Text of Senator Charles Schumer's Letter to Robert Mueller, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Dear Director Mueller:

This week marks the tenth anniversary of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing that took the lives of six people, injured over a thousand others, and awoke domestic law enforcement to the fact that terrorists were ready, willing, and able to strike at the heart of America. In the wake of the 1993 bombing, and the ensuing Oklahoma City bombing and the 9/11 attacks, the hue and cry for FBI reform reached a crescendo last year.

While many needed improvements, like computer upgrades and managerial reforms, have been considered and discussed, very little has been done to address the one area that impacts the FBI's ability to prevent future attacks: data analysis. I am writing today to ask why the FBI has failed to improve the way it analyzes data and would like to share the results of an informal review I have conducted on the FBI's efforts to address the way it conducts data analysis. My review suggests that the Bureau's analysts remain undertrained and understaffed.

We know that several data analysis missteps could have been avoided had investigations been properly staffed with enough well-trained analysts. For example, the failures that led to the 9/11 attacks were not so much the result of having too little information as much as they were a failure to connect dots that were present. According to the Congressional Joint Inquiry Staff report of September 18, 2002, "the FBI's al-Qa'ida-related analytic expertise had been 'gutted' by transfers to operational units and that, as a result, the FBI's [international terrorism] analytic unit had only one individual working on al-Qa'ida at the time of the September 11 attacks."

If domestic intelligence is to remain the responsibility of the FBI, a question that gains greater relevance given the issues raised in this letter, the FBI's efforts to reform its analysis of data must become more of a priority. Specifically, the FBI must improve its mode of analysis, increase its number of analysts, and improve their overall quality.

One of the primary criticisms of the FBI's work as a terrorism-prevention agency is that its agents and analysts are trained to solve crimes after they happen, not stop them while they are being planned. Criminal investigators and terrorism intelligence agents use different processes and strategies to conduct gather information and evaluate it. The Central Intelligence Agency has established a standard process for converting raw information into finished intelligence for use in decision-making called the Intelligence Cycle. It consists of five basic steps that have become the gold standard for intelligence agencies: 1) Planning and Direction, 2) Collection, 3) Processing, 4) All Source Analysis and Production, and 5) Dissemination.

Although the Intelligence Cycle is used by every other federal agency that gathers intelligence, I have learned from sources at the FBI that the Bureau has not implemented this method in any of its ongoing investigations. When I requested a copy of the curriculum for the new class of analysts that began training at Quantico this month, I was told that none was available. Can you tell me if these analysts are being trained to use the Intelligence Cycle?

It has also come to my attention that the FBI still lags far behind in hiring the number of information analysts that many critics believe are needed at the Bureau. Prior to the September 11 attacks, there were 1,242 agents and just 218 analysts. The Bureau is currently funded for 1,640 agents and 338 analysts, only halfway near the 700 or so analysts that have been proposed for FY04 and shy of the 2:1 agent-analyst ratio that reformers believe is needed for the Bureau to succeed in its counter-terrorism mission.

Some critics, including a former Special Agent who served on the Newark, NJ joint terrorism task force, Stephen Denny, have suggested that these ratios should be reversed and that there need to be twice as many analysts as agents if the FBI is to effectively evaluate the raw data it generates. Could you tell me if the Bureau shares this view and if it plans on seeking additional funds to hire those extra analysts?

In addition to revamping the process by which it conducts investigations, the FBI needs to ensure that the analysts it hires are better qualified and better trained. I was surprised to learn that the FBI's requirements for its analysts are not on par with those the CIA has for its analysts. The FBI requires analysts candidates to meet two requirements. First, they must have an undergraduate bachelor's degree. Second, they must have "specialized experience in collection, analyzing program management, dissemination of information, trends pertaining to foreign and domestic areas directly or indirectly affecting national security."

The CIA on the other hand, requires an advanced degree in Middle East or South Asia studies, international affairs, or national security with a strong Middle East or South Asia focus for those being considered for counter-terrorism data analysis. Extensive foreign language skills and personal knowledge of relevant foreign nations are also required.

With the FBI no longer just investigating bank robberies, an undergraduate degree and a modicum of law enforcement training is simply not enough to get the job done. While some terrorists, like Timothy McVeigh, are homegrown, many come to America from overseas, speaking different languages, reared in different cultures, and adhering to a different set of patterns and practices than the run-of-the-mill criminal. Until the FBI understands this and demonstrates its understanding by drastically revising the way it evaluates raw intelligence data, we remain at greater risk of future attacks.

I implore you to take steps to reverse this course and hope you will work with me to do so. I hope to hear from you as soon as possible.

Sincerely,
Charles E. Schumer
United States Senator