Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee - Defense Department Military Operations and Proposals to Reorganize the U.S. Intelligence Community

Federal News Service

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: DEFENSE DEPARTMENT MILITARY OPERATIONS AND PROPOSALS TO REORGANIZE THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)

WITNESSES: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD; AND ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE JOHN MCLAUGHLIN; AND GENERAL RICHARD MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND STEPHEN CAMBONE, UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

LOCATION: 325 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BODY:
SEN. SUSAN COLLINS (R-ME): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman -- (off mike). There. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I say it three times, I'll get it loud enough eventually. (Laughter.)

Director McLaughlin, I know there's been discussion before I was able to join the panel today about the issue of budget authority, but I want to probe that a bit further with you. When I read the 9/11 commission's report, I was struck by the information on a directive issued in December of 1998 by DCI Tenet, in which he said: We are at war; I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the community.

And the commission concluded that despite that call for action, that in fact very little happened within the intelligence community, that there wasn't a marshalling of resources. And that's one reason that I think the issue of budget authority is so important.

It's my understanding that the National Security Act gives you the authority to guide the intelligence community agencies as they prepare their budget submissions for the National Foreign Intelligence Program, known as NFIP, but you don't, however, have budget execution authority over any of the NFIP except that portion that goes to the CIA and the community management program. And as I understand that, that means that you help set the budget levels for the intelligence community but then you don't have any control over the funds once they are appropriated, except in the CIA direct control; rather it's the Department of Defense that has that control. And we know that's more than 80 percent of the total intelligence budget.

The 9/11 commission recommends that budget execution authority-that is, the control over the funds once they've been appropriated-be given to a new national intelligence director, as you're well aware. And perhaps to me the strongest rationale for this recommendation is it would allow the NID to marshal the resources in a way that George Tenet apparently could not, according to the findings of the commission.

Now ironically, Dr. Cambone summed up the rationale for giving this authority very well last week when he testified before the House Armed Services Committee. He was talking about the need for the national intelligence director to set information technology standards for the entire intelligence community.

And this is what he said, and I quote: "He's going to have to have some ability to push the money in the right places to get it done or to withhold it if it is improperly done."

To me, that sums up why you need to have budget execution authority, not just the ability to shape the budget's missions but execution authority vested, at least for the NFIP, in the new national intelligence director.

So with that rather long introduction, I'd like to ask you whether you believe the NID does need to have budget execution authority if our goal is to have the director successfully be effective in overseeing and coordinating the intelligence community. As Dr. Cambone said when talking about intelligence standards, if the person doesn't have the ability to, quote, "push the money in the right places to get it done or withhold it," can the NID truly be effective?

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Well, as we've said several times, Senator, discussions are ongoing within the administration on this, and nothing is off the table from the administration's point of view. So I can give you my personal view on that --

SEN. COLLINS: That is what I'm seeking.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: -- based on personal experience, but without any sense that that is the view that would prevail.

There's a couple things you have to say at the outset to frame this a bit. First, I think we're talking principally about the NFIP agencies, not about all 15 of the agencies.

SEN. COLLINS: Right.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: As you know, a number of the agencies in that 15 fall into the TIARA; we're talking about the service intelligence organizations and so forth. And I don't think that the national intelligence director should have budgetary authority over all 15 of these agencies. I think it ought to be narrowed to the NFIP agencies, which would be, of course, NSA, NRO, NGA and CIA. So when you're looking at the National Foreign Intelligence Program, it's that.

Second, another thing that needs to be said is in any arrangement, and I mentioned this in my testimony, but fundamentally in any arrangement that you have, whoever has this authority would have to accept iron-clad accountability for support to military intelligence requirements. That would have to be built in, either by understanding or statute or executive direction, because you just-as I said, these agencies are combat support agencies and everyone in the intelligence business realizes that, even though they serve more than one department, which is what makes them national.

Against that backdrop-third point-we have-while we don't have execution authority in the year of the budget, we do have the authority to reprogram, and I think you and I have talked about this once before.

The reprogramming as it currently works works -- (chuckles) -- but it is cumbersome. It requires that when I'm-and you reprogram for a number of reasons. Sometimes you do it because one program is doing better than another, another time because someone is not doing as well as they should, another time because something else is more essential in your judgment. Typically you require the approval of the agency that's surrendering funds, you require the approval of the department head from-who oversees that agency, usually the secretary of Defense, you require the approval of OMB, and you require the approval of six congressional committees. Typically that takes about five months. So you can see that's not very agile to the needs of today.

So what does all of this, my long answer to you, add up to? My view is that that national intelligence director ought to have the authority to move those funds because-with the caveats that I built into this: absolute accountability for military intelligence needs. And frankly, even in that circumstance with that authority, a national intelligence director I can safely predict would consult closely with the secretary of Defense as funds were moved around. But in the circumstance that you and I have just discussed, that person would have the final authority on-or the final decision-making authority. And I think if you look within the NFIP, the National Foreign Intelligence Program, just as another fact to put on the table, I think about 30 percent of the personnel in the National Foreign Intelligence Program are military. So all of that has to go into the mix.

Sorry for the long-winded answer, but --

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you. It's helped.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: -- as all of us have said, this is complicated.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.