Federal News Service - Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee - Transcript

Federal News Service

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE SUBJECT: PROGRESS IN THE RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION OF IRAQ

CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE JOEL HEFLEY (R-CO)

WITNESSES:

COLONEL MICHAEL LINNINGTON, USA, FORMER BRIGADE COMMANDER, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION;

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JEFFREY SPRINGMAN, USA, FORMER COMMANDER, 3RD BATTALION IN SUPPORT OF THE 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION; CAPTAIN PATRICK COSTELLO, USA, FORMER ADA, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION;

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRYAN P. MCCOY, USMC, FORMER COMMANDER, 3RD BATTALION, 4TH MARINE REGIMENT; CAPTAIN MORGAN SAVAGE, USMC, FORMER COMPANY COMMANDER, 3RD BATTALION, 4TH MARINE REGIMENT

LOCATION: 2118 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BODY:

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

REP. KEN CALVERT (R-CA): The hearing will please come to order. The next person to ask questions is Congressman Calvert, who is temporarily the chair. And I appreciate, gentlemen, for coming today and I certainly want to be one of those who thank you for your service. I recently returned from Iraq. Also I was there with Chairman Hunter and Congressman Reyes and we certainly saw evidence of all the good that the military has done and continue to do every day. Unfortunately, that is not being conveyed to the American public but certainly we're very appreciative of that.

But one problem that, when we were in-one part of the theater was Fallujah and I probably want to specifically ask the Marines this question. But certainly you guys are there and obviously April was a very tough month. We suffered significant casualties not just in Fallujah but in other parts of Iraq. But that seems to be the crossroads of insurgency at this time and certainly we got some bad news over the weekend of what's occurring in Fallujah. So I'd like to get, starting with Colonel McCoy, your feelings about how do we deal with Fallujah. Is that a problem that you think needs to be resolved in order for us to stop the transshipping of not just individuals but bombs and other paraphernalia that's being shipped apparently through Fallujah.

COL. McCOY: Sir, my involvement with Fallujah lasted about five weeks when we were called from Western Al Anbar into Fallujah and participated in Operation Vigilant Resolve. The thrust of your question, respectfully Mr. Chairman, is really outside of my line. As a battalion commander, I execute tactical tasks. That's exactly what I did. I executed tactical tasks while we were there in Fallujah and frankly, we took the fight to the enemy. And that's pretty much where my lane ends, sir.

REP. CALVERT: Staying on that vein, the enemy in Fallujah, what did you see there? Define insurgency. Was it mainly a local insurgency or is it some foreign fighters also?

COL. McCOY: I think we were fighting, from my experience, we were fighting this insurgency which at large actually has a few components to it. There are the foreign fighters that were there to further their cause, turn Iraq into the next Afghanistan, Baghdad into the next Beirut.

REP. CALVERT: Is there a percentage that anecdotally you can share with us? What you've seen in the field, what percentage of foreign fighter versus --

COL. McCOY: It would be pure speculation. Since I wasn't able to take a census with these guys, it's hard to tell who's shooting at you, whether he's one of the criminal elements that are out to make a buck or if it is a former Baath Party regime or a hard-core terrorist. I will tell you, in Fallujah, you can tell when you're up against a guy that has a little more formal training and you have to make sure that your tactics are very precise when you deal with them.

They are much more accurate, much more lethal than if you're going up against the guy that's firing an RPG at you for a couple of hundred bucks. When you deal with a professional terrorist, you know it. Their fire is much more accurate and you need to be much more careful.

We did run into a combination of all three, I believe, in Fallujah. There were very well trained insurgents that we fought. They fought from four to five houses that were constructed in a textbook manner and we also fought against those that were not as proficient.

REP. CALVERT: The criminal element, are these folks being paid for by former Baathist or foreign fighters in order to inflict casualties?

COL. McCOY: Yes, sir. When we follow the money, it's coming from former Baath Party, where they get their money, or from foreign terrorists that are also kind of extending their reach, their operational reach if you will, by getting some surrogate foot soldiers to do some of their bidding.

REP. CALVERT: Any other comments from the panel in regard to the insurgency. The insurgency, in general, the components of the insurgency movement today and what kind of progress? I think, Colonel, I'll talk to you and then we'll talk to the others.

COL. LINNINGTON: Mr. Chairman, one of the things we looked at was money as ammunition. In a lot of cases, the unemployment issues in Iraq were what fed the insurgency because especially some of the young men are looking for ways to earn money and one way, of course, is to attack Americans, if you are paid by former Baath officials or foreign extremists. So as we use the money this Congress provided us to rebuild the infrastructure of Iraq, we tried to hire as many folks as we could so that we remove that opportunity to hire poor Iraqi young men specially to participate in the insurgency. So we appreciate your support there.

REP. CALVERT: Colonel Springman.

COL. SPRINGMAN: Sir, I believe we saw very similar. There were definitely those who were just being paid off the street to attack and those who are better trained. And I would agree with the last comment, the more we got back to work either through our projects or through just the economy itself rebuilding, the less good being paid to attack us-like to them especially with the inherent dangers there. And the attacks became fewer from the people just being paid to attack us, sir.

REP. CALVERT: Captain, you just got back in July. How do you see that?

CAPT. SAVAGE: Sir, I look at it from two perspectives. One was a constant fight for the 80 percent gray. Ten percent are committed to doing aligning with us. In other words, those that could go one way or the other, that's where creating the conditions for them to understand our cause and understand that we're there to help them get back on their feet was so critical because if these conditions existed, a sense of despair existed among the disenchanted youth, then the concern is that there would be more enemy. That's why getting out there with the civil affairs projects was important.

The second part to that is it seemed those that were better trained, whether they be foreign fighters or former Baathist members, could definitely spark or ignite a certain sense of euphoria. I think the term in RCT-1 headquarters was "drunk with jihad" but after getting smacked down and after they got punished quite severely, I think that would go a way and you'd be left with those that are diehard committed to killing Americans and the rest would be like, it's not so cool to jump on the bandwagon.

REP. CALVERT: Captain Costello.

CAPT. COSTELLO: Sir, I'd like to echo what Colonel Linnington and Colonel Springman said. The big difference is the money paid in keeping those potential guys on our side of the fence.

REP. CALVERT: Thank you.