SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 1999--Continued

Floor Speech

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Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I come to the floor to talk about the McCain-Barrasso amendment to the New START treaty, and I appreciate hearing all the strong and passionate support for this amendment from my colleagues on the issue of missile defense. We debated this yesterday, well into the evening, and we are going to be voting on this a little after 3 this afternoon.

I think it is important that the American people are given the opportunity to hear the implications of the New START treaty. The New START treaty significantly impacts America's national security and our nuclear deterrent. I believe this treaty places limitations on the ability of our Nation to defend itself--limitations I believe should not be in the treaty.

The preamble to the New START treaty provides an explicit link between strategic nuclear offensive weapons and strategic nuclear defensive weapons. It also implies the right of Russia to withdraw from the treaty based on U.S. missile defense that is beyond ``the current strategic capabilities.'' Well, by specifying current strategic capabilities, the intent is clear: They are signaling that future U.S. capabilities could pose a problem. Russia does not want us to improve or to expand missile defense capabilities for the United States. For me, this is absolutely unacceptable.

The administration claims the language in the preamble has no legally binding significance. They claim it is simply a nonbinding concession to Russia--a nonbinding concession to Russia. Well, it is important to note that the New START treaty is not the first attempt by Russia to limit our national defense. Russia has wanted language limiting U.S. missile defense for a long time. They are looking for grounds to claim the U.S. missile defense program violates an international agreement.

Russian threats have had an impact on our own missile defense decisions in the past. This administration abandoned previous plans to deploy missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. It is evident the administration already receives considerable pressure from Russia to limit our Nation's missile defense activities. I believe the language in the treaty will only further add to that pressure and will impact U.S. decisionmaking on our own missile defense.

I wish to emphasize, again, that the United States must always remain in charge of our own missile defense capabilities, not Russia and not any other country. It is unacceptable for the United States to make any concessions on missile defense. Defending our Nation should be a top priority.

Many of my colleagues have come to the floor over and over to highlight this very point. We share a deep concern about the concessions the New START treaty provides to Russia, especially the limitations of our missile defense. There is no legitimate reason for the inclusion of limitations to our national security in this treaty. The New START treaty is just the first step in allowing greater concessions on U.S. missile defense in future agreements.

I think it is also important to point out the continual change in the story by the administration--the one they have provided this Senate regarding the inclusion of missile defense language in the treaty. Originally, the Senate was told the New START treaty would not contain anything on missile defense. Then the Senate was informed there would be no reference to missile defense other than in the preamble of the treaty but certainly no limitations. Then we found that article V of the treaty contains a limitation on the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers into launchers for missile defense. The Senate has a treaty before it now on nuclear strategic offensive weapons with several limitations on missile defense. We are now being told not to worry about these limitations on our ability to defend ourselves in the New START treaty. The administration says: Well, it is only a statement of fact. They say: It isn't legally binding or this administration doesn't plan to use it or it is only an insignificant concession to the Russians.

I do not find any of these arguments comforting. This treaty sets a terrible precedent. The United States should not be placing any constraints on our ability to defend ourselves, no matter the type, the size or the length of time.

Significant disagreements exist between the United States and Russia on missile defense provisions in the New START treaty. Some argue it doesn't matter what Russia says about the issue. Well, I believe it is vital that we examine what Russia has said about this very matter. When two countries enter into a bilateral agreement, there needs to be an actual agreement--an agreement of what is said and an agreement of what it means. Discussing the disagreements between the two parties to the treaty is imperative, and it is part of the Senate's constitutional obligation. The two parties to this treaty--the United States and Russia--need to know how both parties will be acting and how they will both be interpreting the New START treaty. We cannot ignore the differences.

Some proponents of the treaty have argued that passing the McCain-Barrasso amendment will complicate ratification. I reject that idea. I reject the idea that the Senate's advice and consent duty is to take it or leave it. I believe the Senate's advice and consent role is either to accept the treaty or improve the treaty, and that is what this amendment does--it improves the treaty. We, as a Senate, cannot simply be a rubberstamp to treaties due to fears of fixing flaws and improving important provisions.

The Congressional Research Service published a study on the role of the Senate in the treaty process. It is titled ``Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of The United States Senate.'' On page 125, the study states:

Amendments are proposed changes in the actual text of the treaty. They amount, therefore, to Senate counteroffers that alter the original deal agreed to by the United States and the other country.

So should the Senate agree to strike the missile defense section of the preamble, we are simply asking the Russians to accept it. The ball is in Russia's court. The Russians can either accept or reject the Senate's counteroffer. If the text of the preamble is just a nonbinding statement of fact, then Russia should not have any problem in eliminating that portion of the preamble. But if Russia does have a problem with eliminating a so-called nonbinding statement of fact and Russia is willing to jeopardize the entire treaty over it, then every Member of the Senate should be concerned about the provision's impact.

The treaty's preamble, the Russian unilateral statement on missile defense, and remarks by senior Russian officials all show an attempt by Russia to limit or to constrain future U.S. missile defense capabilities. Let's take a look at the Russian unilateral statement. It shows how the Russians will act under the treaty. It states:

The treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively.

That is the Russian unilateral statement. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated the treaty contained ``legally binding linkage between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons.'' He went on:

The treaty and all obligations it contains are valid only within the context of the levels which are now present in the sphere of strategic defensive systems.

To me those statements seem very clear. The negotiators have given in and they have allowed limitations on our missile defense capabilities. I have no doubt that Russia will threaten to withdraw from the treaty, should the United States expand its current nuclear capabilities.

There should be no problem in removing the language in the preamble when treaty proponents believe that it has no legally binding significance.

I have been sitting here, visiting and discussing this treaty with Members on both sides. This amendment only strikes a portion of the treaty that people who support the treaty have called nonbinding, legally insignificant, and one Senator called it a throwaway provision. Then they should throw it away. This Senate can ensure that there is no limit on U.S. missile defense by simply passing the McCain-Barrasso amendment. Our missile defense is worth the effort and the time to get it right.

The McCain-Barrasso amendment significantly improves the treaty and I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of this very important amendment.

I yield the floor.

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