SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 1999--Continued

Floor Speech

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Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I wish to speak to the START treaty, more specifically to the McCain-Barrasso amendment which is the amendment that is currently under consideration and on which we will vote later this afternoon. I want to point out at the outset that you do not have to watch the news very often in this country to realize we live in a dangerous world. There are lots of countries around the world that are run by regimes that not only mistreat their own populations but would love to do harm to countries that are allies of ours, as well as to the United States. That is why a debate about an issue such as missile defense is so important. That is why this particular provision in the START treaty has drawn so much attention, so much concern by many of us who are concerned about the linkage it establishes between offensive strategic arms and defensive strategic arms.

The Senate made it abundantly clear at the outset of the negotiations on the New START treaty, specifically in section 1251 of the fiscal year 2010 National Defense Authorization bill, that there should be no limitations on U.S. ballistic missile defense systems. The New START treaty not only contains specific limitations on those systems, but also reestablishes an unwise linkage between offense and defense that was broken when the ABM Treaty came to an end.

We were told as recently as March 29, by Under Secretary Tauscher, ``The treaty does nothing to constrain missile defense. This treaty is about strategic weapons.''

I quote again, ``There is no limit on what the United States can do with its missile defense systems.''

And then quote again, ``There are no constraints to missile defense.''

Those were all quotes made by Secretary Tauscher on March 29. But these assertions are incorrect in two ways. No. 1, not only are there specific limits on some missile defense options--and I note article V, paragraph 3 of the treaty text itself--but, second, when viewed together with the treaty's preamble, Russia's unilateral statement and statements by senior officials all provide potential for Russia to intimidate the United States by threatening to withdraw from the treaty if the United States seeks to increase its missile defense capabilities.

The treaty's supporters are going to argue that the limit on converting offensive silos for missile defense is meaningless because we don't have any such plans. But the question I come back to is simply this: Why is there a limitation at all on missile defense in a treaty that is meant to deal with nuclear weapons? Why did we concede to the Russians on this important point and can we be sure we will never have such plans. After all, we have converted offensive silos to defensive silos--for defensive purposes--in the past.

My own view is that particular provision in the treaty text is a direct linkage between offensive and defensive arms. Then you have the preamble and unilateral signing statements that I think are even more telling when it comes to that connection that is drawn between--that interrelationship between offense and defense.

Far more pernicious is the treaty's preamble and the two unilateral signing statements by the Russians and by the United States. The preamble states, ``The current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic arms of the Parties.''

The statement suggests that moving beyond current systems might undermine the viability and effectiveness of strategic systems and could provide grounds for withdrawal.

The administration says that either side can withdraw anyway. That is only partially true. The withdrawal clause in the treaty, as it has been in previous treaties, deals with extraordinary events and the preamble and unilateral statements make withdrawal more likely by building in an inevitable pretext.

So you have the preamble, the language in the preamble, you have the direct linkage in the treaty text itself, and then I also want to mention the other point which I think is equally important and that is the Russian unilateral signing statement makes clear Russia's legal opinion. Here is what it says.

The treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, can operate and be viable only if the United States of American refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively.

It further states:

The exceptional circumstances referred to in article XIV, the withdrawal clause of the treaty, include increasing the capabilities of the United States of America's missile defense system in such a way that threatens the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.

So the Russians have built into the treaty record their threat that improvement of U.S. missile defense creates the legal pretext for their withdrawal from the treaty. It can only be read as an attempt to exert political pressure to forestall continued development and deployment of U.S. missile defenses.

Was our response to that a firm rebuttal? The answer is no. Unlike the START I agreement where the United States said quite clearly that it did not agree with Russian statements linking that treaty to the U.S. status in the ABM treaty, we did not do that this time.

Instead, the State Department said, in response to the Russian unilateral statement:

The United States of America takes note of the statement on missile defense by the Russian Federation. The United States missile defense systems would be employed to defend the United States against limited missile launches, and to defend its deployed forces, allies and partners against regional threats. The United States intends to continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself against limited attack, and as part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key regions.

So it would appear that the U.S. position does not contradict the Russian position in the slightest. What then to make of the U.S. missile defense plan previously announced by Secretary Gates, which talks about the deployment of SM-3 missiles in Romania by 2015, Poland by 2018, and then in 2020 the deployment in Europe of the new SM-3 2B missile for the defense of Europe and the United States against ICBMs; is this still our position or is it now the position set forth in the signing statement and as recently briefed to the NATO-Russia Council in Lisbon where the SN03 2B missile was portrayed quite clearly as being ``available'' rather than ``deployed'' in the year 2020.

It is clear to me the administration is already coming under considerable pressure by the Russians to limit its missile defense activities in the very near future. Past experience would suggest this administration may be willing to alter its plans to accommodate the Russians, as it did in the case of previous plans to deploy missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic.

How will it respond if the President's prized accomplishment, the START treaty, is at risk? I think it is very clear from the language in the preamble, the direct linkage in the treaty itself, and what the signing statements say, what the Russians' intentions are with regard to this particular issue, which is why it is so important this amendment get adopted.

This amendment the Senators from Arizona and Wyoming have offered would simply strike the language in the preamble that is causing so much concern. We have heard arguments on the floor of the Senate since we started debate on the START treaty that the preamble is nonbinding; in other words, it does not mean anything.

In fact, it was said yesterday by someone on the other side that it is throwaway language. Yet at the same time, it has been argued by others on the other side that it is a treaty killer. It cannot be both. It cannot be a throwaway that is not legally binding and a treaty killer at the same time.

Essentially, what they are saying is, it means nothing and it means everything. That is a direct contradiction. That is why it is so important this amendment be adopted, which would clarify once and for all, or separate and decouple or delink this connection that exists in this treaty between offensive and defensive arms.

I think the amendment that is before us right now gets at the very heart of the matter, and we all know the Russians and Americans have different views on missile defense. But the attempt to paper over or even ignore these differences in this treaty sets the stage for future misunderstandings or confrontations as the United States continues its missile defense activities, particularly in Europe.

Confusion about U.S. plans is equally dangerous. This is not an issue on which there should be ambiguity, on which there should be confusion, and on which there should be this kind of a difference of opinion.

So I would simply say, as we come here in an hour or so to a final vote on the McCain-Barrasso amendment, that I think it is important for the Senate in our important role when it comes to treaty ratification to make sure we are doing everything that is in the national security interests of the United States and allows us in the best way possible to defend this country and our allies.

If we are limiting in any way our ability when it comes to the issue of missile defense, we are putting in jeopardy and at risk America's national security interests. So this treaty should not be approved. It should not be approved certainly until some of these changes are made, and we can start today by eliminating the linkage and the connection that exists today in the preamble by striking and deleting that language from the preamble of this treaty and making it very clear that the United States intends to preserve all options available to us when it comes to missile defense.

As I said before, this is something--this linkage was broken years ago under the Bush administration. We should not establish now the precedent of allowing those issues to be linked and to give the Russians an opportunity and an excuse to withdraw from this treaty if the United States decides to proceed with what is in its own best national security interests.

So I would urge my colleagues on this amendment--this is an important amendment. We will hopefully have debate on other amendments. I have a couple of amendments to deal with the issue of delivery vehicles which I think is also a very important part of this treaty. But there probably is no more important piece of this treaty than the issue of missile defense when it comes to the vital national security interests of the United States.

So I hope Members will, when this vote comes up later today, vote in favor of the McCain-Barrasso amendment and make it clear that there is to be no linkage, no nexus, between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms so we eliminate once and for all the ambiguity that exists with regard to this issue and allow us to proceed to other amendments on the treaty.

I yield the floor.

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