Panel I of a Hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee - Assessing America's Counterterrorism Capabilities
Federal News Service
HEADLINE: PANEL I OF A HEARING OF THE SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: ASSESSING AMERICA'S COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITIES; RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION
CHAIRED BY: SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS (R-ME)
PANEL I WITNESSES: JOHN BRENNAN, DIRECTOR, TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER; PHILIP MUDD, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CIA COUNTERTERRORIST CENTER; LT. GEN. PATRICK HUGHES, DHS ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS; JOHN PISTOLE, FBI EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE;
LOCATION: 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.
BODY:
SEN. COLLINS: The committee will come to order. Good morning.
Today the Governmental Affairs Committee holds its second hearing on the recommendations of the 9/11 commission calling for a restructuring of our intelligence organizations. The 9/11 commission provides a highly detailed picture of our intelligence structure on that tragic day. Ultimately our committee's responsibility is to recommend how this structure should look in the future.
We must act quickly to consider this report and to complete our assigned task of reporting legislation by October 1st. And indeed we are acting quickly, starting with our hearings last week.
As we move with both deliberation and speed, we should use the commission's recommendations as a thoughtful and informed guide. That does not mean that this committee will be a rubber stamp. The final shape of our restructuring legislation will be determined by what we learn at these hearings.
The informative and insightful testimony we heard last Friday from the commission chairman, Tom Kean, and the vice chairman, Lee Hamilton, was a very good start. The testimony focused, as our committee has, on the two most important recommendations regarding the executive branch: first, establishing a national counterterrorism center; and second, creating the position of a national intelligence director.
Yesterday the administration acted on some of the same issues that we are considering today.
I applaud the president's swift and decisive action to move forward with some of the commission's most significant recommendations. The fact that two of his priorities are the restructuring recommendations before this committee emphasizes the importance of our work.
The two panels of witnesses before us today-one from the intelligence agencies and the other from the 9/11 commission staff-will discuss the improvements that have been made to our post-9/11 intelligence capabilities, the weaknesses that still remain, and the solutions that we should consider.
Progress has been made since 9/11. The CIA's Counterterrorist Center and the FBI have undergone substantial changes. The Department of Homeland Security and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center are entirely new. But it's one of our witnesses here today, TTIC Director John Brennan-told the 9/11 commission in April, quote, "We as a government and as a nation are not yet optimally configured to deal with the terrorist threat," end quote.
We can learn a lot from TTIC, since in many ways the proposed national counterterrorism center would be a more robust version of it. This committee has closely followed the development and implementation of TTIC and has held two hearings on its structure and its authority, an issue that has been of particular interest to Senator Levin and me. The proposed center would be a super-TTIC. If this more powerful version is to succeed, it must get what it needs, both in resources and in its place in the priorities of the agencies that collect intelligence.
At times, getting the resources it needs, especially the expert and experienced personnel, has been a challenge for TTIC. The difficulties in resolving the resource and authority issues involving TTIC demonstrates how important it is for Congress to clearly define in legislation the authority and parameters of the proposed center.
The intelligence structure that stood for 50 years during the Cold War performed well under many administrations and many different agency heads. The new intelligence system we are building for the war against terrorism must do the same. We have an obligation not just to the Americans of today, but to Americans of generations to come to accomplish that mission.
Senator Lieberman.
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
I want to welcome our first panel of witnesses. This panel consists of officials from four of our most important intelligence agencies.
I'm very sure that their experience and expertise will help the committee in the task before us.
I want to thank each of you for your long commitment to public service. Each of you has served honorably and well, and we very much appreciate your joining us today.
John Brennan is the director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, known as TTIC, the intelligence agency created by the president in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. I recently had the privilege of visiting TTIC several weeks ago. I think I was the first official visitor to your new headquarters. And I was very impressed with the work that is being done.
John Pistole is the executive assistant director for counterterrorism and counterintelligence at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Again, this committee has as long relationship with Mr. Pistole. We've worked together on several issues, including the terrorism financing investigation.
Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes serves as assistant secretary for information analysis at the Department of Homeland Security. We welcome you here today as well.
And finally we will hear from Philip Mudd, the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who clearly plays a key role.
We welcome all of you, and we're going to begin with Mr. Brennan.
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Mr. Pistole.
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
General Hughes.
GEN. HUGHES: Good morning, Chairman Collins, Senator Lieberman-I hope my microphone is on now. I think it is.
SEN. COLLINS: If you'll bring it closer to you; they're very directional.
GEN. HUGHES: Okay. Thank you.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Mr. Mudd.
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
We'll now begin a 10-minute round of questions.
Mr. Brennan, I want to start with you. I very much appreciate hearing your strong support today for the creation of a national counterterrorism center, which in many ways will build on the TTIC model. But I want to go back to the statement that you made to the commission in your testimony in April, where you said that in your judgment, the federal government was not ideally configured to deal with the terrorist threat.
If you were going to design the intelligence structure for the United States government, what would you recommend?
MR. BRENNAN: I would recommend that there be an opportunity to understand all of the different parts of the U.S. government involved in intelligence. It is an exceptionally complicated, complex system of many different components doing various parts of the mission.
One of my concerns is that over the years there have been the development of individual initiatives in different parts of that community, to include individual statutes that have set up different types of initiatives and departments, that have not taken into account fully the overall architecture that needs to be in place to make sure that all the different parts of the intelligence community work together in a fused and integrated manner.
The president talked about his support for a national intelligence director. I think it's taking into account the tremendous breadth and depth of the intelligence community, and the need to ensure that there is appropriate engineering of the different parts of that complex architecture.
And what my recommendation would be is that just like Goldwater- Nichols, which really revamped the entire military structure-which took many years on the Hill here; it took about four years before Goldwater-Nichols was actually passed-that that understanding of those different parts of that very complicated system are fully understood and are put together and optimize the contributions of each.
The 9/11 commission report provides a high-level view of some of that architecture. But there really is tremendous engineering that needs to go on to make sure we understand the connections, the intricacies, the mutual dependencies that go on.
So my recommendation is that it needs to be taken into account the many different, and in fact growing elements of the intelligence community right now to make sure we don't lose any of the synergy and we build upon it. So my comment about we're not optimally configured is because we haven't taken that step back to put together that system of systems that allows all those different parts to work together as seamlessly as possible.
SEN. COLLINS: In your scenario, would you have a national intelligence director?
MR. BRENNAN: In my scenario I would have somebody at the top who was able to oversee and orchestrate the many different elements, like the president embraced yesterday, the concept of a national intelligence director. I don't want to say that that would be position like in the diagram shown in the 9/11 commission, because I have some disagreements with what is in the 9/11 commission report. I don't think some of those recommendations take into account how these different pieces need to fit together. But I do endorse the concept of having somebody at the top, yes.
SEN. COLLINS: Mr. Mudd, I want to get a better understanding of how disputes are resolved in the current system. It's the issue of who makes the final call when there's a dispute over intelligence tasking.
For example, let's say that the United States has a satellite that's trained on Iran, and the CIA wants to have that satellite moved to oversee a possible new al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. But the Department of Defense says no, it's really important that it remain trained on Iran.
Under the current system, who resolves a dispute over where a satellite should be positioned or where resources should be allocated to collect intelligence?
MR. MUDD: I'm not an expert on satellites. We spend a lot more time on human operations.
SEN. COLLINS: Right.
MR. MUDD: Let me try that same question with human operations and give you a perspective.
I don't see many disputes. I see a lot of conversation, and the conversation goes like this. When we're operating overseas, typically, if we're a in wartime experience, as we are in Afghanistan and Iraq, we provide support to the U.S. military with the capabilities we have.
When we're running foreign operations overseas to collect intelligence and conduct covert action, typically that's something that's run by the Central Intelligence Agency, with the support of other agencies.
And then when you have domestic intelligence collection capabilities, that's typically run and led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with our support.
So primacy depends on what kind of operation you're talking about, where you're operating. But in terms of the people sitting at this table, it's quite cooperative. I don't-the resources --
SEN. COLLINS: Right, but who makes the call? Who decides? I mean, one of the problems that the 9/11 commission identified over and over again was the feeling that there wasn't a person in charge.
MR. MUDD: Again, when we're talking about military operations in Afghanistan, the military is running the operations; we support.
When we're talking about clandestine operations under the authorities that we have, which are unique, we get support and we run them. We can decide.
And when we're talking about domestic operations, the FBI should-does and should decide. We support them.
SEN. COLLINS: General Hughes, the 2002 Gilmore commission also recommended the establishment of a national counterterrorism center. But under the Gilmore conception, the center would be responsible for fusion of counterterrorism intelligence, but not for planning of counterterrorism intelligence operations.
This is a question that I'm going to ask the entire panel, but I'll start with you, Mr. Hughes. Should the NCTC have an operational role?
GEN. HUGHES: I think, as described in the president's vision of the NCTC, there is some connection to the planning effort. I think it-I hate to characterize it, because these are the kind of details that have to be worked out, but I believe the idea is to have enough planning expertise, especially at the strategic level, to oversee the kind of interface that has to occur between intelligence operations and intelligence activities, and the operational activities undertaken by agencies to carry out missions.
SEN. COLLINS: But in your judgment, should there be a planning role? We have a different recommendation from the 9/11 commission than the Gilmore report. And what I'm asking is, given your 30 years in intelligence --
GEN. HUGHES: Sure.
SEN. COLLINS: -- do you think that the center should have an operational planning role?
GEN. HUGHES: Oh, I'm not quibbling with the question, but I do have to put it in context. The tactical and perhaps operational activities should-they have to engage in their own planning in order to undertake operations. That's what my experience has taught me over the years.
But there is a role for planning at the strategic level, especially to integrate features of broad planning that will affect everyone. And to that degree, I support a planning role at the national counterterrorism center.
But I don't think that we should try to centralize the kind of planning and the kind of activities that result from that planning at the national level. I believe those should be decentralized to the operating agencies. That's my personal view.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Mr. Pistole?
MR. PISTOLE: Yes, I believe the NCTC should have an operational role from the perspective of the planning that you mentioned and the development of intelligence requirements, the setting of those requirements, identifying gaps that may exist in existing intelligence.
Where I think the distinction comes into play is in the operational execution of that planning. And for example, if there is a determination that there is a lack of intelligence collection in Chicago, for example-looking at a domestic issue-concerning Hezbollah, well then they should turn to the FBI and say, "We have identified a gap in intelligence collection there. We think the FBI should take steps to address that." And then the FBI will be responsible for implementing the steps that would solve that gap, and that would be through additional human intelligence, FISA coverage of certain targets-the whole range of investigative activity that the FBI currently has would be brought to play to address that.
SEN. COLLINS: Mr. Brennan?
MR. BRENNAN: I believe that the role of the center, as far as overseeing some type of joint operational activity, has to be very carefully crafted from the standpoint of ensuring that analysis maintains its independence and its integrity. Analysis will inform operations as well as policy. But you want to make sure that when you bring them together, that you make sure that analysis does inform it, but it still maintains its independence and integrity.
Also, you have to be very careful about the types of authorities that we give to this planning group and responsibilities. The 9/11 commission report says that the NCTC would "assign" operational responsibilities but would not direct the execution and implementation of those plans. But it says that the NCTC would be accountable for tracking the progress of the case and ensuring that the plan evolves with it. And so I would need to understand better exactly what are we talking about there as far as the role of the NCTC.
And I would also associate myself with Mr. Mudd's comments about speed is of the essence, and you want to make sure you don't put in place anything that is going to in fact hamper the ability to move forward very quickly on that type of operational activity.
SEN. COLLINS: Mr. Mudd, you're in luck because my time has expired.
Senator Lieberman.
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SEN. LIEBERMAN: Do any of you-my time's up, actually. I'll come back. I was going to ask if any of you-quickly-see the commission report as I do, which is they're recommending the end of the fusion centers and that they'll all be fused into one big one. (No audible response.) No? Okay. (Chuckles.) I take the silence as a negative.
SEN. COLLINS: (Chuckling) Glad you did that follow-up!
SEN. LIEBERMAN: We will ask the commission staff how they see their recommendation.
Thanks, Madame Chairman.
SEN. COLLINS: Senator Coleman.
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SEN. COLLINS: Senator Durbin.
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Senator Specter.
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SEN. COLLINS: Senator Akaka.
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Senator Shelby.
SEN. RICHARD SHELBY (R-AL): (Without microphone.) I ask that my complete statement be made part of the record.
SEN. COLLINS: Without objection.
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SEN. SHELBY: Madame Chairman, I know my time's up. I have a number of questions for the record. Could I submit those for the record?
SEN. COLLINS: Certainly.
SEN. SHELBY: Thank you.
SEN. COLLINS: Without objection.
Senator Dayton.
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg.
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Senator Carper?
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SEN. COLLINS: I noticed. And I will remember that! (Laughter.)
SEN. CARPER: Well, I'll see you August-what is it? -- 16th?
SEN. COLLINS: (Laughing) Yes. You have a chance to redeem yourself. (Laughter.)
SEN. CARPER: I'll try.
MR. MUDD: I'd like to point out, Senator, the panelists also haven't praised the chairman, but we won't -- (laughter) --
SEN. COLLINS: Senator Levin?
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
I want to thank our witnesses on this panel. You've been extremely candid in your assessment and in responding to our questions. We appreciate your service. We will be in touch as we continue this investigation or examination.
SEN. LIEBERMAN: May I add something?
SEN. COLLINS: Yes.
SEN. LIEBERMAN: I just want to add a final word of thanks, join Senator Collins in doing that, and to say that I was very taken with the fact that in the first go-round about what you're most lacking, each of you said adequate trained personnel. And we ought to figure out how to help you create, in some sense a marketing campaign like the old "Uncle Sam Needs You" because intelligence is the frontline of the war on terrorism. And I just believe there's a generation of Americans out there who would respond to that call to duty if we frame it in the right way. And I hope you'll think about that and you'll ask us, and your respective agency heads will come back to us and ask us for the money to fund that, because that is critical.
SEN. COLLINS: Mr. Mudd --
MR. MUDD: Just one comment. We can recruit them, we can train them. We just need to have the flexibility with you to get enough of them.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Senator Shelby?
SEN. SHELBY: I've just got one observation. Thank you, Madame Chairman.
I think in all major legislation initiatives there will always be winners and losers. The details will come from the architecture coming out of this committee and it will spell it out. I think we need to be very, very careful as we approach this not to weaken or perhaps begin the dismantling of the CIA. I think that's very important because the CIA does things for us other than just dealing with counterterrorism, which is very, very important. And I think, Madame Chair, as we move along here, we better be very careful in that regard.
Thank you.
SEN. COLLINS: All right.
SEN. LEVIN: Madame Chairman, will the record be kept open for all of us for questions?
SEN. COLLINS: It will indeed. We have another panel, just so that people understand that. And the record is going to remain open for five days for additional questions of these witnesses, as well as our second panel.
Again, I thank you very much for your testimony this morning.
(END OF PANEL ONE.)