Executive Session

Floor Speech

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I would like to briefly join my colleagues in explaining some of my concerns, first of all, about the process by which we are taking up something as important as a treaty with regard to nuclear arms. Of course, this is the second part of a two-part constitutional process.

The President sent this treaty to the Senate, along with a transmittal letter dated May 13, 2010, and here we are on December 16, shortly before the Christmas holidays and adjournment, taking up a treaty as important as this. Of course, under article II, section 2 of the United States Constitution, a treaty cannot be ratified without the vote of at least two-thirds of the Members of the Senate.

I know everyone--whether they are for this treaty, whether they are against this treaty, whether they are merely questioning some aspects of the treaty and are perhaps seeking to make some modifications--I believe everyone is approaching this issue with the kind of seriousness and gravity that should be required of a Senator approaching something this serious.

But I have to make this observation: Here we are, as I said, on December 16, 2 days--2 days--after having dropped on us a 1,924-page Omnibus appropriations bill which calls for the Federal Government to spend an additional $1.2 trillion. The idea that we would later today take up the issue of funding the Federal Government and consider this Omnibus appropriations bill while we would have to basically detour and lay this treaty by the side--this is, to me, just irresponsible. I do not know any other word to describe it.

We have, in fact, been in session 151 days during 2010. That is right. You heard me correctly. The Senate has actually been in session 151 days this year. I think most people would love to get a paycheck across America and only be expected to show up and do their job 151 days a year.

Now, I know when we go back home, we continue to work with our constituents, to listen to their concerns and otherwise, but my simple point is, when the President sends this treaty over on May 13, 2010, and at the same time, simultaneously, we are being asked to consider this huge Omnibus appropriations bill of $1.2 trillion--some 2,000 pages long--the idea that we would try to jam through or give expedited consideration to the serious, substantive issues being raised by this treaty is, as I said, poor time management, to say the least, and I think irresponsible.

I want to raise some of the substantive concerns I have about the treaty on which I know there will be further discussions.

First of all, I would point out that the treaty does not itself address tactical----

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I have the floor.

Mr. KERRY. I know. I am just asking if the Senator would yield for a question.

Mr. CORNYN. I would be glad, after I get through my remarks, to yield for some questions.

Mr. KERRY. I appreciate it.

Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I would note, as others have noted, that the treaty completely excludes consideration of a limitation on tactical nuclear weapons, even though Russia possesses a significant superiority in terms of numbers over the United States for these types of weapons.

I would just note that some at the Department of Defense have noted that the difference between strategic weapons and tactical weapons has become somewhat muddled and less meaningful in recent decades. I believe a legitimate cause for concern is why we would exclude tactical nuclear weapons, that the Russians have numerical superiority of, and not even seek to regulate or contain those at all, while we are focused strictly on strategic nuclear weapons, of which the United States would have to cut our current numbers and the Russians not at all in order to meet the goals of the treaty.

I would say, secondly, I have concerns about the treaty's provisions on verification. Of course, President Reagan was famous for saying we should trust, but verify when it comes to this type of treaty. I would point out that Brent Scowcroft, in 1997, pointed out the importance of when we are actually reducing the overall number of weapons, verification becomes that much more important. He said, in 1997:

Current force levels provide a kind of buffer because they are high enough to be relatively insensitive to imperfect intelligence and modest force changes. ..... As force levels go down, the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly delicate and vulnerable to cheating on arms control limits, concerns about nondeployed ``hidden missiles'' and the actions of nuclear third parties.

So we need to be extraordinarily careful, even more careful now than perhaps we have been in the past with regard to the verification measures.

We know the Russians have taken every advantage to cheat on previous treaties and to be untrustworthy. According to the official State Department reports on arms control compliance, the Russians have previously violated--or are still violating, even as we speak--important provisions of most of the key arms control treaties to which they have been a party, including the original START treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and Open Skies.

The New START treaty does not close that gap on verification loopholes that the Russians are already exploiting or, in fact, evading.

As my colleague, Senator Bond--who is, notably, the vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence--has told us, the annual 10-warhead limit on inspections allowed under this treaty permit us to sample only 2 to 3 percent of the total Russian deployed force and, therefore, it will be impossible--it will be literally impossible; limited to 10 annual warhead inspections over a 10-year treaty--to inspect all, much less most, of the 1,550 limit on deployed warheads.

So why would we call this a robust verification provision if we are only allowed to see 2 to 3 percent of the total Russian force?

The New START treaty, unlike its predecessor, permits any number of warheads to be loaded on a missile. So even if the Russians fully cooperated--which I do not believe they have in the past, nor can be trusted to do so in the future--even if they do cooperate with all of the provisions in the New START treaty, these inspections cannot provide the sort of conclusive evidence that you would think would be required given the gravity of the potential risk. They cannot provide conclusive evidence that the Russians are, in fact, complying with the warhead limit.

Third, the New START treaty handcuffs the United States from deploying new capabilities we need to defend our Nation and our allies from missile attacks.

I would just point out that this chart I have in the Chamber demonstrates the ballistic missile threat that is presented in a map of Europe and Africa and Asia. You will notice that Russia is not even on this map. But you will notice a number of other ballistic missile threats that could affect not only the United States but most certainly our allies. This map is a compilation from the Missile Defense Agency based on information from several agencies in the intelligence community and shows that more than a dozen nations--more than a dozen nations--have developed or are developing ballistic missile capabilities. Several of these nations are notorious for that--North Korea, Iran, and Libya, just to name a few. But we know others, such as Yemen and Pakistan, have al-Qaida operatives or other extremist groups operating within their borders.

The fact is, we need a robust missile defense capability, not to protect us from Russian ballistic missiles but from ballistic missiles from some of these other nations that have developed them, some of whom have groups such as al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations there that would love to get their hands on some of these weapons and use them against America or our allies. That is why it makes absolutely no sense to constrain our future missile defense options in exchange for reductions in the strategic nuclear weapons of just one country, and that is Russia.

Now, some of my colleagues may be arguing there are no limitations on missile defense in the treaty and that the language in the preamble, which ties our strategic offensive arms to our strategic defensive arms--for the first time ever, by the way--that this preamble language does not mean anything, does not operate as a constraint on our missile defense programs.

But that is not what the Russians have said. That is not how they read it. Of course, the Senate has been denied the negotiating record by which we could actually clarify what was said by American negotiators and Russian negotiators in coming up with this language. Isn't that something you would think the administration would want clarified, if they could clarify it by providing this information? But, no, we have been stonewalled and told: You cannot have it, Senate, even though under article II, section 2 of the Constitution, you have a constitutional duty when it comes to treaty ratification.

I just think it is a very poor way to do business, to say the least, and causes me to question whether there is a uniform understanding of constraints on our missile defense system. Again, you can see that the risk is not just from Russia, it is much more widespread, unfortunately, than that.

Russia has also made a unilateral statement that it claims the right to withdraw from the New START treaty if the United States does, in fact, expand our missile defense capability. Doug Feith shed some light on this issue earlier in an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal.

Mr. Feith, of course, as you remember, is a former Under Secretary of Defense under the Bush administration, and he helped negotiate the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, known as the SORT treaty. He says during those negotiations, the Russians were constantly trying to get the Americans to negotiate away our right to defend ourselves from missile attacks. The Bush administration rightly rejected those Russian demands, and they got a good treaty anyway. But the Obama administration, in this treaty, gave Russia what it wanted when it came to our missile defense, among other concessions as well--a very serious concern, I would say.

The New START treaty has other flaws, but even if it was an outstanding treaty, I think the gravity of what we are about here--in considering this treaty, and reductions in nuclear arms, and trying to make the world a more secure and safer place--that it warrants more careful and deliberate consideration of this treaty than we are going to be able to give during this lameduck session.

I have heard people talk about, well, the fact that this is the Christmas season--of course, we would all like to be with our families. But we recognize the fact that we have important obligations to perform in the Senate. I think all of us are willing to perform those. But the problem is, we have had an election on November 2, and there are a lot of people, as the Senator from Oklahoma said, who were just elected by the American people who would be denied an opportunity to let their voice be heard on such an important issue if this treaty is jammed through during the waning days of the 111th Congress.

Now, we know the legitimacy of our government itself rests upon the consent of the governed. The fact is, during the most recent election the American people said they don't like the direction Washington is heading and they want us to change. The idea that we would then--after the election takes place but before the new Senators in Congress are actually sworn in--try to rush through such important matters such as this treaty and deny them an opportunity, and the voices of the people who elected them to be heard, to me, does not speak well of this process, and I think indeed denies us the legitimacy of the consent of the governed, or certainly many of them.

Let's be clear about what is happening. We know the administration wants a vote on this New START treaty because they think they have a better chance of passing it now than when these new Senators are sworn in on January 5. There is no one I have heard who has suggested there is a national security threat to the United States from delaying the ratification of this treaty by a month. No one. I don't think they could plausibly make such a contention.

I think there is a little bit of an attempt to focus our attention away from the $1.2 trillion spending tsunami that was unleashed on Congress just 2 days ago in which we are told Senator Reid, the majority leader, is going to insist be voted on in just a few days. I think a better alternative to that, and certainly a better alternative than to go through this unnecessary drama about government shutdowns, is to pass a one-page continuing resolution that would keep the government operating until January or February, at which time these newly elected Senators and House Members would be able to participate. It would be the time when we could certainly take up this treaty and give it thoughtful and careful consideration, the kind of debate and amendment process I think our responsibility requires rather than trying to move it through in this irresponsible manner.

This omnibus bill I mentioned earlier will no doubt be called up later today, perhaps, and be attached to a continuing resolution and then cloture filed, asking 60 Senators to agree to close off debate, denying any opportunity for amendments and the kind of consideration I think the American people would want us to have for a $1.2 trillion spending bill.

We know Christmas is almost here and many Americans look forward to celebrating that important holiday and reflecting on what comes with the new year. I hope our friends on the other side of the aisle will reconsider the tactics they are employing during this lameduck session to try to gloss over or ignore the important substantive concerns many of us have about this very significant treaty and to ram through unpopular legislation just as happened last year on Christmas Eve with the passage of the health care bill. Many Americans remember passing that bill on Christmas Eve in the Senate, and they were outraged by the process, by the back-room negotiations and deals that took place in order to get over the 60-vote threshold.

So this year I would submit that millions of Americans want just one thing from Congress, and that would be a silent night. Let's pray they get it. If the Senator still has a question or two for me, I would be glad to yield for that purpose.

I thank the chair and yield the floor.

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