Hearing of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee
September 14, 2004 Tuesday
HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE SELECT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: NOMINATION OF REPRESENTATIVE PORTER J. GOSS TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CHAIRED BY: SENATOR PAT ROBERTS (R-KS)
WITNESS: REPRESENTATIVE PORTER GOSS (R-FL)
LOCATION: 562 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.
SEN. RICHARD DURBIN (D-IL): Congressman Goss and Mrs. Goss, thank you for being with us today.
One of the significant differences between the House and the Senate, of course, is this nomination process. And I will tell you that I've come to believe, since 9/11 and my service on the Intelligence Committee, that next to the president's Cabinet and lifetime appointments to the federal courts, this appointment to the CIA is one of the most serious and most important assignments that we have to consider. Intelligence is literally our first line of defense in the war against terrorism, and that's why this nomination hearing has to be taken so seriously and your appointment taken more seriously than many others.
I've said publicly that you are a good person. My service with you convinces me of that. There are a multitude of appointments in this administration that you would be excellent to be part of.
But I would tell you today that I come to this nomination with two very fundamental questions, and that is whether you're the right person for this job in light of what's happened to America on 9/11 and in the invasion of Iraq, and I looked at two or three specific things.
Number one, are you reform-minded? Do you have it within you to really undertake what will be titanic battles to reform intelligence in America, which I think is long overdue? Secondly, will you be nonpartisan? And I think you've said from the outset that that is one of the most important elements in your service in this position if you are nominated (sic).
Now I will tell you this, Mr. Goss, because I know you and I know your competence: whoever briefed you for this hearing and said that, when you get in a tight spot over something you have said or done, keep repeating "the record is the record" did you no great service. That is a dismissive comment that you never should have included, I think, in your comments before this committee. It basically tells us that you're not prepared to answer or discuss some important things about you and your background and your beliefs. And that leaves us, as Senator Wyden has said, at a real disadvantage when it comes to answering these fundamental questions.
On the issue of partisanship, I have to tell you, Vice Chairman Rockefeller's presentation about the budget figures speak for themselves. You made some allegations about John Kerry and about the Democrats which, when they're compared to your own record, don't stand up. They were entirely partisan, and not that we all aren't guilty of it from time to time, but I think you should have given us a little more in terms of how you got into that fix and why you were asked to take on this aggressive partisan role when it came to John Kerry.
But even more important than this election, which will come or go, is the whole question of your loyalty to the administration at times when serious questions were raised about the political misuse of intelligence. This whole question of Ahmed Chalabi; to say that oversight worked well on Chalabi is to ignore the obvious. Chalabi was dismissed as a non-credible person by the CIA and the State Department's INR while he was being used as the leading witness and expert by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Now to say that oversight worked well-one of those agencies was wrong, and history has shown us that the Defense Intelligence Agency was wrong. Ahmed Chalabi is now under investigation for perhaps treason. And this man, who was posted to sit behind the first lady at the State of the Union address, is an embarrassment to us. And to say that oversight worked there I don't think is appropriate.
On the Valerie Plame incident, I'm not going to recount your statement, which you have said you regret and we all make statements we regret. But you said what you were looking for, the point you wanted to make was this was about evidence, not about allegations. The evidence was Robert Novak's column. That was the evidence. This woman, this professional, literally had her professional career and her life in jeopardy because someone-according to Mr. Novak, in the White House-disclosed her identity. I don't know what more evidence you'd like or want to initiate an investigation, but you didn't do it.
On the Abu Ghraib scandal, to criticize the Senate for being a "circus," I wish the House would have looked at this scandal as aggressively as the Senate did. Again, it was an episode during the Bush administration which could have brought embarrassment to the president during an election cycle, and you chose as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee not to get involved, raising questions again about whether or not you can be nonpartisan in this position.
On your commitment to reform, you're part of the 1996 commission, Aspin, Brown and Rudman commission.
And as Senator Wyden has said, you've been after the 9/11 Commission vote. There's no evidence that you have introduced significant reform legislation until just three months ago. You voted against the creation of the 9/11 Commission when the White House opposed it. When you lost that vote on the floor and the White House changed its position, you embraced it. That was what many in your party did. But it doesn't show the commitment to reform that many of us are looking for.
Also, I have to really look at your committee, House Intelligence and Senate Intelligence, and say that we have been accused of not being reform-minded. This 9/11 Commission report, which we have all praised to high heaven, and should, on page 420 says, "Congressional oversight for intelligence and counterterrorism is now dysfunctional." Now, that happened on our watch, Congressman, while you were chairman, and while I served here. What did we do to show a commitment to reform?
Let me be specific in the question that I think may get to the heart of this, as far as I am concerned. We now have allegations that there is at least an alternative, if not a rogue intelligence operation, at work in the Department of Defense under Mr. Douglas Feith. Do you feel the Department of Defense under Secretary Rumsfeld and Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz, specifically DIA and Mr. Douglas Feith, have gone too far in creating an alternative intelligence effort, specifically in their lionizing Ahmed Chalabi and in the dogged efforts which they made to try to legitimize some meeting in Prague involving Mohamed Atta?
REP. GOSS: The-this issue of Mr. Feith's position, I believe he's not actually in the intelligence community. I think he's in the policy side of the community. And I'm not sure that, as DCI, if I am confirmed, that my portfolio goes that far into the secretary of Defense's territory. That's a question I just would have to explore further. I've already said very clearly that I do believe that there can be no policy contamination of the intelligence product. Intelligence informs policy makers, not the other way around.
Now, do I believe any cabinet secretary has the right to go out and do his business or her business the way they see fit, subject to the appropriate oversight on the Hill? The answer is of course, and subject to following the laws of the land. Do I feel that oversight as it applied to intelligence worked in the Chalabi case? The answer is yes for this reason: we found out in the oversight committees that there was a question with the sourcing. The information that came through that channel was not, in my view, sufficiently better explained.
SEN. DURBIN: But Mr. Goss, we found out AFTER we invaded. We found out AFTER we had committed 140,000 troops. We found out after hundreds of Americans lost their life. To say that oversight worked is to ignore the obvious. Years ago the CIA dismissed Ahmed Chalabi while he was being feted and elevated by this administration as a reliable person. Oversight did not work. We ended up in a war that he is, frankly, laughing at us over. He told the British press, "So, we didn't find weapons of mass destruction. I achieved what I wanted: American troops are in Iraq and Saddam Hussein is gone." Oversight didn't work.
REP. GOSS: Senator, I agree with you on your observation, which I-I think is what I-you're implying, is that we did not have enough good sources in Iraq. I certainly do agree with that. And that I would not consider Mr. Chalabi a great source.
SEN. DURBIN: So let's go back to my first question. Here is the DIA lionizing Mr. Chalabi, trying to create this link between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, at war with the CIA in terms of its sources and its presentations. I want to know this: If you become the director of the CIA, what will you do about this rogue intelligence operation in the Department of Defense?
REP. GOSS: Senator, I certainly would not want to characterize anything as a "rogue intelligence operation" unless I had ample evidence and much more background information than I do.
But if there were a rogue activity going on that was in any way tarnishing or affecting the product that I am responsible for providing to the very, very important customers that the community has, if I'm confirmed, obviously I would deal with it rather directly.
SEN. DURBIN: Are you familiar with that I've talked about here, this competition and this friction between the Defense intelligence operation and the CIA? You must be familiar with this.
REP. GOSS: Senator, of course I am aware that there are different views in many of the agencies about the consensus of opinions that the intelligence community comes up with and delivers. I think that's healthy to have competitive analysis going on. It's when that competitive analysis is no longer part of the teamwork that that would be a problem.
SEN. DURBIN: Do you think it went too far when it came to Mr. Feith's efforts and the DIA's efforts to create the scenario that led to the invasion of Iraq, that misled not only the administration but the American people about the reality on the ground in that country?
REP. GOSS: I simply don't have the answer to that. It would require a judgment on facts that I don't have and didn't have as the chairman of the committee.
SEN. DURBIN: As chairman of the House Intelligence Committee you don't have an opinion as to whether they went too far?
REP. GOSS: Senator, I'm no longer the chairman of that committee, and I have-you have stated your concern about my independence and my nonpartisanship, and I don't think it's appropriate for me to go down that road.
SEN. DURBIN: I will just tell you, if you were candid with me in that answer it would convince me that you will be nonpartisan. But the fact that you reserve judgment whenever it gets close to be critical of this administration continues to trouble me.
I yield, Mr. Chairman.