Brunswick Naval Air Station's Stratigic Advantage

BRUNSWICK NAVAL AIR STATION'S STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE -- (Senate - February 09, 2005)

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, Brunswick Naval Air Station, which is in my own home State of Maine, is a facility of great importance to our Nation's military. While I could reflect today upon the bravery and tenacity of the P-3 Orion pilots at Brunswick who have supported the global war on terrorism, today I share with my colleagues the significant benefits and strategic advantages that Brunswick Naval Air Station offers our efforts in the areas of homeland defense and maritime interdiction operations. As we look toward the future, and develop new tools to address future threats, we must ensure that these tools are located in facilities where their advanced capabilities can be fully utilized. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that a white paper, authored by Ralph Dean, one of Brunswick's great advocates, entitled Homeland Defense and Maritime Interdiction Operations, be printed in the Congressional Record. The white paper provides significant insight on the great advantages that Brunswick Naval Air Station offers.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Homeland Defense and Maritime Interdiction Operations

In the business of homeland defense (as in real estate), location is the key. Imagine a naval search for a single, relatively small merchant ship, which intelligence sources have revealed has a hold full of weaponized chemicals. Its destination is a major coastal city. After tense hours of searching, a maritime patrol aircraft locates two possible suspect vessels out of hundreds in one of the world's busiest maritime areas. The aircraft directs two fast naval frigates to the vicinity of the targets. The frigates and their onboard helicopters intercept and challenge the target vessels. One vessel submits to search and is determined to be harmless. The other however, resists interception and boarding. Finally, helicopter-borne special operations commandoes descend upon the vessel, board and secure the ship and its potentially deadly cargo.

This scenario actually occurred in the western Mediterranean Sea last month. The weapons of mass destruction seized were simulated; the entire sequence of events part of a successful exercise of Maritime Interdiction Operations conducted by forces of four NATO nations.

Maritime interdiction capability is a hot item right now for defense planners, a particularly important focus of a larger effort known as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). PSI is being advanced by 15 core member nations, brought together at the request of President Bush last year to develop cooperative diplomatic, military, and intelligence means to stop ships which may be carrying weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Many of the maritime interdiction precepts under PSI are evolving from a multinational "game" conducted last September at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and refining these concepts and procedures is clearly a high priority for the nations involved. Japan recently hosted the latest multinational PSI exercise, the twelfth in the short time since the Initiative began.

As the Mediterranean exercise and others showed, Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) are a critical, almost always essential part of successful maritime interdiction. Whether conducting a broad-area search, refining a datum provided by other (including national) sensors, or vectoring surface, rotary-wing or special-warfare assets to a target, MPA are a key link in the chain from initial intelligence to intercept. MPA are of particular value in crowded shipping lanes, in areas of poor weather or visibility. No other platform is as versatile in this mission area, one as old and enduring as naval aviation itself. But land-based aircraft need bases to fly from-bases which optimize their speed, range, and turnaround capability on missions protecting the nation's most vital areas. The seaborne WMD threat has become primary. Maritime interdiction platforms and infrastructure must be top concerns for naval strategists and planners.

Fortunately help is on the way, again from patrol aviation. The Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) promises a substantial increase in capability for commanders responsible for maritime interdiction. Based on the Boeing 737-800, the MMA will bring increased speed, range, and reliability compared to the current workhorse MPA, the P-3C Orion. MMA sensors for interdiction missions will include a new electro-optical and infrared spectrum sensor, moving target indicators, an enhanced inverse synthetic aperture / synthetic aperture radar, and a new signals intelligence suite. Perhaps best of all, MMA will control and exploit the capabilities of the Broad-Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.

The aircraft themselves will certainly be fantastic, but land-based planes are only as good as the base they operate from, and the future homes for MMA/BAMS have not yet been identified. Conventional wisdom has it that the transition from the P-3 force to one of fewer than half as many MMA will inevitably result in a reduction in the number of maritime patrol aircraft bases in the U.S. This assumption may be incorrect, since optimum basing for maritime interdiction assets is as important as the assets themselves. Bases must be located to provide rapid response to all coastal areas, particularly those containing major population centers and port facilities. They must be versatile, able to support not just MPA, but rotary wing units and special warfare forces with easy access, unencumbered space and facilities for joint, coordinated training, and self-protection and security from intrusion or attack. Maritime interdiction is a team game, and collocation of the assets for training and operations is essential.

The current MPA force laydown includes P-3 bases at Kaneohe Bay in Hawaii, Jacksonville, Florida, Brunswick, Maine, and Whidbey Island in Washington State. A robust P-3 capability is maintained for fleet support and other missions at the North Island Naval Air Station in San Diego. These last four bases, at the "corners" of the continental U.S. are perfectly situated for maritime interdiction of WMD threats. From these sites, MMA response time to any point on the coast will be less than two hours, and all major sea lanes of approach can be covered within the 1200--1500 nautical mile operational range of the aircraft.

All four sites have their advantages, and all are essential to that coverage. For example, the Naval Air Station in Brunswick, Maine has remarkable potential as a joint forces maritime interdiction center under the PSI initiative: The only remaining fully capable active-duty military airfield in the northeastern U.S. and near its coastal cities-a region of over 48 million people; immediately adjacent to all major sea lanes in the North Atlantic; more than 63,000 square miles of unencumbered airspace for training and exercise missions; versatile and extensive modern facilities (including a new hangar designed specifically for MMA and BAMS) and land with no encroachment issues; an established all-weather training area available for Special Forces and other units; completely secured perimeter and outstanding force protection layout and capability; and easy access by all forms of transportation.

The ports and shipping lanes to the northeastern region of the United States deserve the protection which can only be provided by maritime interdiction forces operating from a base within that region. Obviously transatlantic shipping is critical to our nation's economy, but as west coast ports operate at capacity, more and more operators are redirecting their shipments from Asia directly to the northeast. These shippers prefer to have their cargo spend the additional 7 to 10 days at sea rather than accept delays at west coast ports and during rail transport across the continent. Container traffic to New York alone has risen 65% in the last five years, the fastest rate of growth in over 50 years. All of the enormous volume of shipping to the region must be monitored, and if necessary interdicted whenever it may pose a threat.

The Defense Department's Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) will in 2005 identify military infrastructure for permanent elimination. The BRAC process must carefully factor in future requirements for maritime interdiction as they are just now being developed under the PSI. Caution is indicated-the nation cannot afford to close irreplaceable military facilities just as new concepts and capabilities are being developed to address a burgeoning threat. Maritime interdiction of weapons of mass destruction headed for our shores is zero-defect work, and the selection of bases for that effort must be equally judicious and effective. Location is an enduring essential-we must keep open our bases "at the corners."

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