National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004-Continued
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004-CONTINUED
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, we are now going to resume consideration of S. 2845. Senator Lieberman and I, along with the two leaders, encourage Members to come forward with their amendments. The leaders are determined that we will finish this bill very early next week. In order to do so, we need the cooperation of all Senators who have filed amendments, and we encourage them to bring them forward.
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Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I commend the Senator from Arkansas for the diligence with which he approached the hearings throughout the August recess and the writing of this important legislation. I very much appreciate the comments of the Senator from Arkansas. He is always generous to me, as well as to the ranking member. We would be remiss if we did not thank him for his contributions to this bill. He was terrific about redoing his schedule throughout the August recess to participate in our numerous hearings. He was instrumental in drafting provisions of the bill including the requirement for the GAO report. I recognize his hard work and leadership and thank him for his kind comments.
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Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I thank our distinguished colleague from Florida, Senator Graham, for introducing this amendment that clarifies the role of the national intelligence centers that the NID is empowered to create under our bill.
Senator Graham, as former chair of the Intelligence Committee, and having just published a book on intelligence, provides this body with a very important perspective in this debate. His amendment strengthens the role of the national intelligence centers by placing them on par with the National Counterterrorism Center. This amendment provides much needed flexibility to the national intelligence director in establishing the centers. It allows the director to establish criteria for the centers to focus on vital areas of expertise.
The amendment also directs the national intelligence director to provide an annual report to Congress on the responsibilities of each of the centers that are created. This is an important aspect of this amendment. We can no longer afford to maintain the same percentage of Russian linguists today, for example, as we had during the Cold War. We have new wars, new challenges, new threats, and they demand new capabilities and responses as the 9/11 Commission Report indicated.
This amendment is well within the intent of the 9/11 Commission Report and recommendations as is evident by the letter that the Senator has from the chairman and vice chairman of the committee. I endorse the amendment on my side. I am happy to accept it. I thank the Senator for working closely with us.
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Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I join Senator Lieberman in commending Senator McCain for offering this amendment. It would make several changes to the Presidential transition process, changes that are consistent with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
The Governmental Affairs Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Voinovich, held a hearing on this issue at which two of the Commissioners, Fred Fielding and Jamie Gorelick, discussed how the current transition process does not serve our country well in the handing over, the transitioning of important national security decisions from one administration to another. One reason is that it is such a slow process to get the new administration's team in place.
I believe this amendment would greatly improve the process. I know of no opposition to it. I urge adoption of the amendment.
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Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, once again, I thank the Senator from Arizona for bringing up another series of recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission.
This is a very broad amendment. There is much in it which I support, and I agree with the Senator that there is a significant problem with fraudulent documents, including driver's licenses. Nevertheless, several groups, including the National Governors Association, the National Council of State Legislatures, and the American Civil Liberties Union, have expressed concerns regarding the degree to which some of the provisions in this amendment would infringe on the powers traditionally exercised by the States to set standards in the area of driver's licenses, for example. Therefore, I would like to suggest to the Senator that we continue working on these issues to see if we can resolve some of these concerns and that we set this amendment aside for the time being to allow for that.
Mr. McCAIN. I thank the manager. At this time I will not be proposing a further amendment.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, if I could get the attention of the manager of the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Maine yield the floor?
Ms. COLLINS. I yield the floor temporarily.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, we have a number of Members in and out of the Chamber who want to know when they can offer amendments and/or speak. Senator Cornyn is here, Senator Feinstein, Senator Lautenberg is here. I wonder if at least for
these three can we get a queue set up so they will know when they can be expected to speak.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I suggest, based on the conversations I have had with all who are present in the Senate now, we first yield to the Senator from California, who is going to discuss her proposal while we are continuing to work at the staff level on the language of her amendment; that we then go to the Senator from Texas, who has two amendments he would like to discuss-again, we are still working with the Senator from Texas-and we then proceed to the amendment Senator Lautenberg has proposed.
Mr. REID. If I could be recognized to further this dialog, I wonder if we could then have a consent agreement that the Senator from California be recognized for 10 minutes, the Senator from Texas be recognized on his two amendments for no more than 15 minutes, and the Senator from New Jersey would be recognized after that.
I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from California be recognized for 10 minutes; following that, the Senator from Texas be recognized for 15 minutes; and Senator Lautenberg be recognized for 15 minutes to offer his amendment.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, that unanimous consent agreement would work well from my perspective.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. We will now then go to the Senator from California.
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Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Texas for his comments. We look forward to working with him on his two additional amendments. We were pleased to be able to pass his first amendment to this bill last night. We appreciate his cooperation.
In consultation with the Senator from Nevada, the Democratic whip, I ask unanimous consent that the consent request previously entered into be altered so that Senator Byrd would be recognized for up to 25 minutes prior to Senator Lautenberg offering his amendment.
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Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Illinois for his terrific contributions to this bill. He was the individual who brought to the committee's attention the woefully deficient information systems that have hindered the war against terrorism.
I remember how shocked I was at our first hearing, when the Senator from Illinois described the FBI being unable to transmit pictures of the 9/11 terrorists to its field offices. He also told us the FBI did not have the capacity to transmit fingerprints to the Border Patrol. Those underscored, in a way that few have been able to do, the lack of an adequate, integrated communications network within the Federal Government.
We worked very closely with the Senator from Illinois on this section of the bill. It incorporates his thoughts, his language, and it is his leadership that is behind those important provisions. So I salute him for being out in front on this issue and helping us come up with provisions that I think are going to make a real difference.
I salute and thank the Senator from Illinois.
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AMENDMENT NO. 3823
Ms. COLLINS. I know Senator Conrad is waiting to have a colloquy with the managers of the bill. I do have an amendment that I think I can dispose of very quickly. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside. On behalf of Senator Voinovich, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Maine (Ms. Collins), for Mr. Voinovich, proposes an amendment numbered 3823.
Ms. COLLINS. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To improve the financial disclosure process under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978)
At the appropriate place insert the following:
SEC. __. FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND RECORDS.
(a) STUDY.-Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Office of Government Ethics shall submit to
Congress a report-
(1) evaluating the financial disclosure process for employees of the executive branch of Government; and
(2) making recommendations for improving that process.
(b) TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD RELATING TO PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED POSITIONS TO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES.-
(1) DEFINITION.-In this section, the term "major party" has the meaning given that term under section 9002(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
(2) TRANSMITTAL.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-Not later than 15 days after the date on which a major party nominates a candidate for President, the Office of Personnel Management shall transmit an electronic record to that candidate on Presidentially appointed positions.
(B) OTHER CANDIDATES.-After making transmittals under subparagraph (A), the Office of Personnel Management may transmit an electronic record on Presidentially appointed positions to any other candidate for President.
(3) CONTENT.-The record transmitted under this subsection shall provide-
(A) all positions which are appointed by the President, including the title and description of the duties of each position;
(B) the name of each person holding a position described under subparagraph (A);
© any vacancy in the positions described under subparagraph (A), and the period of time any such position has been vacant;
(D) the date on which an appointment made after the applicable Presidential election for any position described under subparagraph (A) is necessary to ensure effective operation of the Government; and
(E) any other information that the Office of Personnel Management determines is useful in making appointments.
© REDUCTION OF POSITIONS REQUIRING APPOINTMENT WITH SENATE CONFIRMATION.-
(1) DEFINITION.-In this subsection, the term "agency" means an Executive agency as defined under section 105 of title 5, United States Code.
(2) REDUCTION PLAN.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the head of each agency shall submit a Presidential appointment reduction plan to-
(i) the President;
(ii) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(iii) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives.
(B) CONTENT.-The plan under this paragraph shall provide for the reduction of-
(i) the number of positions within that agency that require an appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and
(ii) the number of levels of such positions within that agency.
(d) OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS REVIEW OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, in consultation with the Attorney General of the United States, shall conduct a comprehensive review of conflict of interest laws relating to Federal employment and submit a report to-
(A) the President;
(B) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
© the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives; and
(E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
(2) CONTENT.-The report under this subsection shall-
(A) examine all Federal criminal conflict of interest laws relating to Federal employment, including the relevant provisions of chapter 11 of title 18, United States Code; and
(B) related civil conflict of interest laws, including regulations promulgated under section 402 of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.). [Page S10026]
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I know the Presiding Officer has a great interest in the issue that we are about to briefly discuss. The amendment of Senator Voinovich would require the Office of Government Ethics to report to Congress on recommendations for streamlining the financial disclosure forms for the executive branch. In addition, the amendment would require each executive branch agency to examine the number of positions requiring Senate confirmation. It would ask the Office of Government Ethics to conduct a comprehensive review of the Government's conflict of interest laws, and it would require the Office of Personnel Management to provide Presidential candidates with a list of all appointed positions within 15 days of their party's nomination. This amendment is based on legislation that was favorably reported by the committee during the last Congress.
The 9/11 Commission recommended that the Senate should not require confirmation of appointees within the national security team below level 3 of the executive schedule. The Voinovich amendment lays the groundwork for this recommendation by requiring the executive branch to identify which positions could be eliminated from the confirmation process.
Review of that information by all Senate committees will help those of us in the Senate make a more informed and thoughtful decision on reducing specific positions that now require confirmation.
The financial disclosure requirements have been in effect for almost 25 years. Unfortunately, in some cases, they have deterred very good people from serving in the Federal Government. I hope this will lead to more effective, more efficient, and simpler requirements so it no longer will deter potential nominees from serving, or force them to go through great expense in order to comply with overly burdensome laws and regulations.
Again, this proposal is very consistent with the recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission and I urge acceptance of the amendment.
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Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, first of all, I thank the Senator from North Dakota for the thought he has given to this issue. I know he has a great interest in management structures, in making sure we have the most efficient structure possible to serve the taxpayers. So I very much appreciate the spirit with which he has raised these questions.
I want to make three concluding points to emphasize some of the points already made by my colleague from Connecticut.
First, it was evident as we studied this issue and read the 9/11 Commission Report that the current system does not foster the kind of communication and cooperation we desperately need. It is a series of stovepipes with no one having the ability to make the final decisions, to resolve conflicts, to move resources and people where they are most needed. You cannot go to the President of the United States on everything.
I have seen that firsthand in the staffing of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center where the Director feels he needs more resources, other decisions have been made by various agency heads, and there is no one to step in and set the priorities, move the people, and direct the resources. I think our bill really changes that.
Like Senator Lieberman, I was struck by Director Tenet's 12/98 memo in which he does this call to be at war and that all resources should be marshaled, and virtually nothing happened. That will change under our structure. There will be accountability under our structure because people will know who is in charge and whose call it is, and that is the national intelligence director. Our organization enhances accountability, cooperation, coordination, communication, and, most of all, results.
Second, the 9/11 Commission considered doing the kind of structure you have raised questions about. Essentially, that would be creating a department of intelligence. You would take all of these units out of the other agencies and do a brandnew department. And it felt-and I agree-that would be too disruptive, particularly at a time when we are at war; that it would be expensive, it would be complicated, it would take a long time to put into effect.
We have seen that with the Department of Homeland Security. That has been a massive undertaking. I am very proud of the leadership of Secretary Ridge and Admiral Loy, but it has not been without its growing pains. We just could not afford that kind of disruption right now.
Third would be the reaction of DOD if we took all of those entities out and put them in a new department. There was testimony of a former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency at a hearing on the House side in August. He said if you pulled those agencies, like the National Security Agency, the DIA, the NGA, the NRO-those that serve DOD and other consumers-if you pulled them out, you would see DOD re-creating within the Department new entities to replace those if you severed that link and transferred them. To quote William Odom, "You're just going to end up with a big mess" if you do that. That is why we came up with this structure.
Mr. CONRAD. The last reference of winding up "with a big mess," whose quote is that?
Ms. COLLINS. William Odom, who is a former head of DIA. So we felt the case was very persuasive for the kind of organizational structure we came up with. That was recommended by the 9/11 Commission.
Having said that, I am sure it is not perfect. I am sure we are going to learn from it. That is why we have reports required back to Congress after a year's time and by the General Accounting Office Accountability Office in 2 year's time, because
we want to make sure we get this right.
I think we have struck the right balance in the organizational structure we propose.
Mr. CONRAD. Let me conclude on this note: The thing I am most concerned about is having an entirely separate Central Intelligence Agency and an office of national intelligence director. The thing that I have a difficult time understanding is how that is not going to create its own turf battles, its own communications problems. I hope I am proved wrong by this, but it is the one thing I looked at and I was surprised by and, I must say, I wondered about.
I read the reports on the difficulties we had with the coordination between the CIA and the FBI and their turf battles and their unwillingness to share information. When we preserve the Central Intelligence Agency and create an office of national intelligence director and we still have, of course, the FBI's Office of Intelligence, I wonder whether we don't wind up with more turf battles. I know the intention is to avoid that and to appropriately create a place that will coordinate all the work of the intelligence community.
My great management concern is that we will wind up with additional turf battles. I hope that is not the case. I am glad the reviews are built in because I think that is important. I wanted to express these concerns publicly. I wanted to raise these issues and have a chance for the managers to fully respond.
I very much thank the chairman and the Senator from Connecticut.
Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. CONRAD. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I know Members are eager for us to vote on Senator Lautenberg's amendment, which I believe is the pending amendment. I hope to conclude the debate on that shortly and move to table his amendment. Senator Stevens is in the Chamber and would like to lay down a couple of amendments. I will delay the debate on the Lautenberg amendment until after Senator Stevens.
I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside so Senator Stevens may offer his amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I have enormous respect for the Senator from Alaska. He is an extraordinary Senator, with many years of experience. I do want to assure the Senator from Alaska that, contrary to the implication in his statement, the committee did not adopt the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission to declassify the aggregate budget totals of all the agencies that make up the national intelligence program. We did not adopt that recommendation of the 9/11 Commission because, based on our hearings and the testimony of our witnesses, we concluded that that goes too far and might well reveal information that would be helpful to those who would do us harm.
The only declassification in the Collins-Lieberman bill is the top line aggregate amount for the entire national intelligence program. It does not declassify the specific appropriations amount distributed to agencies such as the National Security Agency, or the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the CIA, even though the 9/11 Commission recommended declassification at that level.
Declassification, the top line, only that aggregate figure which has been estimated in the newspapers many, many times, I believe, will improve congressional and public oversight of the intelligence budget. It will help us with better decisionmaking
on resource distribution, and it will make the structure and the management of the intelligence community more transparent.
We asked our witnesses, including the Acting Director of the CIA, John McLaughlin, his views. And he, like most of our other expert witnesses, told us that as long as the specifics of the intelligence budget remain classified, there was no harm to national security to declassify just that top line aggregate amount.
I think we struck the right balance in this regard. What we did is we included a study asking the national intelligence director to report back to us-to the Congress-on whether further declassification was appropriate. But the only step we took was that top line aggregate amount. If you don't declassify that in order to have a separate appropriation, then you end up, I fear, with the status quo-the money going through DOD accounts once again. That greatly weakens the budget authority of the national intelligence director.
Again, I have enormous respect for the Senator from Alaska. I wanted to make clear what our bill does and what it doesn't do, because I think we have reached the right decision.
Mr. STEVENS. Will the chairman yield for a question?
Ms. COLLINS. Yes.
Mr. STEVENS. I am looking at the bill. The bill says the President shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of funds authorized and appropriated for the national intelligence program. Then I go back to the page 6 for the definition of national intelligence programs. It says:
Refers to all national intelligence programs, projects, and activities of the elements of the intelligence community;
Includes all programs, projects, and activities (whether or not pertaining to national intelligence) of the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Office of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of Information Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.
That involves five different bills in the appropriations process. We currently put in any one of those five bills a portion of the clandestine activities we are financing with these moneys. So what you are going to tell us is, we no longer can use any portion of those because we are going to disclose the whole amount in every one of those bills.
Listen to me. You have not lived with how we have financed the intelligence community. The money is not disclosed. It is put in parts of the budget and you don't know where it is. It rests with Senator Inouye and me, to be honest about it, and we make sure that is what it is. Maybe four people in the House and Senate know where this is. You are telling us to disclose it, without regard to where we put that money-disclose the money that is in each account and it goes into five separate bills. I say that is wrong. Wait until the NID comes into office and have him tell us how we can disclose what should be disclosed to the public. The public should not ask us to disclose this very classified, secret information to protect the future of the country through clandestine activities and acquisitions.
I ask the question, does the Senator understand what her bill does? It will disclose the aggregate amount of funds-disclose them all, including the very, very top secret items, which probably three or four people in the White House, a few people in the CIA, or the DIA, and maybe eight people in the Congress would know.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I direct the attention of the Senator from Alaska to line 16 on page 115, which clearly says that:
The President shall disclose to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of appropriations requested . . . for the National Intelligence Program.
It does not say that we are requiring disclosure of the appropriations for the elements that make up the national intelligence program.
Mr. STEVENS. It says:
The aggregate amount of funds authorized to be appropriated, and the aggregate amount of funds appropriated, by Congress for each fiscal year for each element of the intelligence community.
Both authorized and appropriated. That is on page 116, line 9.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I say respectfully to the Senator from Alaska that that refers to the study on whether there should be further declassification. It does not refer to the disclosure. The disclosure is only-and it is very clearly stated-of the aggregate amount of the appropriations for the national intelligence program.
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Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I will quote Acting CIA Director John McLaughlin from our September 8 hearing on this very issue. He said:
If there is a separate appropriation for the foreign intelligence program, the national intelligence program, as distinct from the current arrangement where that appropriation is buried in the larger Defense Department bill, I think it would make some sense to declassify the overall number for the foreign intelligence program.
That was typical of our witnesses.
I also note that the top line has been made public on occasion in the past. It was made public in 1997 and 1998 by the DCI.
At this point there are numerous Senators who are asking what the plan is for today and who are trying to catch planes. I ask for the regular order with respect to Lautenberg amendment No. 3802, and I ask unanimous consent that there be 2 minutes on each side prior to a motion to table the amendment. I further ask for the yeas and nays.
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Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the amendment offered by the Senator from South Carolina eviscerates the underlying bill. I want to be very clear about that. His amendment takes a radically different approach to intelligence reform. The Hollings amendment creates a national intelligence coordinator and transfers to this individual the responsibility and authority that the Director of Central Intelligence now has as head of the intelligence community. The DCI would remain as head of the CIA and principal adviser to the President.
This approach is completely contrary to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. It is completely contrary to the report of the congressional joint inquiry. It is completely contrary to numerous government and private sector reports over the past five decades.
The Hollings amendment gives the national intelligence coordinator the responsibility to manage the intelligence community but does not give that individual any additional authority to allow him to accomplish that task. The Hollings amendment also provides that except as otherwise provided by law, the national intelligence coordinator shall not be accountable to Congress regarding the performance of the responsibility of the coordinator. It is difficult to imagine why we would establish such a position with a list of legally defined responsibilities and authorities currently in the National Security Act of 1947, very important responsibilities and authorities which affected the security and the liberty of the American people, and then specifically provide that this individual is not accountable to Congress.
I am strongly opposed to this amendment. It guts the entire Collins-Lieberman bill. I urge my colleagues to defeat it.
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Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I commend Senator Rockefeller and Senator Hutchison for their amendment to improve the quality of intelligence analysis by creating a red team. Both of them talked to me very early on about the need for this improvement in our bill. Senator Roberts and Senator Mikulski have also been very interested in this issue. I am very pleased they have been able to come together. They have produced an excellent amendment that will improve the quality of intelligence analysis.
I also urge adoption of the amendment.
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Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, let me begin by saying that I very much appreciate the distinguished Senator from Virginia, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, working with Senator Lieberman and me to modify his amendment so that it is consistent with the goals of our legislation.
The JICC was suggested by the White House when we drafted our bill. I view it as an important component of the Collins-Lieberman bill because it provides a forum for the national intelligence director to solicit the views of and to receive advice from key Cabinet members on a wide variety of issues.
It is important for the members of the JICC-the Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, and other Departments, Treasury as well-to see the council as a way to communicate their views freely to the NID to help the NID reach the right decisions and to be a forum for a wide variety of issues.
It is also important for the NID to remain firmly in control as chairman of the council, and I believe the modification makes clear that it is the NID who is the chairman and who will regularly convene this council.
Senator Warner's amendment, as modified, meets both those goals. It strengthens the bill. I can speak on behalf of the ranking member of the committee in urging its adoption. I thank the Senator again for working with us.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished friend and colleague, the manager. Might I solicit her views on the concern I have-and I have not figured out how to do it. The views of the Secretaries of State and Defense are very important because they have their own internal intelligence functions and they are subjected to this, particularly those two Cabinet officers, on a daily basis.
The Director of the CIA will report to the national intelligence director. The national intelligence director-I do not know quite what the infrastructure will be. It is conceived, as the Senator from Maine said earlier today and several times, that she is not creating a whole new department. But the CIA Director will remain in charge of what I say is the most magnificent reservoir of professionals to be found anywhere in the world. I cannot give, because of classification, the numbers, but it is in the tens of thousands of these individuals all over the world. The CIA Director has instantaneous contact with them and personal association as he travels-or she, as the case may be-worldwide. It is a network of these intelligence people who have knowledge that comes back up to the Director. He is hands on. The NID will not have that hands-on experience, cannot possibly because he has so much to manage.
One of the reasons for this legislation is to split off the functions of the former head of the CIA, the Director of the whole Central Intelligence, and to give those responsibilities, as it relates to the national collection of the intelligence program, portions of it to the NID to operate now, leaving the Director of the CIA to manage primarily that agency.
Supposing the Director of the CIA has a strongly held opinion and viewpoint which is at variance with the national intelligence director, but when the national intelligence director goes in to brief the President and the Security Council, in all likelihood the Director of the CIA will be at Langley. I am not certain how that varying opinion is given to the President and the other structure at the White House and the other Cabinet officers who may be present-for instance, at the meetings of the council, how that opinion can be expressed. I have not thought of it. Maybe the chairman and I can work on this in the few days remaining on this bill. But I am concerned about it.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I would be happy to consult further with the Senator about his concern in this area. I note that the 9/11 Commission and numerous other commissions have determined that the CIA Director has too many roles right now; that he has three roles. He is the principal adviser to the President for intelligence, he is the head of the CIA, and he is the manager of the intelligence community. There is widespread consensus that is too much for the CIA Director to have, so our legislation alters those roles.
The CIA Director would run the CIA. The national intelligence director would not run the day-to-day operations of the CIA, but the national intelligence director would become the principal adviser to the President on intelligence. The national intelligence director would also be the manager of the national intelligence programs. So we have defined those roles in that manner, but we have not altered the fact that the CIA Director would still be a Presidential appointee, he would still be confirmed by the Senate, and he would still have lots of access, in my view, just as Cabinet members are always going to be able to get their views to the President.
I think the structure the Senator has improved, the joint intelligence community council, strengthens that flow of communication, but that structure is there. I do not believe that is going to be a problem.
I also point out to the Senator that the Senator made an excellent point earlier when he was talking about the need for competitive analysis for a variety of viewpoints to be presented to the President and that we did not see that work as well as it should have in recent cases.
We have put in extensive language in our bill due to amendments authored by Senator Levin, as well as the work Senator Lieberman and I and others have done, that makes very clear, for example, that when a National Intelligence Estimate is produced, that it has to highlight dissenting views. That does not happen now sufficiently. Often those dissenting views are hidden away in a footnote when they really should be up front for us to be aware that there are dissenting views and who has those dissenting views.
Another example: We require these estimates to have a confidence level attached to the prevailing view so we will know how much support that prevailing view has.
So throughout our bill there are requirements to make sure that dissenting views are heard. Indeed, the Rockefeller-Hutchinson amendment we just adopted also strengthens that by having the office of alternative analysis. So I think there are numerous safeguards to make sure that all voices are heard; that competitive analysis is strengthened; that dissenting views are highlighted.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, all along I have expressed complete concurrence in what the Senator has done in this bill to the extent the Senator and I have looked at various sections. I may have reservations about others and tomorrow I hope to engage with the Senator on a number of amendments.
As to the basic charter that the Senator outlined in her opening remarks, I am not going to at this time in any way indicate an objection. I just wanted to focus on this one individual, the CIA Director, who, as the Senator knows, under previous Presidents, and certainly President Bush, was in his office one way or another almost every day of the week working with him.
The CIA Director had this-I understand all of these responsibilities may be too much for one individual and I am not arguing about shifting that at the moment, but I am talking about this magnificent collection of individuals-and he is the boss-who take all of these risks together, collect and analyze and develop opinions and it comes up to him and he may form a view which is totally opposite to the NID, and the NID goes into the President. I have guaranteed here that the Cabinet officers have the right to have their views presented simultaneously, one view after another, to the President, but I am not satisfied yet that the views of the CIA Director, which could well be different than the analysis and conclusion of the NID, would be given to the President with the weight and sufficiency I think they merit.
Ms. COLLINS. I am certainly open to working with the distinguished Senator to address his concerns. I believe it would work similarly to how the views of the head of the NSA, the NRO, the NGA, and DIA get to the President now through the Secretary of Defense.
Under our bill, the CIA Director clearly reports to the NID, much as the head of the NSA reports to the Secretary of Defense. Nothing prevents the CIA Director or the NSA Director from going to the President, but we have changed the structure.
We are making the NID the principal adviser to the President for intelligence, but I cannot conceive of a situation where the NID would not be relying very heavily on the CIA Director for the advice that he is giving to the President. It would be foolhardy for him not to.
Mr. WARNER. I see the Senator's point. The Senator put out a very clear example of the NRO, the NSA, the old mapping agency, they report to the SECDEF-we have just given the SECDEF the right to have his views presented simultaneously if they are at variance with the NID at the time he meets with the President. That is not present in the Central Intelligence Agency. If those views vary, there is no obligation under the law to see that they are presented simultaneously.
The Senator says she cannot envision how they would not be. Well, it depends on the human factor, that these two individuals would get along and have a mutual respect. I can remember in my first term on the Intelligence Committee, there was a very colorful Director of the CIA, Mr. Casey. He was an extraordinary man. I remember he used to come in and testify before the committee. All the members would lean up like this because they could not understand him, to be honest. He spoke in a rather unusual way. I think he did that to get through his testimony pretty quickly and get out of that hearing room. I am trying to put a note of humor into some serious things, but let us hope the Senator is right that as this law goes forward those individuals entrusted, the NID and CIA Director, can have a mutual respect and a mutual professional bond that will enable the views of the CIA Director to be given to the President if they are at variance with the NID. That is left up to the human quotient. This amendment, if adopted, puts it in law, not for the CIA Director but for the other members.
Ms. COLLINS. I say to the distinguished Senator that I think the analogy is very similar. The Secretary of Defense is not required to present the views of the NSA to the President. I think this works in a more collaborative way than we are giving the system credit for.
We have to be careful, while we put in all of these safeguards-and I support the chairman's amendment-that we do not create a situation where it is unclear who is the principal adviser to the President. And that, under our bill, is the national intelligence director.
Mr. WARNER. In no way do I wish to in any way diminish the significance of the NID that is now being created presumably by law in the future. I think we have had a healthy discussion. I appreciate the distinguished manager accepting this amendment, and I will continue to work on the Director of the CIA issue which I continue to be concerned about. Maybe as a consequence of this colloquy, those who might be following it could come up with an idea. I hope they would communicate it to me or to the distinguished chairman.
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Ms. COLLINS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. I wish to express my appreciation to the distinguished manager. I look forward to rejoining her tomorrow. Let us hope that those amendments that I bring forward largely with my colleague Mr. Stevens will add to the strength of this bill.
Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Senator from Virginia for his contributions. It is always a pleasure to work with him, particularly on an issue that is so important to our Nation's security.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
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Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I ask the Democratic whip that those amendments be interspersed with Republican amendments.
Mr. REID. That is appropriate. I modify my request that that be the case.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I appreciate the assistance of the assistant Democratic leader. I echo his hope that Members will come to the Chamber tomorrow to offer and debate their amendments. We will delay the votes on those amendments until Monday, but we have an awful lot of work to be done. Senator Lieberman and I will be here tomorrow ready to engage on these amendments. I ask my colleagues to be here as well and help make progress on this very important bill. We are making some progress, but we are not making enough progress and we need to pick up the pace. We need to whittle down that amendment list. We need to have some of those amendments simply go away. I hope that will happen.