: ``None of the funds made available in this Act under the heading `Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation' may be made available to enter into new contracts with or new agreements for Federal assistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran except for contracts or agreements that include authority for the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct anytime, anywhere inspections of civil and military sites within the Islamic Republic of Iran.''

I was encouraged to see Energy Secretary Moniz, President Obama's chief technical expert in the Iran negotiations, quoted as saying: ``We expect to have anywhere, anytime access'' to conduct nuclear inspections of Iran.

I share his view that without these full, intrusive inspections there is simply no way to fully and truly verify that Iran is complying with the terms of any deal they supposedly agree to.

Unfortunately, the Iranians do not share the views of our Secretary. Shortly after the Secretary made these comments to Bloomberg News, Iranian Brigadier General Hossein Salami responded by saying:

``Not only will we not grant foreigners the permission to inspect our military sites, we will not even give them permission to think about such a subject. They will not even be permitted to inspect the most normal military site in their dreams.''

Apologists for Iran say that they just need to say these types of things, as well as maintain a limited nuclear stockpile, in order to save face and preserve their national pride.

Mr. Chairman, I didn't come here to help the Iranians with their PR efforts. Neither did you, and neither did anyone in this body. Our job is to keep the American people and the free world safe, and any deal with Iran that lifts sanctions but is not coupled with strict inspection requirements isn't just not worth the paper it is written on; it will make us less safe.
History can be our guide on this very subject. In one of his biggest but least discussed foreign policy failures, President Clinton in 1994 made a similar ``deal'' with North Korea that was supposed to end their nuclear ambitions and bring them into the international community.

Sanctions were lifted, but we were given nothing but mischief and deception by the North Koreans in return. International inspectors were obstructed and blocked on a regular basis. North Korea continued to develop their nuclear program, only now in the shadows and in hardened, underground facilities. In 2006, they successfully detonated a nuclear bomb, and they continue to develop and test long-range missiles and to threaten their neighbors and the West. Instead of weakening the authoritarian regime that controls North Korea, the lifting of the sanctions and the development of nuclear weapons allowed the Kims to tighten their grip on the country and pass it along to the next generation.

Congress cannot allow President Obama's flawed deal on Iran to take us down this same path.

Once again, if we are going to use DOE resources and taxpayer money to help Iran clean up the mess created by their nuclear ambitions, it should come with conditions. The most important condition should be that they permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct the anytime, anywhere inspections that are so essential to any nuclear reduction agreement.

History and our own Energy Secretary tell us that this deal won't work without robust and full inspections. I urge a ``yes'' vote on this amendment to make sure that those inspections do happen.

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