Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms--Resumed

Floor Speech

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Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amended No. 4920 be made pending.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I do object. I want to say to the Senator that I am delighted to have a discussion with him about this particular issue. But I think given the efforts we have made thus far to deal with a fixed set of amendments has been affected somewhat by some of those amendments that were filed late, and also not germane, requiring colleagues at the last minute to consider a lot of issues on the floor that are not pertaining directly to the treaty itself.

The subject the Senator wants to bring up and talk about, which is Russian cooperation on Iran, is absolutely essential to us as a matter of foreign policy. I want to join with the Senator in emphasizing that. I look forward to hearing his comments about it. I think we can have an important colloquy that could add to the record of our discussions with respect to this treaty without negatively impacting the direction we are moving in at this point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, if I might, given that, speak to the amendment. I regret that the amendment can't be voted on. The process has been fairly open. A number of amendments have been considered. This amendment was filed sometime this afternoon. It deals with an important subject, which is germane to the debate that we are having with regard to the New START treaty.

One of the predicates for improving the START treaty is the so-called reset of our relationship with Russia. Of course, the President, as recently as November 18, 2010, made a statement, which is in this amendment:

``The New START Treaty is also a cornerstone of our relations with Russia'' for the reason that ``Russia has been fundamental to our efforts to put strong sanctions in place to put pressure on Iran to deal with its nuclear program.'' Accordingly, the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the New START Treaty is conditioned on the expectation that the Russian Federation will cooperate fully with United States and international efforts to prevent the Government of Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability.

What this amendment does is to provide some assurance that all those intentions and statements actually come to pass. It would require the President to certify to the Senate the following:

Prior to entry into force of the New START Treaty, 1, the President shall certify to the Senate that (i) the Russian Federation is in full compliance with all United Nations Security Council Resolutions relating to Iran; (ii) the Government of the Russian Federation has assured the United States that neither it nor any entity subject to its jurisdiction and control will (I) transfer to Iran the S-300 air defense system or other advanced weapons systems or any parts thereof; or (II) transfer such items to a third party which will in turn transfer such items to Iran; (iii) the Government of the Russian Federation has assured the United States that neither it nor any entity subject to its jurisdiction and control will transfer to Iran goods, services, or technology that contribute to the advancement of the nuclear or missile programs of the Government of Iran; and (iv) the Government of the Russian Federation has assured the United States that it will support efforts at the United Nations Security Council and elsewhere to increase political and economic pressure on the Government of Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program.

That would be a commitment, a certification, that would be issued prior to the entry in force of the treaty by the President each year, and on December 31 of each subsequent year a similar certification would be issued by the President. In fact, if the President fails to certify, then it would require that he consult with the Senate and submit a report on whether adherence to the New START treaty remains in the U.S. national security interest.

I say this because I think there is a direct connection and correlation between this treaty and the efforts of the Russians that we assume the Russians are going to commit to in terms of putting pressure on Iran regarding its nuclear program and not doing things that would put in jeopardy the security of the region.

I have to say, obviously, this has a big impact on our great ally, Israel, as well as the whole region. It would be very destabilizing if the Iranians have a nuclear weapon. So I think the effort made by the administration to ``reset relations with Russia,'' bears directly on this treaty. As I said, it was stated clearly by the President as recently as November 18, where he recognized that important relationship. I simply say this amendment, I don't think, is anything that anybody would not agree with. All it does is require not just a statement that this is going to be part of our ongoing relationship with Russia, but it provides an assurance, a certification that the administration would make to the Senate before the treaty would enter into force and each year subsequent to that with those basic issues.

The issues are fairly straightforward. It simply requires a condition that the Russian Federation is in full compliance with all U.N. Security Council resolutions relating to Iran and the government of the Russian Federation assures the United States that neither it nor any entity subject to its jurisdiction and control will transfer to Iran the S-300 air defense system or other advanced weapons systems or any parts thereof or transfer such items to a third party, which will in turn transfer such items to Iran.

While the S-300--for the time being, Russia has refrained from doing that. There are concerns and reports that Russia has recently provided Tehran with a new radar system allegedly through third party mediators from Venezuela and Belarus. So the concern about that coming into Iran through some third party is also something that I think is of great concern to America's national security interests as well as those of our allies.

Mr. President, the amendment, again, is very straightforward. It requires a certification before the entry into force of the treaty, and then each year thereafter about those basic conditions that the Russians be in compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, that they would not try to get the S-300 to the Iranians, directly or indirectly, and they would continue putting pressure on the Iranians with respect to their nuclear program.

We know too that the nuclear reactor in Bashir is now producing plutonium. Russia has fueled a nuclear reactor there that is now producing plutonium in Iran. That ought to be of great concern to everybody here as we pass judgment on this treaty, which is obviously important to our relationship with Russia, but also bears on the relationship we have with other countries around the world.

I think anybody in the foreign policy community that you talk to today, when you ask what is the most dangerous threats the United States and its allies face around the world today, Iran and nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran top that list.

So the efforts that we make to persuade the Russians to put pressure on the Iranians and make sure there isn't anything going on there that would destabilize or put in peril America's national security interest is certainly an objective we have.

This would require the President certify that those things are taking place rather than relying on the statements and good intentions of the Russians. I wish, again, that I could get this amendment pending and get it voted on. I think it is important to have the Senate on record with regard to this issue. I regret that the amendment has been objected to.

I appreciate the opportunity to at least raise the issue, and I certainly hope it is something that the administration and our leaders in the Senate and the entire military establishment of this country pays close attention to in the days ahead. This issue will not go away. I think it bears definitely on the treaty.

With that, I will conclude my remarks and say I wish we had an opportunity to get a vote on it.

I yield the floor.

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