Panel I of a Hearing of the House Government Reform Committee - 9/11 Commission Recommendations

Federal News Service August 3, 2004 Tuesday

HEADLINE: PANEL I OF A HEARING OF THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAIRED BY: REP. TOM DAVIS (R-VA)

WITNESSES: JOHN LEHMAN, 9/11 COMMISSION MEMBER ®; BOB KERREY, 9/11 COMMISSION MEMBER (D)

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REP. BETSY MCCOLLUM (D-MN): Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'd like to thank the commission for the work that they did. I learned a lot, either being in my kitchen in the morning listening to your staff reports, and opportunities when I had to watch the hearings on television.

But most importantly, I want to thank the families. I think, because of the families and the work that you did, the report that the commission generated that I've been reading, again, and that a woman next to me on an airplane looked at-I said, "You should read this." "Oh, I don't know if I'd understand." I said, "You should read this, because you will understand it. It is written in a way that provides a wealth of information in a way that every American citizen, every family, can benefit."

And so I thank you both for the work product that you have. And she agreed with me. She could read it. She did understand it. She's going to buy a copy.

In chapter 12 of the report, you say, "Counterterrorism has become, beyond any doubt, the top national security priority for the United States." The report goes on to say, quote, "The catastrophe threat at this moment in history is more specific than just terrorism. It is a threat possessed by Islamic terrorism, especially the al Qaeda networks, its affiliates and its ideology."

The other day, the president was asked the question, in what way would his new structure, or looking at any new structure, prevent the kind of intelligence failings that preceded the war in Iraq? I'm very, very troubled by not having the type of intelligence failings in Iraq addressed clearly. We had the intelligence failings of 9/11 and Iraq.

The president, when asked that question, answer to me was equally troubling. He (said), quote, "And let me just say to you, knowing what I know today, we still would have gone to Iraq."

Prior to March-and that's the end of the president's quote. Prior to March 2003, would Iraq have been defined a top national security priority for the United States based on this report's threat definition? Has the war in Iraq helped protect American citizens from the threat of Islamic terrorism when Osama bin Laden, Mr. Omar and thousands of al Qaeda operatives remain at large?

How can the Congress and the president use what you have in place to prevent the intelligence failure of Iraq? Because it was a failure in intelligence for the reasons we did vote, or some who voted to go to war.

MR. LEHMAN: Well, I think that it was a blessing that the intelligence failures in Iraq were not part of our mandate and we did not spend a great deal of time on those intelligence failures. And there is now a commission studying those. So I don't feel comfortable testifying as a commission member on that first part of your question.

But the second part of the question I feel very comfortable, because what I've read in the newspapers and what those parts of the Iraq issue that have come before our commission's investigation-and there are a bit of that-make it very clear that this is of a piece with the failings that we found led up to 9/11; that this is a balkanized intelligence community that does not share, that does not have ability within itself to prioritize what is important, and as one commissioner said, unable to distinguish between a bicycle accident and a train wreck in terms of raw intelligence.

It's remarkably shocking that the senior members of this Congress and of this administration first learned of the Iranian connections from us, not from the intelligence community. It was we, the 9/11 commission, that dug this intelligence out that existed in the intelligence community, had been gathered, was sitting there scattered around the intelligence community. We had to put it together; we, the commission.

So that is a remarkable fact that just illustrates that we have a dysfunctional, balkanized intelligence establishment today. And the failures of the intelligence system in Iraq, in WMD, are entirely of a piece with everyone else we've learned about the dysfunctions of this system.

MR. KERREY: Yeah, I'll stick with John's answers as well. I mean, it was sort of outside of the envelope, but it does get connected in one way for me, and that is that among the insights that I've taken away from the experience of being on this commission is that-it's hard to deal with it, but it's true-and that is that for the United States, the homeland is the planet. And try as you might to say, "No, it's just the continental United States, Alaska and Hawaii," you're not going to get it done. If you're trying to deal with border security or immigration issues or whatever you're dealing with, you need the rest of the world to participate.

When school children died in a fire in Bombay here a couple of weeks ago, it felt like it was in my neighborhood. When Spaniards were killed on the 15th of March, it felt like it happened to us. And one of the mistakes that we made, in my view, with bin Laden is as long as he was killing people over there, it wasn't as big an issue for us as it was when he killed people here.

In 1993, in January and February 1993, we had the World Trade Center attack when six Americans were killed and we had two Americans killed at CIA headquarters by a guy by the name of Kanzi. We tracked both of those guys down, brought them back to the United States. They stood trial and they got justice.

But when it was killing Americans in Somalia, when it was killing Americans in East Africa, when it was killing Americans at OPM SANG in Saudi Arabia, when it was over there, it didn't affect us as much. We didn't respond like we did when it was here.

And among the things that I think Americans are going to have to get their head into-and it has lots of moving parts-is that the homeland is the planet. And I understand that imposes upon us a lot of responsibility, and a burden that we perhaps prefer not to have. But it's our burden. It comes with the consequences of our wealth and our power and our capability.

REP. DAVIS: Thank you very much. Ms. Harris.

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