Hearing of the Senate Armed Services - Duelfer Report on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

Federal News Service

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE SUBJECT: DUELFER REPORT ON IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)

WITNESSES: CHARLES DUELFER, SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR STRATEGY REGARDING IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION; AND BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSEPH J. MCMENAMIN, USMC, COMMANDER, IRAQ SURVEY GROUP

LOCATION: 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BODY:
SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Duelfer and General. I did have the opportunity to visit you, and I appreciate the arduous circumstances and the extraordinary commitment that you and your colleagues have made to do your mission.

Mr. Duelfer, let me follow up on a question that the chairman asked about your perception of the threat prior to the invasion. You-I think you indicated that you thought there might be some stockpiles, but-and I don't want to put words in your mouth, but the question I have, at that point, did you think that that constituted an imminent threat to the United States and our interests?

MR. DUELFER: Bear in mind I was not a member of the intelligence community at that time. I was just, you know, me with my own background --

SEN. REED: You might have-given what we've learned, you might have been in a better position.

MR. DUELFER: It was my judgment that Iraq retained, perhaps, a strategic reserve-in other words, a deterrent, not an offensive capability.

SEN. REED: Let me ask you another question which I think is very interesting. You've had the opportunity to meet with Saddam. Why did he accept U.N. inspectors into his country with virtually unrestricted access? And I think, as I recall, they actually discovered some of these missiles that were out of compliance and destroyed them.

MR. DUELFER: First, let me correct a point in your premise.

SEN. REED: Thank you.

MR. DUELFER: I have-the way we debriefed Saddam was by one interlocutor, who spent his entire time. My interaction with him was always one step removed.

SEN. REED: Thank you.

MR. DUELFER: But the question-you know, why did he accept the inspectors? I think, you know, to the best we understand, from what he has said, which is not always the truth, and-but from those around him, was he took-he recognized the growing pressure. I mean, it was clear that the military force buildup was taking place. You know, his advisers convinced him that, look, there has been a ground shift of the support in the Security Council away from Iraq. He was feeling isolation. Some of the revenues were tailing off. And he was, I think, getting advice also from some of his friends on the Security Council, who said, "Look, the world has changed. You've got some problems here."

SEN. REED: That seems to be a pretty rational response from somebody who we've kind of labeled as a lunatic or delusional. That's just an aside.

The inspectors on the ground, I presume-and you've got great experience, as a former inspector-would probably be the best source of intelligence and information. They could have significantly increased our awareness of the true facts-and difficult to get at, I grant you-but yet they were prematurely removed, very abruptly removed. In your judgment, was that a wise decision?

(Pause.)

MR. DUELFER: I come back-I mean, first of all, I have enormous respect for the inspectors. And there is no substitute for having people on the ground. That provides a lot of information. It provides a deterrent.

But I would come back to the question of were those conditions sustainable. Hans Blix and his people were on the ground in an extraordinary set of circumstances. The United States had deployed a lot of forces. There was a crisis in the Security Council.

And so when I ask myself the question, you know, were inspections working, you know, whatever yo mean by that, I mean-and I'm asking myself that, but-you know, are you asking a question which is at one point in time, or is it over a continuum? And I find it hard to convince myself the circumstances which allowed the inspectors to be successful to the extent that they were-I don't think those conditions were sustainable.

SEN. REED: Well, I think you raise the issue of the length of sustainability. Certainly I would assume that you can see they could have been sustained for several more months, at least.

This coalition, this-this was a huge, huge step backing him down, forcing him to admit that the situation had changed, that the U.N. was going to crack down on him. And perhaps it wouldn't have lasted for two or five years or indefinitely, but for two or three months, for six months, or seven months, at which time we could have learned a great deal more about the very questions we're debating now: Were those biological labs producing hydrogen or something else? Was it a real nuclear program or was it sort of a-dormant?

MR. DUELFER: I'm not sure I can answer that question, sir. I mean --

SEN. REED: Mr. Duelfer, I respect you, and I think that's probably a good answer. But certainly those questions should have been asked by our leadership.

MR. DUELFER: That is the heart of a good discussion and good debate, and I hope this report informs that discussion.

SEN. REED: Let me ask another question, if my time allows. From what you said-and this might be repeating your response to Senator Levin-that Saddam consciously and deliberately ordered the destruction of virtually all of his weapons of mass destruction-chemical, biological; and termination at some point of the nuclear program-which begs the question, if he was so intent in reconstituting the program, if this was his unshakable idea, why didn't he simply hide small portions of this material?

MR. DUELFER: Well, he wanted to get out of sanctions. That was-I mean, we pretty much-you know, that was his priority. On a non-interference basis, with that objective, he wanted to sustain-as we understand it from talking with his advisers and him, he wanted to sustain the intellectual capabilities and some bits and pieces that are hard to duplicate of his programs. This was particularly the case in the early years of the U.N. constraints, from '91 to, say, '95, and particularly the period of time during which his son-in-law, who was in charge of developing and had some pride of creation of these programs, was still around. But after he left in 1995, you know, I think Saddam concluded that, you know, this business with the sanctions is going on longer than he expected; you know, he did not anticipate, you know, the duration of these, and he had to take other decisions, to include getting rid of some of the production capabilities and other things.

SEN. REED: It seemed that the sanctions were working.

MR. DUELFER: Well, again, you know, if you look at a point in time, and if you look at-you know, it depends on what you mean-I hate to say this-by "working." The sanctions certainly were modifying Saddam's behavior. They were also having an enormous effect on the people in Iraq. And once Saddam elected to begin the oil-for- food program because of the devastation on the Iraqi population and because of the threats that that caused to his own regime, once those oil-for-food programs began, it provided all kinds of levers for him to manipulate his way out of sanctions.

So again, I come back to, you know, trying to avoid a static analysis and tried looking at it at a more dynamic analysis. You know, what are the trends? Where is this headed? And I apologize if I sound like I'm disappearing into jargon here, but to me, I think that's a distinction with a difference.

SEN. REED: Well, thank you. General, thank you.

My time's expired.