Nomination of Roy K.J. Williams to Be Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Economic Development

Floor Speech

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Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, one of the protagonists of Leo Tolstoy's epic ``War and Peace'' is the iconic Russian general Mikhail Kutuzov. Kutuzov was brought out of retirement to be the commander in chief of Russian forces during Napoleon's invasion, and his unorthodox strategy confounded and frustrated his superiors and his underlings alike. He becomes convinced, as Tolstoy depicts, that Napoleon will lose the war by overextending his army. He believes by playing the long game he will exhaust and defeat the seemingly invincible, unstoppable French army.

Tolstoy creates a fictionalized version of Kutuzov, of course, but one of the most famous passages from ``War and Peace'' is worth repeating here today. Speaking of those who doubt his strategy, Kutuzov says:

Patience and time are my warriors, my champions.

Again, quoting from the book:

He [Kutuzov] knew that an apple should not be plucked while it is green. It will fall of itself when ripe, but if picked unripe the apple is spoiled, the tree is harmed, and your teeth are set on edge. Like an experienced sportsman, Kutuzov knew that the beast was wounded, and wounded as only the whole strength of Russia could have wounded it.

Whether or not this famous Russian general ever shared this exact sentiment, it is representative of a time when the Russians better than anyone on Earth knew how to play the long game. How times have changed.

Over the past few weeks, I have listened in agony to my Republican friends criticizing the Obama administration for having no coherent policy regarding the current crisis in Ukraine. I come to the floor today to rebut that argument and also to add a few suggestions on how the administration's policy can be enhanced.

I certainly understand the Republicans' frustrations. News of the ongoing daily drama in Ukraine dominates the national news. Russia seems omnipresent, manipulating events on the ground by the hour, and there clearly has not been a proportional pound-for-pound response from the United States or the collective West. This frustration is fed by memories of the Cold War--obsolete, even ancient memories given how fast the world has changed since 1991. But the President's critics, fueled by these largely irrelevant memories, insist that when Russia acts, we must meet fire with fire--crippling unilateral sanctions immediately, lethal arms for Ukrainian military, new missile capacity in Eastern Europe.

The problem is that this is a strategy for 1964, not 2014. Russia simply doesn't matter to us in the same way it used to. They are a secondary world power whose power is diminishing. Their demographics are catastrophic, their economy can't survive the inevitable global energy revolution, and their endemic corruption is going to rot their society from inside out. The invasions of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine are signs of Russian weakness, Russian insecurity, not Russian strength.

Last fall, two former Russian Republics, Georgia and Moldova, refused Russian overtures to join their nascent economic union and inked preliminary agreements to join the European Union. Ukraine, at the last minute, bowed to Russian bullying and refused to ink the same deal, but it set off a series of events that pushed Russia's man in Kiev out of office.

In a panicked reaction, Russia invaded, and the consequences have been devastating. Russia's economy is in free fall, with nearly $70 billion of capital leaving the country in just the last few months alone. No major institutional investors will touch Russia today with a 10-foot pole. To make matters worse, Russia has been kicked out of the G8 and generally has become an international pariah, not allowed at the table with major powers. Russia is increasingly isolated at the United Nations. And things are going to get even worse as the Europeans use this crisis as a wake-up call to make themselves truly energy independent of Russian energy and also to reinvigorate NATO.

In ``War and Peace,'' Kutuzov goes on to say this of his critics:

They want to run to see how they have wounded it. Wait and we shall see! Continual maneuvers, continual advances! What for? Only to distinguish themselves! As if fighting were fun. They are like children from whom one can't get any sensible account of what has happened because they all want to show us how well they can fight. But that's not what is needed now.

The story of ``War and Peace'' and the Russian-French war is not entirely a useful parallel to the current crisis in Ukraine or to the proper response of the United States. What is needed now is much more than just patience and time. But our response needs to be proportional to our Nation's national security interests, not proportional to Russia's actions in their backyard. That is why the administration is right to strongly support this new Ukrainian Government without overreacting in a way that could compromise our relationship with other nations or make the situation worse, not better, on the ground in Ukraine.

I would like to take a few minutes this evening to lay out what a coherent, thoughtful approach to the crisis might look like and how, in fact, the actions of the Obama administration largely follow this pretty simple outline.

First, as Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenuk has been quick to tell visiting dignitaries, the most important help the United States can provide is economic assistance, conditioned on necessary reforms to show the Ukrainian people that a Western-oriented government can deliver prosperity to their country.

Russia has effectively invented a new form of warfare that is based on gradual provocation, where Putin uses psychological methods, intimidation, bribery, and propaganda to undermine resistance so that firepower is rarely needed to get his way. But of course these tactics only work on vulnerable countries with weak economies and a susceptibility to Russian overtures of economic overlordship and corruption.

So the best way to repel Russian provocations is to strengthen the Ukrainian economy and government institutions both for the short and long run. The $1 billion in loan guarantees authorized by Congress and the $17 billion loan approved by the IMF and brokered by the United States are an important part of that process, and the conditions imposed--which include a floating exchange rate, steep increases in gas tariffs, and budget reductions over the next several years--represent some of the tough medicine necessary to get Ukraine back on its feet.

The United States hasn't sat on the sidelines when it comes to economic aid to Ukraine. We have led from day one, and the results are impossible to deny.

Second, let's recognize what military assistance makes sense and what military assistance does not make sense. It makes sense to shore up our treaty obligations in Eastern and Central Europe by positioning more troops in places such as the Baltics and Poland and Romania. Just in case the Russians were thinking of trying to use these types of destabilizing tactics in NATO countries, make them think twice. But remember that Ukraine is not a NATO ally; we have no obligation to defend their sovereignty, and it is totally unrealistic and indeed irresponsible to think that we can make up for decades of military neglect and mismanagement inside Ukraine with a few million dollars of aid today.

Ukraine doesn't need more small arms. Their problem isn't that they don't have them; their problem is that they don't know how to shoot them. There is no way the Ukrainians can effectively utilize more sophisticated weaponry like anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery. The only way they could do that is with military advisers standing side by side with Ukrainians, and there is really no appetite here in the United States to commit personnel to a ground war in Ukraine.

To be clear, I don't offer these cautions because of a danger of provoking Russia with an influx of U.S. arms. Russia is going to do what Russia is going to do in Eastern Ukraine regardless of what small investment the United States makes today in Ukraine.

But I do worry that since any lethal assistance from the United States would have little to no effect on the ability of Ukraine to repel a Russian invasion, a Russian victory over the Ukrainian army, backed by U.S. weapons, would then be sold by Putin to his public as a Russian military triumph over the United States. That is a truly bad outcome, but that shouldn't stop us from more quickly delivering nonlethal support to help bolster the Ukrainian military in the short term--reasonable support such as body armor and communications equipment--that balances our limited direct interest in Ukraine with our humanitarian interest in saving lives. There is a middle ground between just sending a handful more MREs and sending tanks or automatic weapons, and we have had ample time to explore those options.

Over the medium and longer term we need to work with Ukraine to rebuild its military institutions that were neglected for so many years by its leaders who were pilfering from the state rather than providing for the country's defense forces.

Third, focus, focus, focus on the May 25 elections. The Russians occupy dozens--not thousands--of buildings in Eastern Ukraine. They have no hold or influence on other sections of the country near and to the west of Kiev.

As part of the international effort, the United States has committed millions of dollars and thousands of hours of manpower into making sure the May 25 election is held in a free and fair manner. The Russians will likely do everything possible to stop this election from coming off. As of today they effectively have no straw man in the race, and so more likely than not the result will be a victory for a free, whole, sovereign Ukraine and a damaging blow to Russia's claims that Ukraine can't govern itself. Our State Department representatives in Ukraine are working feverishly to help Ukraine conduct this election, and we have helped deploy unprecedented resources from the OSCE to make sure Russia cannot dislodge this election from occurring. That is American leadership happening right now on the ground in Ukraine.

Fourth, let's be crystal clear on what will lead to the next logical level of U.S. sanctions, which would be industrywide, sectoral sanctions against the Russian economy. We have moved deliberately so far because, wisely, President Obama has desired to move in relative concert with our European allies. But it is increasingly clear to me and to many others that Europe is simply not prepared to move at the pace necessary to send a strong message to Russia about the consequences of their continued aggression.

So having primarily mounted a defense of the administration's policy in Ukraine so far today, I would make one additional, significant suggestion for amendment of this policy. I believe the highest levels of American foreign policy leadership, from the President, to the Vice President, to the Secretary of State, should make it clear today to Russia, right now, that if the May 25 elections do not occur in a free and fair manner, we will hold Russia--and only Russia--responsible because if not for their interference, there can be no explanation for why these elections could not come off properly.

Further, we should make it clear that if the May 25 election is not allowed by Russia to be conducted according to OSCE electoral standards, the United States will immediately impose sectoral sanctions on the most important Russian industries, including but not limited to

the Russian banking, energy, and raw materials sectors.

Hopefully, significant Russian interference in the elections would prompt Europe to act with us in order to protect our most important democratic values, but we can't wait for them any longer. Let's make it totally, completely, unequivocally clear today that if the May 25 election doesn't occur, the United States will move toward industry-level sanctions against Russia.

This is and can be a coherent, thoughtful U.S. strategy toward the crisis in Ukraine: Support Ukraine economically. Strengthen NATO. Don't overreact with reckless military aid to the Ukrainians. Do everything possible to make the May 25 election a success. Be clearer than current policy on what will trigger sectoral sanctions by the United States. And then act if Russia doesn't listen.

I get it that this isn't all my Republican colleagues desire when it comes to U.S. policy toward Ukraine, but overreacting to this crisis is just as bad, if not worse, than doing nothing. I was in Kiev at the very beginning, standing on stage at the Maidan with Senator McCain, urging the Ukrainian people to demand more from their government. I was here, advocating for a robust U.S. response to support these protesters. I believed, as I still believe, the United States should be playing an active role in this crisis, and I was making this argument before anyone else in this Chamber. But this isn't the Cold War. This is a fight in Russia's backyard, and the cold hard reality is that the stakes are just simply greater for Moscow than they are for us. And the world is no longer organized around who is with the United States and who is with Russia. The foundational paradigms of global security now are about who has nuclear weapons and who doesn't. Who is allied with the Shia and who is allied with the Sunni. Where are the Islamist terrorists organizing and who is helping them.

I don't mean to say that unchecked Russian action doesn't have global consequences. It does. China, for instance, is certainly watching to see if nations pay a price when they reset their borders through aggression rather than through diplomacy. But we ultimately won the Cold War by playing the long game. We knew that if we held true to democratic and free market values, the world would notice that an alliance with us was far more beneficial than an alliance with the Soviet Union. That, in fact, is the very reason for the current crisis. The Ukrainian people revolted because they saw the value of a Western economic and political orientation. We didn't need to use intimidation or bribery or little green men; we just showed them that our stuff is better.

Of course, the irony is that the Russians used to be the kings of the long game. Kutuzov let Napoleon march into Moscow after clearing out the city and leaving only about 10,000 people behind. He strung out the French army and left it ultimately helpless.

We don't have to resort to the drastic tactics of this old savvy Russian general. There are actions we can take and have taken to support Ukraine and send a message to Russia. But we shouldn't overinflate our national security interests in this crisis. We simply do not need to win every battle to win the war. And this body, the U.S. Senate, built by our Founding Fathers to see and play the long game for America, should understand this fact. We aren't the Russians in 1812. We must engage in a robust policy toward Ukraine that is much more than simply time and patience, but that doesn't mean there aren't some important lessons to be learned.

I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

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