Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee - Defense Department Detention Operations

Federal News Service

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DETENTION OPERATIONS

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)

WITNESSES: JAMES SCHLESINGER, CHAIRMAN, INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DETENTION OPERATIONS; HAROLD BROWN, MEMBER, PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS

LOCATION: 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BODY:
SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Thank you very much.

Secretary, Mr. Secretary, thank you for your report. And I think one thing you did, among many admirable things, is to make it quite clear that Operation Iraqi Freedom was governed by the Geneva Convention. Afghanistan was not. Guantanamo was not.

But I think you also raise the complexity. And I think the best way, from my view, to approach this is not the procedures but the types of people that are categorized: enemy prisoners of war, under the third Geneva Convention, protected persons under the fourth Geneva Convention, and a third category, perhaps, of unlawful combatant.

Now, Dr. Brown, in your testimony you suggested that this definition of unlawful combatant as applied to Iraq was restricted to foreign terrorists. Is that --

MR. BROWN: That's my understanding --

SEN. REED: Is that your understanding?

MR. BROWN: -- that resisters --

SEN. REED: Foreign terrorists?

MR. BROWN: Yeah. Resisters don't qualify under that category.

SEN. REED: Now, in October of 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld, at the request of Mr. Tenet, ordered military chain of command to deny the-at least the registration rights on the Geneva Convention to an individual who I believe is an Iraqi citizen, part of Ansar al-Islam. Do you think that is consistent with the application of the Geneva Convention to Iraq? Sep 09, 2004 17:04 ET .EOF

MR. SCHLESINGER: You going to take that?

The answer to that is no, it's not consistent.

MR. BROWN: If that happened-if that happened, that is not consistent.

SEN. REED: That's not consistent.

MR. BROWN: The-I think that that is something that will-should be examined under the heading of intelligence, if I may just throw in that --

SEN. REED: Thank you, Mr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Now, this decision was staffed down the line from General Myers, General Sanchez, General Abizaid. It was a decision of the secretary of Defense, it was an order given by him. Do you think that in any way either colored their judgments about what they could do, i.e., we can declare anybody an enemy combatant here if we think they're dangerous enough, or it simply reflected the fact that this issue of the rules of the game were confused, not just in Iraq and Sanchez, but all the way up to the secretary of Defense's office?

MR. SCHLESINGER: They are-I think special rules that apply to the CIA, and that in our discussion we recommended that what needs to be a better definition of the relationships between the CIA and the DOD.

SEN. REED: Dr. Brown?

MR. BROWN: I'm not sure how the-this event affected the thinking of those military commanders. But we did not see any sign that they acted in a way that corresponded: that is, that they created ghost prisoners.

SEN. REED: All right. Let me ask a follow-up question, if I may. My understanding of the opinion of the White House counsel, Mr. Gonzalez, is that the only individual that could designate people as enemy combatants or to relieve the restrictions of the Geneva Convention was the president of the United States. Is that correct? Or is that delegated to the secretary of Defense?

MR. SCHLESINGER: I do not know the answer to that.

MR. BROWN: I don't know. I don't know.

SEN. REED: Is that a question that's worth pursuing?

MR. SCHLESINGER: Yes, indeed. I think that you have to pursue that, as I say, in the intelligence area.

SEN. REED: Thank you.

Let turn to --

SEN. WARNER: We're losing your voice again, Dr. Schlesinger.

MR. SCHLESINGER: I'm sorry.

SEN. WARNER: That mike is quite directional.

MR. SCHLESINGER: I'm sorry.

SEN. WARNER: Yeah.

MR. SCHLESINGER: Did I-is there something I should repeat?

SEN. WARNER: I-I'll leave that up to the senator. I think I heard him --

SEN. REED: I think the answer was that we-that should be pursued. And --

MR. SCHLESINGER: In the intelligence channel, yes.

SEN. REED: Let me change the subject. You are critical of General Fast for her performance of her duty.

We heard today, from General Kern and from his colleagues, that they have a great deal of admiration for her performance in many aspects. And I share that, having met her briefly. But what is revealing to me is that General Fast's responsibilities were divided-not formally, but effectively-between General Sanchez and Mr. Bremer.

Did you ask Ambassador Bremer or anyone in the CPA of what instructions or decisions that they gave to her or anyone else with respect to Abu Ghraib intelligence operations?

Dr. Schlesinger? Dr. Brown.

MR. SCHLESINGER: No.

MR. BROWN: We didn't speak with Jerry Bremer.

SEN. REED: So you have a critical intelligence officer who was at the heart of so much of this who is responding not only to General Sanchez but to the direct representative of the secretary of Defense, Ambassador Bremer, and he has not been questioned. That's correct?

MR. BROWN: That's correct.

SEN. REED: Who did the CIA station chief work for effectively in Iraq?

MR. BROWN: You'll have to --

MR. SCHLESINGER: Let me modify that statement about Ambassador Bremer. He was nominally under the secretary of Defense; but in fact, he responded directly to the White House.

SEN. REED: He responded directly to the White House. And let me again-my time is expiring. Effectively, who did the CIA station chief work for in Iraq?

MR. SCHLESINGER: The CIA station chief should be working for Ambassador Bremer.

SEN. REED: Should be working for Ambassador Bremer. General Fast is working for Ambassador Bremer.

Much of the difficulties we've seen, the reports of abuse, stem from a failure to coordinate military rules and regulations with the Central Intelligence Agency. All leads seem to lead to CPA, and through CPA directly to the White House, in this regard. Is that the subject of an appropriate inquiry?

MR. SCHLESINGER: Well, all these lead strikes me a little strong, but it certainly points in that direction, yes, sir.

SEN. REED: Dr. Brown?

MR. BROWN: Yes.

SEN. REED: Thank you very much.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. REED: Mr. Chairman, if I may, since I posed the question. I don't want to unfairly take advantage of the response.

My question was, simply stated, is that Ambassador Bremer had significant responsibilities for both coordinating the Central Intelligence Agency operations and also coordinating many of the activities of the intelligence chain of command in the military under General Fath (sic/Fast). He has not been asked by any panel any significant questions about what guidance he gave to either the CIA or to General Fath (sic/Fast). I think this is all correct. I assumed until I was corrected by Secretary Schlesinger that he was directly under the direction of the secretary of Defense. So my question was simply that. I just think that is a huge, huge gap in any kind of accountability of what went on with respect to Abu Ghraib and many other things in Iraq.

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.