Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015

Floor Speech

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, I support the core pillars of the President's plan to fight ISIS--the use of American surveillance, intelligence assets and air power to support the ground operations of the Iraqi army and Kurdish fighters in Iraq, and to strike ISIS military equipment, troop concentrations, and command and control in Syria. I also believe we should supply weapons to those groups in Syria, such as the Syrian Kurds, who have consistently fought ISIS, and whose priority is to defeat ISIS. I welcome the opportunity to work with my colleagues to revise the existing 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force to more clearly support these objectives, but to also ensure that U.S. ground forces are not engaged in combat in Iraq or Syria.

My one concern with the Administration's plan relates to the proposal to arm the so-called ``moderate'' Syrian opposition. I believe that it is a well-intentioned proposal that will have unintended negative consequences that will not serve our ultimate goal of defeating ISIS.

First, the primary objective of these Sunni Islamist fighters is the defeat of Assad and his Alawite dominated regime--not the defeat of ISIS. Since the start of the war there have been shifting alliances among these Sunni Islamist forces that include the al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, different elements of the Free Syrian Army, the Islamist Front, Ahrar al-Sham and ISIS, among others. Their common cause and overriding objective is defeating Assad. Indeed, the commander of the Syria Revolutionaries' Front, Jamal Maarouf, one of the most militarily proficient commanders of the FSA, recently said that, ``It's clear that I'm not fighting against al-Qaeda. This is a problem outside of Syria's border, so it's not our problem. I don't have a problem with anyone who fights against the regime inside Syria.''

While there is no doubt that Assad is a brutal dictator, he does not pose the same threat to the United States as ISIS, and his forces have recently been battling ISIS. At this point, arming fighters whose primary purpose is to weaken Assad has one unintended result--strengthening ISIS. Indeed, I fear that the arms we provide to the so-called Syrian opposition are more likely to end up in ISIS hands than to be used against ISIS terrorists.

There is one group within Syria that has been battling ISIS from the start, and that is the Syrian Kurds. We should provide material support to these Kurdish fighters in Syria.

We should also continue our efforts to get the Sunni tribesmen in Iraq and Syria to take up the fight against ISIS. The President and his team deserve great credit for helping to push former Prime Minister Maliki from power. He ruled Iraq, not as a nationalist Iraqi leader, but as a Shia strongman. That sectarian approach alienated the Sunni population in Iraq, and made them more open to tolerating the rise of ISIS.

With the emergence of a more inclusive Iraqi government, we must work with all parties to assure Sunni tribesman that their interests are better served by a united Iraq than by ISIS. That is why the President's emphasis on a political component to this strategy is so important.

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