Introduction of Iran Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act

INTRODUCTION OF IRAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION ACT -- (Extensions of Remarks - November 20, 2004)

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, to day I am introducing the "Iran Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act," a bill to stop the transfer of nuclear equipment and technology to Iran.

This week Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to intelligence that Iran is working to adapt missiles to deliver a nuclear weapon, which would provide further evidence Iran is determined to move forward to become a nuclear weapons state. His comments come on the heels of reports that Iran on the one hand has agreed with three European countries to freeze its uranium enrichment program, and, on the other hand, reports by an Iranian opposition group that Iran may still be pursuing a covert uranium enrichment program at an undeclared location.

The credibility of the United States suffered when we missed the mark so badly in Iraq when the Administration concluded that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. In Iraq the IAEA had the advantage of 250 inspectors on the ground with anytime, anywhere inspection authority to go look wherever they suspected there might be evidence of nuclear weapons activity. The IAEA does not have that advantage in Iran. Instead, both the U.S. and the IAEA are trying to divine the plans of a regime through fragmentary pieces of information gleaned from a variety of sources, much of it subject to widely varying interpretation and credibility. We simply cannot afford to be wrong on a subject as serious as the spread of nuclear weapons.

We know that a variety of foreign countries and companies may have provided assistance to Iran's nuclear program. Some of these countries may also be engaged in nuclear commerce with the United States, or may have received U.S.-origin nuclear technology in the past, or seek access to U.S. nuclear materials or technology in the future. Should we engage in nuclear commerce with countries that are supplying Iran with the wherewithal to move forward with a nuclear weapons program? I don't think so.

Let's take just one example. China is known to have provided support to the Iranian nuclear program in the past. In recent months, there have been press reports that Vice President CHENEY is championing efforts to export nuclear reactors to China. It just does not make any sense to say that we are against nuclear proliferation in Iran, and then to turn around sell nuclear reactors to China.

The bill I am introducing today will:

Stop the transfer of nuclear equipment and technology to any country that is supporting Iran's nuclear program;

Require the President to report to Congress a complete list of countries who have provided missile and nuclear materials and technology to Iran;

Require the President to report to Congress an estimate and assessment of Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear explosives and their delivery vehicles.

Require the President to give to Congress an assessment of the European-Iran deal.

Require the President to provide to Congress an evaluation of the basis and credibility of a possible secret nuclear facility in Iran.

Require the President to provide to Congress information on whether the U.S. has provided the United Nations and International Agency, IAEA, weapons inspectors with full access to intelligence on Iran's nuclear program.

Require the President to report to Congress on the steps the U.S. is taking to ensure that United Nations and IAEA inspectors have full access to all suspected Iranian nuclear sites and on what steps the U.S. it taking to work with the international community, including the IAEA, to ensure Iran is complying with the Nonproliferation Treaty.

This bill will not:

Apply to radiation monitoring technologies, surveillance equipment, seals, cameras, tamper-indicating devices, nuclear detectors, monitoring systems, or equipment to safely store, transport or remove hazardous material.

Apply, with a waiver by the President, if it is in the vital interest of national security.
Apply, with a waiver by the President, if the transfer is essential to prevent or respond to a serious radiological hazard.
Limit the full implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs, also known as the Nunn-Lugar program.
While there is legislation in place that provides for sanctions against Iran-the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act or ILSA, this legislation has not proven to be effective. ILSA provides for sanctions against companies that invest $20 million or more in Iran's energy sector in a single year. Here is what the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service reports about the implementation of the Act:

The Clinton Administration apparently sought to balance implementation with the need to defuse a potential trade dispute with the EU. In April 1997, the United States and the EU formally agreed to try to avoid a trade confrontation over ILSA and the "Helms-Burton" Cuba sanctions law (P.L. 104-114). The agreement contributed to a decision by the Clinton Administration to waive ILSA sanctions on the first project determined to be in violation: a $2 billion (1) contract (signed in September 1997) for Total SA of France and its minority partners, Gazprom of Russia and Petronas of Malaysia to develop phases 2 and 3 of the 25-phase South Pars gas field. The Administration announced the waiver on May 18, 1998, citing national interest grounds (Section 9© of ILSA), after the EU pledged to increase cooperation with the United States on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. The announcement indicated that EU firms would likely receive waivers for future projects that were similar.

The Bush Administration has apparently adopted the same policy on ILSA as did the Clinton Administration, attempting to work cooperatively with the EU to curb Iran's nuclear program and limit its support for terrorism. According to the Bush Administration's mandated January 2004 assessment, ILSA has not stopped energy sector investment in Iran. However, some believe the law has slowed Iran's energy development, and Iran's sustainable oil production has not increased significantly since the early 1990s, despite the new investment, although foreign investment has slowed or halted deterioration in oil production. On the other hand, Iran's gas sector, nonexistent prior to the late 1990s, is becoming an increasingly important factor in Iran's energy future, largely as a result of foreign investment.

Since the South Pars case, many projects-all involving Iran, not Libya-have been formally placed under review for ILSA sanctions by the State Department. Recent State Department reports on ILSA, required every six months, state that U.S. diplomats raise with both companies and countries the United States' ILSA and policy concerns about potential petroleum-sector investments in Iran. However, no sanctions determinations have been announced since the South Pars case discussed above.