Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2016 -- Continued

Floor Speech

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Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. President.

Over the course of the next few days, we are likely going to debate a
series of amendments relative to the ongoing nuclear negotiations with
Iran. It is my hope that over the course of this debate, on a handful
of amendments that may be offered, that the way in which we conduct
this debate and the way in which these votes come out is going to unify
us rather than divide us.

A lot has been made over the partisan division that has been created
over the past few weeks with respect to our support for negotiations,
despite the fact that we have all said--Republicans and Democrats--that
our priority, our hope, is that we can divorce Iran from a nuclear
weapons future through negotiation rather than through military action,
despite the fact that historically we have all tried to keep close to
the idea that politics stops at the water's edge, that we understand
the limitations of our ability to substitute ourselves for the
administration when negotiating foreign policy with foreign powers. So
my hope is that this debate unites us because there is a lot to be
united about.

The fact is we all understand the catastrophe that would be wrought
if Iran was able to obtain a nuclear weapon. This is a country that has
pledged over and over again to wipe Israel, America's sacred ally, off
the map. This is a regime that has killed Americans, has sponsored,
funded, and organized terrorism all over the world. It is also not just
about Iran because we know what would happen in the region. Their Sunni
rivals would have no choice but to become nuclear powers themselves.

The stakes are high and we are all united around the common belief
that it should be the policy of the United States and the policy of the
Senate to make sure Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon, but I just
want to make a couple of additional points clear that should underscore
the debate we are going to have about that simple, unifying principle.

The first is that these negotiations that are occurring are about the
future of Iran's nuclear program. They aren't negotiations about Iran's
support for terrorism or Iran's role in fighting ISIS or Iran's other
weapons programs. I know this is hard to hear because the resolution of
these other pressing issues is instrumental to preserving the security
of America and our allies. But let's all be clear that this set of
negotiations is about the future of Iran's nuclear program, and for
Congress at this point to step in and essentially move the goalposts
and say we will only support the outcome of these negotiations if they
satisfy another set of concerns that we have--grave concerns about
Iran's policy in the region and the world--is disingenuous because we
all supported a sanctions regime intended to get them to come to the
table and talk about their nuclear program. Frankly, it becomes easier
to solve many of these other vital issues if we remove the question of
Iran's potential nuclear weapons program from the laundry list of items
with which we have great concerns about.

Second, let's talk about the role Congress can play and how, again,
that can be unifying if we choose to do it in the right way. If the
negotiations fall apart, then we are likely all going to stand together
in imposing a new set of sanctions on Iran. I don't think there is
disagreement at all within this body about the fact that within days of
those negotiations failing, we will be back here imposing new crippling
costs on the Iranian economy. If this agreement succeeds and there is
ink put to paper, then this Congress reserves the right--has the right,
has the ability--to statutorily stop the implementation of that
agreement from going forward, once we are able to review it and look at
its parameters, conditions, and elements.

We don't need to vote on sanctions legislation today. We don't need
to vote on legislation establishing our ability to review the agreement
because we already reserve those powers. We already have the ability to
pass sanctions in the event of failure or to vote on approval or
disapproval in the event of success. But we aren't in the room
negotiating this deal, so if we want to respect our proper place in the
constitutional order, then I think it makes sense for us to look at
those who are negotiating who have said that a bright, bold, blinking
signal of division within the American political system would be
detrimental to negotiations.

I want to see the product of these negotiations so I can use my power
as a U.S. Senator to vote them up or down, but if we take steps now, if
we vote on budget amendments that signal our support to take steps to
undermine those negotiations by either precipitously passing sanctions
legislation or setting up a process of approval or disapproval before
the negotiations take place, then I am limiting and I am decreasing the
likelihood that I will see that deal. We have a role to play, but that
role comes at the end of these negotiations rather than in the middle.

Lastly, if we are serious that the policy of the United States is to
stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, then we have to be serious
about what the consequences of the failure of negotiations truly are.
It is disingenuous to suggest that there are credible and likely
options other than military action should these negotiations fail,
especially if the U.S. Congress takes steps that allow the world
community to blame us for the failure of those negotiations. Why is
that? Well, because the easy thing to do would be to simply reinstate
global sanctions if the negotiations fall apart, try to squeeze Iran
even more tightly. But that is unlikely to happen if it is the United
States that gets blamed for the failure of the negotiations. Why?
Because our partners in those sanctions will not join us. They will
walk away and either lift the sanctions or look to cut their own deals
with Iran.

It is easy to say we will just put the sanctions back in place, but
it is impossible, at best very difficult, to do if we are doing that
unilaterally. Let's be honest about what military action really means.
It means setting back Iran's nuclear program by 3 to 5 years, but it
also means setting off a catastrophic series of events in the region
that will do great harm to our allies, great harm to U.S. security
interests, dragging us into a conflict that in the end will not serve
U.S. national security interests, especially given the fact that it
will only temporarily halt Iranian nuclear ambitions.

Now I still say we should keep on the table the potential of military
action, but we should just be honest about the fact that if we take
steps to undermine these negotiations today, if we, the U.S. Congress
are blamed for these negotiations falling apart, then it becomes
virtually impossible to put these sanctions back together; thus, giving
us only one option, a military option, one that has grave and
consequential aftershocks for the United States and for our allies.

I simply come down to the floor knowing we are going to set forth in
motion a series of amendments, many of them surrounding the question of
Iran's nuclear program, tomorrow. I am hopeful the result of those will
be to signal this Congress's unity, a unity that we have expressed many
times over that we will not allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon and
that a negotiated settlement is the preferable way to do that,
reserving for ourselves all of the inherent powers of this body to pass
sanctions if they fail, to approve or disapprove the deal if the
negotiations succeed. The best way to disabuse Iran of the notion that
they can ever obtain a nuclear weapon is in the next 48 hours for this
Congress to stand united--united in our position to guarantee a
nonnuclear weapons future for Iran.

I yield the floor.

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