Hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee - Building an Agile Intelligence Community to Fight Terrorism and Emerging Threats

Federal News Service

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: BUILDING AN AGILE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO FIGHT TERRORISM AND EMERGING THREATS

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS (R-ME)

WITNESSES: ROBERT S. MUELLER, DIRECTOR , FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; JOHN E. MCLAUGHLIN, ACTING DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

LOCATION: 342 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BODY:
SEN. COLLINS: (Sounds gavel.) The committee will come to order. Good morning. First, let me apologize for the late start for our hearing. Senator Lieberman and I were among a group of members of the House and the Senate who met with the president and vice president and Dr. Rice to discuss intelligence reforms this morning. And as our two witnesses know better than most, you don't tell the president, "Gee, I've got to go-I have another appointment." So Senator Lieberman is on his way back. He will be here very shortly to join us.

Today the Committee on Governmental Affairs holds its sixth hearing on the recommendations of the 9/11 commission regarding the restructuring of America's intelligence community. I thank my colleagues for their dedication to the vital mission assigned to our committee, and I welcome our distinguished witnesses, whose testimony will help to guide us.

In just a few days, we will pause to commemorate the third anniversary of a monstrous, unprovoked act of war. September 11th, 2001 was the day of unimaginable cruelty and inspiring heroism. It is a date all Americans, indeed all civilized people, will remember for all time.

For the purposes of the task before this committee, however, it is what happened, or more precisely what did not happen three years ago today that is instructive. In the chronology of events leading up to the terrorist attacks, September 8th, 2001, three years ago to the day, was not a remarkable day. Rather, it was like far too many other days for far too many years a day of missed opportunities. On the night of September 8th, one of the hijackers, Ziad Jarrah, began driving from Baltimore to Newark. Along the way he was pulled over for speeding. The Maryland state trooper who made the stop had no way of knowing that Jarrah had been in violation of his visa for more than a year, a violation that should have rendered him inadmissible on each of his six reentries into the United States, a violation that should have brought an abrupt end to the flight training he received in Florida. Nor could that trooper had known that foreign governments had advised U.S. intelligence of Jarrah's suspected ties to terrorism, of his possible attendance at al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, and of the likelihood that he held two passports in order to disguise his travels. Without access to any of that information, the trooper had no reason to do anything but write him a ticket and send the motorist on his way.

Three days later, Ziad Jarrah took the controls of Flight 93. Also on September 8th, a memo received at FBI headquarters outlined the concerns of an agent in the Phoenix field office that Osama bin Laden had mounted a concerted effort to enroll al Qaeda recruits in American flight schools. The memo was not read that day, just as it had not been read since the agent sent it two months earlier.

On September 8th, Zacarias Moussaoui was in his third week of detention on an immigration violation. His extremist beliefs, his strong ties to al Qaeda and his interest in flight training were known to field agents in several components of the intelligence community. Despite the continued urging of those field agents, September 8th was just another day in which this information was not shared. No top intelligence officials were briefed, and no action was taken.

The 9/11 commission observes that a maximum effort to investigate Moussaoui might have brought investigators to the core of the 9/11 plot.

And also on September 8th the CIA had in its possession what the commission describes as the final piece of the puzzle: information linking Khalid Sheik Mohammed to an alias that he used in planning acts of terrorism. Had this piece been connected to other pieces possessed by various intelligence agencies, a clear picture might have emerged of a top bin Laden lieutenant who had been recruiting operatives to travel to the United States to carry out acts of terrorism, and who had definite links to Moussaoui.

But September 8th, 2001 was no different from the days before. The pieces remained unconnected, the puzzle remained unsolved. Much has changed since that time. There have been many, many improvements. We have created the Department of Homeland Security, the Joint Terrorism Task Force program has been expanded, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center is up and running, the cooperation and coordination among our intelligence agencies have never been better and have been vastly increased. The two agencies represented here today, the FBI and the CIA, have been leaders in this effort. We have strengthened our defense against terrorism and we have gone on the offense against the terrorists. But we have not yet transformed an intelligence community designed for the Cold War into one with the agility to respond to threats that range from nuclear missiles in North Korea to an al Qaeda operative on a highway in Maryland.

An important step was taken less than two weeks ago when the president issued a series of executive orders to strengthen our intelligence community. But as the president noted at that time, these orders are not an alternative to congressional action; they are a starting point. We need to institutionalize through law many of the reforms that have been implemented by the leaders before us today. We must continue the dramatic progress that has been made since 9/11. The intelligence structure we create must be designed for the demands of the 21st century, for the current war against terrorism, and for new challenges that we do not yet even envision.

On September 8th, 2001, America was a nation asleep. Three days later, we were jolted awake. Three years later, as we again prepare to reflect on the attacks on our country on that day, we must remain alert and committed to doing everything we can to provide a more secure future for our country.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

I'd now like to introduce our two distinguished witnesses. Each of them has devoted a considerable part of their lifetime's work to public service, and we are very grateful for their service to our country.

Robert Mueller became director of the FBI on September 4th, 2001, just one week before the terrorist attacks. He immediately became responsible for spearheading what is perhaps the most extensive reorganization of the FBI since its inception in order to strengthen the bureau's anti-terrorism efforts.

John McLaughlin became acting director of Central Intelligence on July 12th of this year. He had been deputy director of Central Intelligence since October of 2000. But I would note that he is a long-time intelligence professional. I believe his career with the CIA actually started in the 1970s, if I remember correctly.

I want to thank you both for sharing your experience and expertise and judgment with us today. And Director Mueller, we'll start with you.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you for your testimony. Director McLaughlin.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you. I would tell my colleagues that I hope to do two rounds of questioning today, so if everyone could adhere to the six minutes in the first round, we will do a second round.

Director Mueller, I very much appreciate your listing as a core principle of the FBI for intelligence reform the need to protect civil liberties. Oftentimes in the debate on the reforms I think that issue, which is so critical, has been slighted, and I appreciate your listing it front and center as one of your most important principles.

Some, such as former CIA Director Bob Gates, have expressed concerns that the establishment of a national intelligence director and a National Counterterrorism Center with authorities that would bridge the foreign and domestic divide would erode the separation between domestic law enforcement and foreign espionage. And as we know when the CIA was first created back in 1947, President Truman among others took great pains to make sure that the lines were clearly drawn. Do you have any suggestions for safeguards that this committee could incorporate into our legislation to ensure that the protection of our safety in the war against terrorism does not result in an erosion of civil liberties?

MR. MUELLER: I think as the drafters go about looking at the language that the drafter should be very careful to distinguish between strategic planning and specific tasking. In other words, I believe that a national intelligence director or under the national intelligence director the head of the National Counterterrorism Center should play a role in coordination of our efforts across the agency lines with the FBI, CIA, Department of Homeland Security, coordination planning, establishing collection requirements. But how you go about responding to that dictate should be the responsibility of the individual agencies. If you are clear in drafting the language then, it is clear that the FBI reporting through the attorney general collects the intelligence according to the guidelines established by the attorney general, according to the statutes that guide our collection of intelligence, and you maintain that division.

One of the things I believe in is the importance of continuously attempting to integrate the analytical side of it as opposed to the collection side, but also when you have something I'll call a transnational intelligence investigation, where you have information or intelligence gathered overseas about a threat in the United States-and we have to investigate some persons in the United States, and the CIA has to investigate persons outside the United States-there has to be an exchange of information. There has to be a coordination of those investigations. But how those investigations are carried out should be left to the discretion of either the director of central intelligence or the director of the FBI.

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you. We look forward to working closely with you on that very important issue.

Director McLaughlin, your testimony you alerted us to concerns about parts of the commission's plan about which you have reservations. You talk about dual-hatting, for example, and I agree with you that that raises uncertainty in the chain of command. You say that-and you've said this time and again, that "speed and agility are the keys to winning the war on terrorism." What authorities do you think that the national intelligence director should have in order to improve the speed and agility of the intelligence community? I know you would prefer to have more authority vested in the DCI, but since we are headed toward an NID, how can we achieve your goal of improving the speed and agility of the intelligence community?

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Well, I think a national intelligence director would need the authority to move money and people quickly. We've talked in other committees, and I've spoken with you personally about some of the hurdles you go through as you try to do those things today. So those are the principal things. In today's world, unlike the world of the Cold War, issues come and go with blinding speed, and sometimes your opportunity to exploit the opportunity-your chance to exploit the opportunity to attack that issue, to pool resources on it, to get your best heads together, both collectors and analysts and operators, is quite fleeting. And so a national intelligence director needs to be able to say to his operating or her operating agencies, "I need five from you, and five from you and five from you, and I need them in two or three days, and they need to be up and running in this room, with these computers, and these information technologies, these systems, with these databases flowing to them"-in order to move with maximum agility and speed. I mean, those are the kinds of things you need.

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you. Your example that you've previously given to me in a private meeting of it taking five months to reprogram money I think lends credence to what you're saying. We want to make sure that there is sufficient authority for the new NID so that he or she can be truly effective.

Senator Lieberman.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you. Senator Coleman.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLEMAN: I'm not sure-are we going to have a second round?

SEN. COLLINS: Yes, we are.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Senator Lautenberg.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Senator Sununu.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you. Senator Durbin.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Senator Shelby.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Senator Pryor.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you. Senator Specter.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Senator Levin.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: There is, of five minutes each.

Senator Voinovich.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you. Senator Dayton.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.

Senator Carper.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you. We are going to have a brief second round of questions, but I'm going to take a five-minute break. I really mean five minutes. I am going to resume the hearing in five minutes.

MR. MUELLER: Sort of a seventh inning stretch.

SEN. COLLINS: Right.

(Recess.)

SEN. COLLINS: The Committee will come back to order. We'll now have a final round of questions, limited to five minutes each.

Director McLaughlin, as you could tell from the questions you've had from us at this hearing, and at previous hearings, there is a great deal of interest in learning exactly how the budget process works now, and how we can reform it and institutionalize it in the legislation that we're drafting. In consulting with my colleagues, I think it would be very helpful to enhancing our understanding if you were to provide to the committee a copy of the budget guidance that the DCI sends out to the 14 intelligence agencies. So I would ask that you provide that for the record.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: I will.

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you. The other issue on which there continues to be great debate, debate driven, in fact, in part by the fact that different agencies define planning differently, as you have pointed out, has to do with the role of operational planning, and how we should draw those lines. In your testimony you referred to an operational meeting that you chair every day, "with intelligence community, military, and law enforcement elements represented." And I'm told that these meetings often focus on counterterrorism issues. You also noted in your testimony, and again I quote, that "at those meetings we review and act on that day's intelligence." I'm trying to get more of a feel for what that means. Does that include discussing operations to be carried out by the agencies represented at that operational meeting?

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: It's mainly focused on operations to be carried out by CIA, but we have in that meeting, as part of the personnel from our counterterrorism center, representatives from other agencies, an FBI officer who is there, stationed in the counterterrorism center, so that there's transparency with the FBI. So it's mainly on CIA operations.

That said, it is frequently the case that in the course of our operations we uncover a link to the homeland, and that's passed on the spot to the people from the bureau, and migrates back to the FBI. It's also the case that there may be a military dimension, so I have in that meeting the associate DCI for military support, a three star Navy SEAL, who if we require military involvement in a counterterrorism operation, he's there to organize that. This is a very tactical meeting we have.

SEN. COLLINS: Are you tasking, though?

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Yes, we're not tasking the agencies, but it's, in fact, analogous to what I think might happen in a larger setting in a national counterterrorism center. I don't task the FBI, and I certainly don't task the U.S. military, but these issues arise, and I will say to my officers, be in touch with the FBI to make sure that they are aware of what we've just heard, and are acting on it, be in touch with the Pentagon to make sure that they have forces deployed along border X, in the event we drive a terrorist over it. Be in touch with the National Security Agency to make sure they have these phone numbers that we have uncovered in some document collection that we've encountered. So this is a very tactical, hands-on type of operation every day.

SEN. COLLINS: It's information sharing, it sounds like, as well. Is this what you would envision the National Counterterrorism Centers doing in order to free up the NID to focus on managing the intelligence community?

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: I see it as a variation of that, I think somewhat less tactical, more strategic, and less directive, because I do direct CIA officers and stations to perform certain duties. I would see the NCTC as being more of a clearinghouse for data, and the development of a checklist of things that must be done, things that must be plugged together, things that must be integrated, and then directing-directing is probably the wrong word, asking people to focus on that and get back to you. This will have to be determined in practice, but that's my kind of understanding of how this would work.

SEN. COLLINS: Director Mueller?

Is your mike on, excuse me?

MR. MUELLER: I also have a meeting twice a day, 7:15 in the morning, and then 5:00 in the evening with counter-terrorism. And sitting at the table are representatives of the Department of Homeland Security, and CIA, but it's an effort for me to understand what we're doing in our organization, and give direction to make certain that we are doing what is necessary to meet the counterterrorism mission. But, apart from what I do, and what John does, there also is twice a day CIVITS, it's called a videoconference, chaired by Homeland Security advisor Fran Townsend, or somebody under her, with each of the component agencies on that videoconference looking to determine whether everything has been done to meet a particular counterterrorism threat. And that is the opportunity, and my understanding is it does take place twice a day, and once on Saturdays. And it seems to me that it is that planning, that bringing together of the agencies that the National Counterterrorism Center will do, that is now being done out of the Homeland Security Advisor's office. And it is that type of daily interaction of the agencies that assures that we are agile, that we are responding to the immediate threats, and that there is coordination.

So I see the National Counterterrorism Center as having the analytical capability, but also that coordinating function that is now being coordinated out of the Homeland Security Advisor's office.

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Senator Dayton.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: Senator Levin.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: I want to promise our witnesses that this hearing truly is almost over. Before I adjourn it, I want to clean up one issue about budget authority over which I think some confusion has been created. And I'd like-I see that Larry Kindsvater is sitting right behind the director. And at the risk of putting him on the spot, I'd like to ask him to come forward and answer this question very briefly. Thank you.

Just to be clear, if Congress wants to appropriate funds directly to the national intelligence director, would we have to change the law?

MR. KINDSVATER: As most things regarding appropriations law, I probably should talk to my attorney first. But my understanding is if you want to specifically appropriate funding to the NID, yeah, you'd have to change the law. But, again, I think, before we go too far on that, we ought to contact our appropriation lawyers and make sure that that's perfectly correct.

SEN. COLLINS: There's been --

MR. KINDSVATER: But I believe it is.

SEN. COLLINS: -- some confusion on that point, whether an executive order can do it or whether there should be a law change. I personally --

MR. KINDSVATER: The only thing I could add is, one, we'd have to go back and check. There's specifically a law today that requires that appropriations for NSA, for example, go to a defense-wide appropriation account. And, again, I need to contact one of my attorneys to find out and review the law to find out if that's correct or not.

SEN. COLLINS: Okay, thank you. I want to thank --

SEN. LEVIN: Two requests of the chair, if I may.

SEN. COLLINS: Yes.

SEN. LEVIN: One is that we've heard a lot about a Scowcroft report recommending some reforms.

SEN. COLLINS: Yes.

SEN. LEVIN: And I'm wondering if --

SEN. COLLINS: (We?) have requested it.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. I'm sorry. I apologize. I interrupted you.

SEN. COLLINS: No, go ahead.

SEN. LEVIN: And the other issue has to do with-and this goes to the oversight issue. A lot of emphasis has been made about the importance of congressional oversight as a way of assuring that there be objective and independent intelligence. And I want to just be blunt. I talked to Stan about this earlier and I talked to Mr. McLaughlin about it as well.

There's a lot of material which is owed to the Armed Services Committee by the CIA, a lot of questions which you've been asked which have not been answered. And it's like pulling teeth. And we've got to change that. If we're going to rely on oversight, we've got to get a much more responsive intelligence community. And I have a list which I'll give to Mr. McLaughlin of the items which have not been provided, despite long-standing-this is months-requests for information.

I only bother this committee with this issue because of the importance of oversight and the need that Congress has, particularly when these are committee requests. This was not individual senators' requests; these were committee requests. So I would just like to make that point part of the record. I'll make this list of items part of the record. We got a few more answers today, but frankly they dribble in. And we've got to have a much greater responsiveness.

Mr. McLaughlin, you and I have talked about that issue as well, and we'll provide the list to Stan Moskowitz.

SEN. COLLINS: We will include that in the record. I would-since many of the requests have been done through the Armed Services Committee, I would encourage you to bring it up to Senator Warner.

Senator Lieberman.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. COLLINS: And I want to echo those thanks, and we very much appreciate your testimony. We look forward to working very closely with both of you as we draft the reform legislation. Thank you for your testimony. The hearing record will remain open for five days. This hearing is now adjourned.