Executive Session
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
SENATE
Sept. 22, 2004
EXECUTIVE SESSION
NOMINATION OF PORTER J. GOSS TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE-CONTINUED
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. What is the pending business before the Senate?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is the nomination of PORTER GOSS.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I rise to speak in reference to that nomination.
Mr. President, I will vote against the nomination of Congressman PORTER GOSS to serve as the next Director of Central Intelligence. I do so reluctantly. I have known Congressman Goss for a number of years, and I consider him a good person and a good public servant. But we are on the verge of enacting significant, historic, and much needed reform of the U.S. intelligence community. It is more important than ever that the next leader of the intelligence community be nonpartisan and firmly committed to meaningful intelligence reform.
Based on his record and his public statements, and on the confirmation hearings before the Intelligence Committee on which I serve, I do not believe Mr. Goss is the right person at this moment in time for this vitally important national security position.
Mr. Goss has served as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee for almost 8 years, the second longest tenure in that position in the almost 30 years since its creation. The chairman of a congressional committee has considerable power in determining on which issues the committee will focus, and the manner in which they will conduct their oversight. I believe this oversight record is a reasonable measure of Mr. Goss's likely effectiveness in managing the intelligence community during this highly challenging transitional period.
Despite having served on the Aspin-Brown-Rudman commission on the roles and capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community in 1996, 8 years ago, and cochairing, along with Senator Bob Graham, a joint inquiry into the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and serving on the House Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence for almost 10 years, Congressman Goss's record demonstrates that he has been more a protector of the status quo than an agent of meaningful reform. Only a few months ago did Congressman Goss introduce, for the first time, legislation to reform the intelligence community. It should be noted that on July 25, 2002, Mr. Goss voted against the amendment of Congressman Tim Roemer of Indiana on the House floor creating the independent National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. That is an incredible fact that must be taken into consideration.
The man who is seeking to be head of the Central Intelligence Agency, at this moment, when significant reform is about to take place, voted against the creation of the 9/11 Commission, which has inspired both parties and the President to our current state.
This 9/11 Commission Report is the foundation upon which current intelligence reform efforts are being undertaken. I met personally with Congressman Goss because I do respect him, and I wanted to hear his explanation. How can he ask to be head of the CIA, when he voted against the creation of the 9/11 Commission?
His argument was not convincing. He argued it was a matter of timing; that while he was undertaking a joint inquiry about 9/11, the creation of a separate commission might, in fact, lead to the executive branch stalling information or refusing to cooperate. That was hardly a satisfying answer.
In addition, it appears that as chairman of the House Intelligence Oversight Committee, Congressman Goss has been reluctant to conduct aggressive oversight of Intelligence Committee issues, particularly when they appear to deal with issues that may be embarrassing to the current administration. For example, although the Senate Intelligence Committee completed the first phase of its inquiry into the intelligence community's performance regarding prewar intelligence related to Iraq, and issued a public report, the House Intelligence Committee, under Mr. Goss's leadership, has yet to complete a similar thorough investigation, despite starting it last year.
As another example, in June of this year during the House Intelligence Committee's markup of the fiscal year 2005 Intelligence Authorization Act, Mr. Goss led a party-line vote to reject an amendment that would have required the Department of Defense to provide an accounting of the nature and extent of its contacts with the Iraqi exile leader, Ahmed Chalabi.
Why is that significant? I hope that people who are following this debate remember Ahmed Chalabi. He was the self-proclaimed leader of an Iraqi national congress. He was the one you couldn't miss on talk shows before the invasion of Iraq. He was the one spreading the information far and wide across America and around the world about the threats of Saddam Hussein. He was the person who was the favored and trusted ally of our Department of Defense when they made critical decisions about committing thousands of American soldiers and their lives to the cause of Iraq.
What do we know of Ahmed Chalabi? We know that some 5 years ago, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State stopped dealing with Mr. Chalabi because they did not believe he was credible. They didn't trust his judgment. They wouldn't bring him into the councils to make important decisions.
But Department of Defense Under Secretary Rumsfeld and his special assistant, Mr. Douglas Feith, thought Chalabi was just what the doctor ordered. He was there to confirm the fears that they spread across America about Saddam Hussein. He was there to confirm the presence of weapons of mass destruction, which became the clarion call of this administration, drawing us into an invasion of Iraq. He was the one constantly suggesting that there was a connection between the 9/11 terrorism in the United States and Saddam Hussein.
What happened to Ahmed Chalabi? Those who follow news know what happened. He went to Iraq, became a somewhat controversial figure in the provisional government, returned to the United States, and was treated by some in the administration as a conquering hero.
In fact, at one moment in time, to the embarrassment, I am sure, of everyone involved today, Ahmed Chalabi was positioned behind the First Lady at one of President Bush's State of the Union Addresses so that he would be on camera, showcased before the American people.
Fast forward just a few months. Ahmed Chalabi has now been the subject of extensive searches by the American Government because of our suspicion that he has not only misled us about information on Iraq but has had some connection with Iran of an entirely dubious nature. Ahmed Chalabi is persona non grata in this country. We are no longer sending him some $350,000 to $360,000 a month to subsidize his lifestyle. He virtually has been banished from his role as prime adviser to the United States.
When Mr. GOSS was confronted with this and asked by his own committee for an investigation as to how Mr. Chalabi, discredited by the CIA, discredited by the State Department, became the darling and favorite of the Department of Defense, peddled bad information to the United States and the American people, and may have betrayed us to Iran-when he was asked to investigate this, he declined. He refused. You have to ask yourself: If Mr. GOSS was unable or unwilling to ask the most basic questions about Ahmed Chalabi, how aggressive, how objective will he be as Director of the CIA?
That is not the only thing. One of the most important issues we have to keep in mind is that the men and women of our intelligence community are dedicated, patriotic, hard-working people committed to the security of our Nation. Occasionally, there will be those who will disappoint us, but that is true of virtually every institution in America. But remembering their patriotism and the fact that many of them put their lives on the line, there came a moment in time when columnist Robert Novak outed the identity of a CIA agent, Valerie Plame. This is not only disgraceful, it is dangerous. It meant that her life and her career were in danger. It sent ripples through the intelligence community of men and women in similar positions wondering who would step forward in Washington to stand up for the integrity of our agents in the intelligence community. Mr. GOSS was then chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. He was asked in October 2003 whether he would investigate the purposeful identification of covert CIA agent Valerie Plame. Mr. GOSS responded, "If somebody sends me a blue dress and some DNA, I'll have an investigation."
Mr. GOSS apologized publicly and privately for that statement, but the fact remains that he was loathe to challenge any intelligence-related decision of this administration.
That is not at all reassuring when we consider the well-documented intelligence failures leading up to 9/11 and prior to the invasion of Iraq.
This is not a routine appointment. This is not a routine position. Intelligence is the first line of defense in our war against terrorism. It is the first line of defense for the American people and our national security. Having the best intelligence network and the best intelligence agency will be critical if we want our children to live in peace and safety. That is why it is so essential that we bring a person to this job who understands what we have lived through during the past 4 years.
Lengthy reports by the 9/11 Commission, as well as the Joint Intelligence Committee's inquiry, have come to the conclusion that our intelligence agency failed us before the 9/11 attack. We know now that they should have gathered more information, shared more information, drawn obvious conclusions, and done something proactive to protect America. They did not and 3,000 innocent Americans died in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New York.
Similarly, there came a point in time when we had to make a critical decision in America whether to launch a preemptive attack against Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the first such preemptive attack in our history. We were told it was essential that we do so. We were told by the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the head of the CIA, and virtually every spokesman of the Government that it was essential we attack Saddam Hussein because he had arsenals of weapons of mass destruction which could be used against the Middle East, other countries in the region and the United States, that he was developing nuclear weapons that would be a danger to the world, that he possessed unmanned aerial vehicles that could even strike the United States, that he was linked with the al-Qaida attacks of 9/11, and the list goes on and on. Today, a year and a half after the invasion, we have found that intelligence information was wrong, just plain wrong.
Think of it. Depending on the intelligence community as our first line of defense, it failed. It failed to alert us of the danger of 9/11, it failed to accurately assess the state of one nation, Iraq, before we launched an invasion which has cost us over 1,000 American soldiers' lives, over 7,000 seriously wounded, and literally billions of dollars.
Can the intelligence community continue with business as usual? No. If there was ever a time in our history when we needed someone clearly nonpartisan, someone who would stand up to a President of either political party and tell them the sober, cold truth, even if it wasn't popular, if there was ever a time that we needed a Director of the CIA determined to reform that agency and the other intelligence agencies under his supervision, that time is today. This is not a routine nomination. This is a nomination as important as any to be considered by the Senate.
I will not go into the lengthy partisan statements made by Mr. Goss so many times in the past where he has taken to task my political party, members of it, suggesting that we were weak on defense, weak on intelligence. In fact, he was drawn into this Presidential campaign in a role now which he has neither explained nor given us much to work with.
When we went to Mr. Goss and said, You have criticized Senator Kerry and Democrats for intelligence spending but back in 1995 you were the cosponsor of a budget proposal that would have had a minimum 20-percent cut in our intelligence community personnel, he wouldn't answer the question. When confronted by Senator Rockefeller with his obvious contradiction between his accusations and his actions, Mr. Goss refused to acknowledge the obvious. The best he could tell us was, "The record is the record." I don't know what that means. I have never before heard it from another witness nor nominee. But it basically told the Intelligence Committee he wasn't about to discuss the issue with us.
I am sorry. I think Mr. Goss should have been open and candid and told us exactly what he meant, and if he made a mistake to concede that point. It would have put him in a much better position to be a credible agent for nonpartisan leadership and for change as Director of the CIA.
Because I have serious doubts about Mr. Goss's commitment to reform, his ability to be independent and nonpartisan, I do not believe he is the right person to be serving at the helm of the intelligence community during this extraordinarily challenging time and I will oppose his nomination.
I concede the outcome of the vote on this nomination. I assume he will be comfortably confirmed by the Senate.
I sincerely hope Mr. Goss will take my comments and the comments of those who vote against him as a challenge to him in his new role at the CIA. I hope he proves me wrong. I hope that I stand before this Chamber in the future and say he was nonpartisan, he was committed to reform, he was prepared to tell this administration and any administration he served the truth, even if it was politically painful. I hope that day will come.
I yield the floor.