Executive Session

Floor Speech

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Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma for yielding some time. We are going to vote on his amendment and on the amendment I have offered. Both address important subjects in the treaty. The Senator from Oklahoma is dealing with the issue of verification and pointing out the shortcomings in the treaty with regard to that very important issue. The amendment I will have voted on deals with the issue of delivery vehicles, which, in my judgment, is a critically important element in this treaty as well.

As I have said earlier today on the floor, what this amendment does--it is very straightforward and it is very simple--is it just increases the number of deployed delivery vehicles, which are the bombers, the submarines, and the ICBMs allowed for in the treaty from 700 to 720.

In terms of background about why that is important--and I want to inform my colleagues in the Senate about why it is important we get that number up to 720--I asked at an Armed Services Committee hearing at what point between the range of 500 and 1,100 delivery systems that GEN James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be comfortable and where we would avoid making our triad into a dyad.

He said: ``I would be very concerned if we got down below those levels about midpoint,'' meaning that he would be concerned if the negotiated number fell below about 800 delivery vehicles. They have made a distinction--the administration has--between deployed and nondeployed, that there are 800 there. And he has subsequently said he could live with a 700 deployed number. But the fact of the matter is that the concern that was voiced initially about dropping down below that midpoint level suggests that we need to at least increase up to where the administration's I guess you would call it their nuclear force structure plan settled, and that was 720 delivery vehicles.

So the amendment raises from 700 to 720 the number of delivery vehicles. As I said earlier in my remarks, if you look at what the 1251 report says, it says up to 60 nuclear-capable bombers, up to 420 deployed ICBMs, and 240 deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles on 14 submarines.

If you add up, up to 60 bombers, up to 420 ICBMs and 240 deployed SLBMs, you get a number of 720 delivery vehicles. That is what the nuclear force structure plan calls for. Yet the treaty specifies 700 delivery vehicles.

So there is a 20-delivery vehicle cap there, which I think is important.

Frankly, if you ask the question about where would those reductions come from, obviously it would come from either ICBMs or bombers. People have suggested it doesn't have to come out of the bombers, but if you did take it out of the bombers, if you reduce the number of bombers from the 60 that is specified in the nuclear force structure plan to get down under 700, you would have to take the bombers from 60 down to 40.

As I said earlier today, we have about 96 B-52 nuclear bombers, about 20 B-2 nuclear bombers, and those are total deployed and nondeployed, the number we have in our inventory arsenal. We have about 94, I think, that are combat ready. But in any case, we are talking about a significant reduction in the number of bombers we could deploy at any given time under the treaty if you get it down to the 700 number.

The question as to whether that would come out of ICBMs or whether it would come out of bombers to get from 720 down to 700, it could be some combination of both. But the thing that concerns me about this is we have a bomber fleet that is aging. Most of our bombers today are pre-Cuban missile crisis-era vintage bombers--about 47 percent of them are. We need a follow-on, a next-generation bomber that will fill that role, that will be survivable in the types of modern-era defenses we are going to encounter, sophisticated air defense systems that are being employed by some of our potential adversaries around the world. So if you think about what we need in terms of a next-generation bomber, we need a field bomber and we need to do it sooner rather than later and it needs to be nuclear.

But when asked the question about whether the next bomber would be a nuclear bomber, the military and the administration have been very ambiguous on that point. They haven't been able to answer clearly, with any degree of certainty, about whether the next bomber, the follow-on bomber, would, in fact, be a nuclear bomber, which would suggest to me the commitment to the bomber wing of the triad is a lot less than it is to perhaps the other two legs of the triad.

That being said, let's assume for the moment that if we have up to 60 bombers, we have up to 420 ICBMs, and we have 240 submarine launchable ballistic missiles, we are talking about a 720 number, not a 700 number. So that is why I think this debate is important and why we are trying to be insistent in getting those two numbers to match.

The other point I wish to make is with regard to delivery vehicles in the treaty. We start out right now with about 856 delivery vehicles, if you add up ICBMs, submarine launchable ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers. We will end up down at 700. So we are going to take about 156 of our delivery vehicles, reduce that, retire those, and get down to that 700 number. The Russians, on the other hand, start at about 620. So they are already well below the 700 number called for in the treaty. It has been suggested that through attrition they will probably get down to somewhere in the 400s in delivery vehicles. So this particular provision in the treaty costs them nothing. We give up 156 delivery vehicles. They give up nothing. In fact, they can come up to the 700 number. They could increase the number of delivery vehicles they currently have to come up to that 700 number.

So I think it is important to point out the difference that exists today and the disparity that exists between the Russian number of delivery vehicles and the number the United States has at our disposal and the number called for in the treaty and why that disparity is so important.

Just one final point, if I might, with regard to the nuclear posture of the country. We also have to defend not only the United States but about 30 other countries around the world that fall under the nuclear umbrella, under our deterrence. The Russians have none. So these delivery vehicle numbers become even more important, given the geographic realities the United States has to deal with in terms of our strategic nuclear forces and what they are expected to do in terms of providing extended deterrence not only to the United States but to many of our allies around the world.

So I think it is important in this treaty debate--this particular part of it--that we get a vote on this amendment. It has been suggested that if this amendment gets adopted, we will have to go back to the Russians. That is part of our goal of advice and consent in the Senate. If it were just consent, we would be nothing more than a rubberstamp. I think we have an important role; that is, to look at these critical issues, and where there are areas of disagreement, to provide our advice. I think, in a very straightforward way, we can vote on an amendment that would increase from 700 to 720 the number of delivery vehicles specified in the treaty. It is a very straightforward amendment and one that would then go back, obviously, to the Russians, but it is certainly consistent with the Senate's traditional and historic role of advice and consent.

Former Defense Secretary Schlesinger testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 2010, that: ``As to the stated context of the strategic nuclear weapons, the numbers specified are adequate, though barely so.''

Well, ``barely so'' does not seem to be good enough for me when we are talking about the important obligations we have in defending America's vital national security interests as well as those of many of our allies around the world. I don't think settling for barely enough or barely so is sufficient.

So I hope my colleagues will support this amendment. I think, as I said earlier, the triad is critical to our nuclear deterrence and maintaining both ICBMs and SLBMs, but then also having a very robust bomber component of that is critical. That is why investing in a next-generation, follow-on bomber that is nuclear is important. I think the ambiguity that surrounds the question, the uncertainty that surrounds the question about whether a follow-on bomber would be nuclear speaks volumes about the commitment to that leg of the triad, but it is also important to remember bombers are the best form of extended deterrence.

If you want to make those who would proliferate nuclear weapons pay attention, you send a bomber in. A bomber is very visible, it is recallable, it is survivable, and it brings great psychological and political advantage to our country when it comes to trying to discourage proliferation by other countries around the world.

So I hope my colleagues will support this amendment. It is an important amendment. The delivery vehicle issue is, to me, critical to this debate not only in terms of the numbers but also the modernization of those various elements of the triad. The triad, over time, has given us great survivability, great flexibility, and if ever called upon, we want to be as prepared as we possibly can be to encounter any nuclear threat that might exist to the United States. I hope my colleagues will support this amendment.

I will reserve my time and yield back now to the Senator from Oklahoma, who I think probably wants to continue to talk about the verification issues.

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Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I wish to speak to an amendment I have pending at the desk, but before I do that, I wish to make some general observations as well about where we are with regard to this process because there has been a lot said about Republicans not wanting to vote on this or trying to delay this. But I think one would have to admit that we have now talked about missile defense, which I think is a very valid issue with respect to this treaty. There are very significant areas of disagreement with regard to how it treats missile defense. We have had a discussion about tactical weapons, which, in my judgment, also is a very important issue relative to our national security interests and the interests of our allies around the world. We have had a debate about verification, about which the amendment of Senator Inhofe is currently pending. Those are all very valid and substantive issues to debate and discuss with regard to this treaty.

The amendment I will offer will deal with the issue of delivery vehicles, which is something that is important as well where this treaty is concerned.

So I would simply say that it is consistent with our role in the U.S. Senate to provide advice and consent. If it were just consent, if that is what the Founders intended, we could rubberstamp this. But we have a role in this process, and that role is to look at these issues in great detail and make sure the national security interests of the United States are well served by a treaty of this importance.

So I think the words of the treaty matter, and I think the words of the preamble matter. I am not going to relitigate the debate we have already had on missile defense, but I believe that if we have language in a preamble to a document such as this, not unlike the preamble we have in our Constitution which is frequently quoted, it has meaning. To suggest that the preamble doesn't mean anything, that it is a throwaway and has throwaway language, to me really misses the point. Obviously, it matters to someone. It matters greatly to the Russians, and I don't think, if it didn't, it would be in there. That is why I believe that having this linkage between offensive strategic arms and defensive strategic arms in the preamble--it is in there for a reason. Somebody wanted it in there, obviously, and I think it certainly has weight and consequence beyond what has been suggested here on the floor of the Senate.

I would also argue as well that the signing statement we have already talked about where the Russians made it very clear in the signing statement, in Prague on April 8 of 2010, that the treaty can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities qualitatively or quantitatively--if you tie that back to article XIV of the withdrawal clause of the treaty where it talks about being able to withdraw for exceptional circumstances, you can certainly see the pretext by which the Russians may decide to withdraw from this treaty.

So missile defense is not an inconsequential issue. It is a very important issue with regard to this treaty, and the amendment that was offered on Saturday and voted on attempted to address that. Unfortunately, that failed. I hope we have subsequent opportunities to get at the issue of missile defense because I certainly think it is an unresolved issue in my view and in the view of many of us.

AMENDMENT NO. 4841

The amendment I offer today is very straightforward and modest. It would simply increase the number of deployed delivery vehicles--in other words, bombers, submarines, and land-based missiles--allowed for in the New START treaty from 700 to 720. It simply adds 20 additional vehicles to the number in order to match up with the administration's plan presented to the Senate for fielding 720 delivery vehicles rather than the 700 called for in the text of this treaty.

Before I continue, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Scott Brown of Massachusetts be added as a cosponsor of this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. THUNE. For those watching this debate who may be unfamiliar with some of the terminology used in these arms control treaties such as the term ``delivery vehicles,'' it is important to understand that delivery vehicles simply means the nuclear triad of systems: bombers, submarines, and land based intercontinental ballistic missiles or ICBMs. This triad of delivery vehicles is very valuable because it is resilient, survivable, and flexible, meaning that if, God forbid, we suffer a nuclear attack, those who attacked us can never be sure that they have knocked out our ability to respond with a nuclear strike. Obviously, without the means to deliver nuclear weapons, an adversary would not take seriously our ability to respond to a nuclear attack. As the numbers of delivery vehicles goes down, it becomes more and more important to make sure they are modernized and that they work as intended. And as numbers get reduced, it begins to have an impact on whether we can effectively retain the triad, making it more likely that our nation would have to eliminate a leg of the triad.

On July 9, 2009, at an Armed Services Committee hearing, I asked GEN James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, about the administration's commitment at that time to reduce our strategic delivery vehicles to somewhere in the range of 500 to 1,100 systems, and to specify at what point in this range would he become concerned that delivery vehicle reductions would necessitate making our nuclear triad into a dyad. General Cartwright responded that he ``would be very concerned if we got down below those levels about mid point,'' meaning that he would be concerned if the negotiated number fell below 800 delivery vehicles. This treaty caps delivery vehicles at 700, substantially below the number that General Cartwright stated a year and a half ago.

Now, the treaty makes this odd distinction between ``deployed'' and ``non-deployed'' delivery vehicles, and the treaty's proponents will point out that the total cap for the treaty is 800 ``deployed and non-deployed'' systems. And of course, there is a letter from General Cartwright in the committee report accompanying the treaty stating that he is comfortable with the distinction between deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles, and the overall limits to delivery vehicles. But it is important to understand that the administration has not articulated how it will deploy a nuclear force conforming to the number of 700. Instead, the administration has presented a plan for how it will deploy 720 delivery vehicles. And that is the motivation behind this amendment. I find it very troubling that the administration has yet to articulate how it will deploy a nuclear force conforming to the number of 700. The comprehensive plan for delivery vehicle force structure the administration was required to present to Congress under section 1251 of the fiscal year 2010 Defense authorization bill, known as the 1251 report, provides a very troubling lack of specificity concerning force structure under the New START treaty. Specifically, the administration's fact sheet on the section 1251 report explains that the U.S. nuclear force structure under this treaty could comprise up to 60 bombers, up to 420 ICBMs, and 240 SLBMs. The only number that is a certainty in the 1251 report is the number of SLBMs. I hope the members from states with bomber bases and ICBM bases will pay attention to this important point. Since deployments at the maximum level of all three legs of the triad under the explanation provided by the administration's 1251 report add up to 720 delivery vehicles, it is mathematically impossible for the U.S. to make such a deployment and be in compliance with the treaty's limit of 700 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Clearly, additional reduction decisions will be made with respect to U.S. force structure under this treaty, and obviously those reductions will come out of bombers and/or ICBMs.

Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen acknowledged in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 17, 2010, that further reductions would still be required to meet the treaty's central limits. They went on to argue that because the United States will have 7 years to reduce its forces to these limits, they did not find it necessary to identify a final force structure at this point; meaning the Senate will commit the United States to a delivery vehicle force of 700 without knowing how that force will be composed.

Compounding this problem of not knowing what the final force structure will look like is the fact that the Obama administration conceded to Russian demands to place limits on conventional prompt global strike systems by counting conventionally armed strategic ballistic missiles against the 700 allowed for delivery vehicles. For those who are unfamiliar with prompt global strike, it is simply a program that would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. Development of these systems is an important niche capability that would allow us to attack high-value targets or fleeting targets, such as WMD, terrorist, and missile threats. A recent Defense Science Board report states that ``the most mature option for prompt, long-range, conventional strike is the ballistic missile'' and that ``Building on the legacy of these [intercontinental ballistic missile] weapon systems provides a relatively low-risk path to a conventional weapon system with global reach.'' Yet this treaty will not permit us to develop this low-risk concept for conventional prompt global strike without it having an impact on the central limits under this treaty of 700 delivery vehicles.

To be very blunt, this treaty was so poorly negotiated that for every ICBM or SLBM deployed with a conventional warhead, one less nuclear delivery vehicle will be available to the United States. This one-for-one reduction in deployed nuclear forces is one we can ill afford at the levels of delivery vehicles allowed under this treaty. When the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General Chilton, testified before the Armed Services Committee on April 22, 2010, he specifically said that we could not replace the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons with a conventional capability on a one-for-one basis or ``even ten-for-one.''

Treaty proponents will point out that there are other potential new conventional prompt global strike systems on the drawing board that may not fall under the treaty's limitations, such as a hypersonic glide delivery vehicle. But why are we tying the hands of future administrations that may need to quickly field such systems, especially since converting ICBMs to carry a conventional warhead are the most advanced systems we have right now on conventional prompt global strike?

The Senate should not ratify the treaty without knowing what kind of conventional prompt global strike systems may be counted and how that will affect our triad at the much reduced delivery vehicle limits. According to the DOD, an assessment on treaty implications for conventional prompt global strike proposals will not be ready until early 2011. If we pass this treaty now, Senators won't know the details on this important issue until the treaty enters into force, when it is too late. Adopting my amendment would provide a hedge against the issues that are raised by the conventional prompt global strike niche capability and its impact on the treaty's limit of 700 delivery vehicles. With a 700 delivery vehicle limit, conventional prompt global strike counting against that number, we will have fewer nuclear delivery vehicles, and this limit will be a disincentive to develop and deploy conventional prompt global strike as a result. Moreover, why should we accept these constraints in a treaty that was about strategic nuclear weapons?

While we are required under the treaty to cut the number of delivery vehicles to the bone, Russia will not have to make any similar cut to their delivery vehicles, leaving one to wonder what we received in return for this significant concession. The treaty essentially requires the United States to make unilateral reductions in delivery vehicles, as Russia is already well below the delivery vehicle limits and would have drastically reduced its arsenal with or without this treaty. As CRS writes, ``[Russia] currently has only 620 launchers, and this number may decline to around 400 deployed and 444 total launchers. This would likely be true whether or not the treaty enters into force because Russia is eliminating older missiles as they age, and deploying newer missiles at a far slower pace than that needed to retain 700 deployed launchers.''

So I want to put a fine point on that, Mr. President. Essentially what we are doing here is we have about 856 delivery vehicles in our arsenal today. We are reducing that down to 700. So we are taking a significant haircut, a significant cut in the number of delivery vehicles that would be available to us. The Russians, on the other hand, are currently only at 620 launchers, delivery vehicles, which is already well below the 700. On the attrition path they are on, it would very soon be down to about 400 deployed launchers and 444 total launchers. So the United States has made huge concessions regarding delivery vehicles in this treaty, and the Russians have conceded nothing on this point. It seems to me this is another area in which we made significant concessions and received very little in return.

Mr. President, we are binding ourselves to the number of delivery vehicles we negotiate with Russia, even though we have security commitments to extend our nuclear deterrent to more than 30 countries, while Russia has none. Given geographic realities, U.S. strategic nuclear forces are part of how the United States provides this extended deterrence. As we face an uncertain future, where other nations like China continue to modernize their nuclear forces, we will need to be able to hold more potential targets at risk to deter attacks. That means we need to be very careful about reducing delivery vehicle levels, and this amendment would simply use the administration's 1251 report force structure plan of 720 delivery vehicles as the ceiling for delivery vehicles under this treaty, rather than the current number of 700 reflected in the treaty.

Some of my colleagues will probably warn that even this modest amendment is a ``treaty killer'' amendment. But article II, section 2 of the Constitution says that the President ``shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties.'' When the other side admonishes us about ``treaty killer'' amendments, it becomes apparent that we are supposed to be a rubberstamp for this treaty, wanting us to provide our consent but not to provide our advice. It should be made clear what a ``treaty killer'' amendment is. It is any amendment seeking to remedy an issue with the treaty the Russians steamrolled us on during the negotiation process but which New START proponents do not wish to adopt because protecting American interests will annoy the Russians and perhaps jeopardize entry into force of the treaty.

One thing should be clear: The Senate cannot kill New START in the way some are suggesting. If the Senate gives its consent to New START with amendment to the text, that just means the treaty is sent to Russia for its approval with the amendment. The ball will then be in Russia's court. As CRS has outlined in its study on the role of the Senate in the treaty process: ``Amendments are proposed changes in the actual text of the treaty....... [They] amount, therefore, to Senate counter offers that alter the original deal agreed to by the United States and the other country.''

Simply put, an amendment to the treaty text would not kill the treaty, it would merely require Russian consent to the amendment as a matter of international negotiation. If Russia chooses to reject that amendment, it will not be the Senate that kills the treaty, it will be the Russian government.

As a side note, I believe it is important to recall that General Chilton's support for New START levels was predicated on no Russian cheating. He testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 22, 2010, that one of the assumptions made when the Nuclear Posture Review was completed was ``an assumption ..... that the Russians in the post negotiation time period would be compliant with the treaty.'' It has been pointed out many times now how Russia is a serial violator of arms control commitments.

In conclusion, reducing U.S. strategic nuclear forces, especially with delivery systems, is a very serious matter that has received insufficient attention. We have little to gain, and much to lose, if we cannot be certain that the numbers in New START are adequate. I think it is worth noting that former Defense Secretary Schlesinger testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 2010, that ``as to the stated context of strategic nuclear weapons, the numbers specified are adequate though barely so.'' Again, this is a modest amendment that takes into account the administration's own force structure plan of 720 delivery vehicles. This amendment would simply use the administration's 1251 report force structure plan of 720 delivery vehicles as the ceiling for delivery vehicles under this treaty rather than the current number of 700 reflected in the treaty. In light of all of these issues, I ask my colleagues to carefully consider this amendment, and I respectfully ask for a vote in its favor.

Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to support this amendment. I simply say that with regard to maintaining a triad and a system of bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs, in order to do that, the 700-number ceiling makes that very complicated.

If you assume 420 ICBMs and 240 SLBMs, that leaves room for some bombers but not a lot of room. Frankly, if you go down from the 720 number to the 700 number, if you assume up to 260 bombers--that is, if you assume the 700 number and take it out of bombers, you would be down to 40 bombers, 96 B-52s and B-1s that are nuclear capable, nuclear weapons we use with nuclear-launch vehicles for extended deterrence around the globe. Going down to 40 would be a two-thirds reduction in the number of bombers we have to provide that type of extended deterrence. It strikes me that we are getting perilously close with this number to moving from a triad to a dyad.

Furthermore, we are tying our hands when it comes to our ability to have the necessary delivery vehicles at our disposal, if and when that time would ever come.

Again, this is a very straightforward amendment. It takes the number from 700 to 720. It is consistent with the 1251 report and what the administration says they can accommodate in terms of launch vehicles. I hope my colleagues will support it.

I yield the floor.

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