Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee - Defense Department Military Operations and Proposals to Reorganize the U.S. Intelligence Community

Federal News Service

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: DEFENSE DEPARTMENT MILITARY OPERATIONS AND PROPOSALS TO REORGANIZE THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)

WITNESSES: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD; AND ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE JOHN MCLAUGHLIN; AND GENERAL RICHARD MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND STEPHEN CAMBONE, UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

LOCATION: 325 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BODY:
SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you have carefully avoided any opinions about many of the proposals in the 9/11 commission. But I think it's important to get another one on the table, and that is the suggestion that the Department of Defense assume all the covert paramilitary operations, those conducted by the CIA as well as operations conducted by the Department of Defense. Do you have an opinion, for the record?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I'll say this. There are clearly things that the Central Intelligence Agency does that are covert that the Department of Defense ought not to do. There are things in the middle where we both do things and where we have individuals involved in teams that are led by them or led by us, and they may be a mixture from time to time. I think it's a subject that lends itself to a classified hearing better than a public hearing, but the short answer is I have not proposed such a thing. It is something that we've asked our people to look at an the agency to look at, but at the moment I certainly wouldn't recommend it. It's something that is being discussed internally.

SEN. REED: Now, Mr. Secretary, are some of your concerns based upon the different frameworks that soldiers operate vis-a-vis CIA operatives, both legal, ethical and cultural dimensions? Or is this simply a practical-that they do things that we don't want to do? Go ahead.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, they do things that are authorized by statute and by findings that we're not organized, trained or equipped to do and don't want to do. There are things that involve preparation of a battlefield which are not public, but eventually become public, which we in the Department of Defense do do as we should, and I think that, again, that's about as far as I'd want to go in a public hearing.

SEN. REED: Well, let me just-again, just the final point is that, from your answer, there are things that they are authorized to do by law and custom that Department of Defense is not authorized to do. Is that correct?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Absolutely.

SEN. REED: And that-so this consolidation would require the Congress to change the law as well as simply authorizing a consolidation of effort, change several laws?

SEC. RUMSFELD: That I don't know because I don't know what anyone would propose by way of responsibilities. We have responsibilities that are authorized by law-preparation of the battlefield-and they have responsibilities that no one that I know of is suggesting transferring out of the agency.

So whether or not-I doubt that a law would have to be changed, but I simply don't know, because I don't know what anyone would propose to change.

SEN. REED: Mr. McLaughlin, do you have a comment upon this topic?

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Yeah, I would-as the secretary's pointed out, this is being discussed in the administration, and we've actually been asked to consult on it and come up with a position.

You want the personal view? I would not accept that recommendation, for a couple of reasons. I mean, this is, again, personal view. I think we have a perfect marriage now of CIA and military capabilities. CIA brings to the mix agility and speed. The military brings lethality. That was the combination that was so effective in Afghanistan.

There are also special authorities that the DCI has by statute-Section 8 authorities, for example-that allow the DCI to do things-for example, to purchase equipment that's useful in paramilitary operations without competitive bidding. It's a small point, but-actually, a large point. It means that the DCI, under current statute, is empowered to move quickly on things that have a paramilitary nature.

It's important to realize there's a vast difference in scale here. Without giving the numbers, we're tiny on this score. DOD is large when it comes to special operations. So we have a niche role here that I think is very important.

The other thing I would say is that not well understood is the fact that our paramilitary capability undergirds our whole covert action program. It isn't just the kind of image that comes across in the movies about what we do. It's that our covert action program across the board, which covers many different areas, has part of its infrastructure, for very-for a wide array of things, this paramilitary capability, in my view.

SEN. REED: General Myers, do you have a comment, particularly from the perspective of a uniformed officer, about the blending of these two different cultures and --

GEN. MYERS: I think my advice would be along the same lines that you've heard from the secretary and from the acting director, in that right now we have well-defined military missions in the world. This would change some of that, if we were to adopt that recommendation. I think we have to think very, very carefully about that.

I know there is-as we have begun to consider it, there is not a lot of enthusiasm at this point for that kind of change. And I think it's important that as people see the military uniform around the world-and we are around the world; we work with-over a couple-of-year period, we probably work with most of the nations in this world, in one form or another-and that they-that we maintain that, that we are the U.S. military and we're not involved in other things.

SEN. REED: Mr. Secretary, the 9/11 commission was a very, very intensive review-after-action report, if you will-of a major intelligence failure. We've had similar failures with respect to Iraq. Has the Department of Defense conducted a major after-action review of the intelligence failures in Iraq? And if so, what are their recommendations for change, not only within the Department of Defense but coordination with the CIA and other agencies?

SEC. RUMSFELD: The Department of Defense, through the Joint Forces Command, embedded a cluster of people in the beginning of the war. And as it went along, it conducted a "lessons learned," a portion of which included intelligence.

They then completed that, and then initiated a series of interrogations of Iraqis and looked at a "lessons learned" not from our standpoint but from what the Iraqis thought they were doing and what they thought they knew or didn't know, and that was then completed. In addition, the agency has conducted some aspects of it from their perspective.

SEN. REED: And these reports are available?

SEC. RUMSFELD: We'd be happy to give you or the committee a briefing on the lessons learned. I found them fascinating. I probably spent 20 hours being briefed on those two lessons learned that the Department of Defense did. I have not been briefed on the agency's piece.

SEN. REED: Thank the secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.