Introduction of Air Cargo Security Act

INTRODUCTION OF AIR CARGO SECURITY ACT -- (Extensions of Remarks - May 03, 2005)

SPEECH OF
HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY
OF MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TUESDAY, MAY 3, 2005

* Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, more than three and a half years after the September 11th attacks, gaping loopholes in our country's homeland security continue to put Americans at risk of another devastating attack. The Department of Homeland Security's former Inspector General Clark Kent Ervin testified recently before the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight. Mr. Ervin told the Subcommittee that: ``Even in the area where the most time, attention, and resources have been invested--aviation security--serious vulnerabilities remain.''

* One of our most dangerous vulnerabilities is the failure to screen 100 percent of the cargo that is carried on passenger planes and all-cargo aircraft. Every time we fly, we wait in security lines, empty our pockets, remove our shoes, walk through metal detectors, and have our baggage inspected. We do not complain much--after all, we are told that this is required to keep our planes secure--and we accept that. But what many people do not realize is that every time commercial cargo is loaded onto the very same passenger planes or placed on aircraft that transport only cargo, almost none of it is ever inspected at all.

* The security risk created by unscreened cargo is not just theoretical: Pan Am Flight 103 was brought down in 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland by a bomb contained in unscreened baggage, and Air India flight 182 was downed in 1985 off the coast of Ireland by a bomb placed in unscreened luggage.

* Uninspected freight on all-cargo carriers also poses a serious danger. Last summer, the 9/11 Commission reported that Al Qaeda operative Zacharias Moussaoui's terrorist plans included ``buying four tons of ammonium nitrate for bombs to be planted on cargo planes.'' Ammonium nitrate is the same chemical compound that Timothy McVeigh used to kill 168 innocent men, women and children at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City 10 years ago. Less than two years ago, a young man shipped himself undetected aboard a cargo plane from New York to Texas. We were lucky he was just a lonely twenty-something, not a terrorist.

* It is long past the time when we should have adopted a policy that subjects cargo on passenger and all-cargo aircraft to the same level of screening that is performed daily on passengers' checked and carry-on luggage.

* Today, Representative CHRISTOPHER SHAYS (R-CT) and I are introducing the Air Cargo Security Act to require the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish and begin implementing a system to inspect all the cargo transported on passenger planes and all-cargo carriers, so that this cargo is subject to the same level of scrutiny as passengers' luggage. Our legislation also. includes additional measures to close the cargo loophole, such as: a mandate that the Secretary of Homeland Secretary establish systems to inspect cargo using equipment, technology and personnel that meet, at a minimum, the same standards established to inspect passenger baggage; a requirement that the Secretary of Homeland Security monitor and evaluate the research and development of effective cargo screening technologies; establishment of a system of regular inspection of shipping facilities for shipments of cargo to ensure that appropriate security controls and systems are observed, both at facilities inside the U.S. and abroad; a directive that the Secretary of Homeland Security report to Congress on the number of cargo shipping facilities that have been inspected, the number of facilities that have failed to comply with security controls, and the number of agreements concluded with foreign aviation authorities to ensure that regular inspections are conducted for cargo transported to the United States; and creation of a training and evaluation program for cargo handlers to improve the security ensure that cargo is safeguarded from security breaches.

* The House has voted overwhelmingly--by votes of 278 to 146 and 347 to 47--to require 100 percent screening of cargo carried on passenger planes. The airline industry and the Bush Administration strenuously objected to the 100 percent screening mandate, and the Senate ultimately dropped it from the final version of the Department's FY04 appropriations bill. Last year, the House narrowly defeated our 100 percent screening amendment after strong opposition from the airline industry.

* The experts who are our aviation system's ``eyes and ears''--namely, the pilots and flight attendants who work aboard aircraft everyday--have endorsed the Air Cargo Security Act. The Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA), which represents 22,000 pilots at American Airlines, Southwest, AirTran and other airlines, and the Association of Flight Attendants, with its 46,000 members, have endorsed this important legislation. Since introducing similar legislation last year, I have addressed the concerns of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) by including all-cargo carriers under the 100 percent cargo screening mandate and providing for federal appropriations to implement this mandate. When I offered the Air Cargo Security Act as an amendment during the committee mark-up of the Homeland

Security Department's FY06 authorization bill, ALPA supported my amendment.

* While last year's appropriations bill for the Department and the 9/11 reform implementation act included funding for cargo screening R&D, additional cargo inspectors, and related provisions, these measures do not go far enough.

* TSA currently handles the screening of cargo carried on passenger planes by using a process it calls the ``Known Shipper Program.'' The Known Shipper Program requires only paperwork to be filed, but no screening to be done. Mail and packages weighing less than 16 ounces are not even subject to the paperwork check--they are loaded straight onto the plane without even a perfunctory paper check! When it comes to freight on all-cargo carriers, inspection is the exception, not the rule--only a tiny portion is physically inspected before loading onboard. TSA now requires air carriers to conduct random inspections of cargo that are randomly verified by TSA--but this still results in almost none of the cargo on passenger planes being physically inspected for explosives or other dangerous materials. TSA is unable to inform us of how many cargo inspections are performed by the air carriers because the air carriers do not have to report to TSA the number of cargo inspections they conduct.

* Some have argued that the technology to screen 100 percent of cargo is not available. But there are numerous companies that are currently selling technology that is being used to screen cargo, including American Science and Engineering; L3 Security and Detection Systems; and Raytheon CargoScreen. Some have argued that 100 percent screening is not technically feasible. But countries including Israel, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands routinely screen cargo. Moreover, Logan Airport in Massachusetts, which has been conducting a cargo screening pilot program, reported in February that ``100 percent of all air cargo on all types of aircraft is technically possible.'' According to Massport, which is responsible for the operation of Logan Airport, a federal mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo and a funding mechanism to distribute cost among the major players involved are required. The Air Cargo Security Act provides this mandate and authorizes the appropriations needed to accomplish it.

* Some have argued that the Known Shipper Program is enough to assure the security of cargo. The Known Shipper Program is dangerously flawed and easily exploited. TSA has admitted that it has not audited most of the so-called known shippers in its database, and packages weighing less than 16 ounces are not even subject to the Known Shipper Program, even though the bomb that brought down Pan-Am Flight 103 contained less than 16 ounces of explosive!

* I urge my colleagues to support the Air Cargo Security Act and close a dangerous loophole that puts our Nation at risk.

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