Executive Session
Floor Speech
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Mr. THUNE. I thank the Senator from Illinois for locking in the time. I want to start by saying here we are, jammed against the Christmas break with the majority using Christmas as a backstop to rush through an arms control treaty with the Russians and a trillion-dollar spending bill on a dual-track basis.
What that means is that we are considering, at the same time, two documents encompassing thousands of pages with very little ability to offer meaningful amendments or devote meaningful time to consider the full impact of these documents that will have a far-reaching and long-term impact on our Nation.
As I wrote recently in an op-ed that appeared in National Review Online:
New START misses one opportunity after another to maintain a stable nuclear relationship between our two countries. To remedy this will require significant time on the floor of the Senate. Trying to force it through without ample time for debate and amendments would amount to a Christmas gift to the Russians.
I ask unanimous consent that the op-ed I wrote for National Review Online entitled ``Don't Force New START,''
dated December 9, 2010, be printed in the Record at the end of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1)
Mr. THUNE. Madam President, the Nation's attention is fixed firmly on this travesty of an omnibus trillion-dollar appropriations bill which we should be debating now because the current funding resolution for the government ends tomorrow. We should not be debating a significant arms control treaty at this late date and trying to dual-track what I said earlier are thousands of pages of documents that need appropriate time on the floor of the Senate.
I want to speak, if I might, briefly today to the substance of the START agreement and my concerns about that agreement in its current form. First of all, I want to speak to the issue of missile defense.
The New START treaty not only contains specific limitations on missile defense in article V but also reestablishes an unwise linkage in the preamble to the treaty between offense and defense that was broken when the ABM treaty came to an end.
Moreover, Russia's unilateral statement that the treaty ``can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities, quantitatively or qualitatively'' is extremely troubling.
When viewed together, the New START treaty's preamble and Russia's unilateral statement amount to a Russian attempt to find a leverage point and exert political pressure upon the United States to forestall deploying a robust missile defense capability, by threatening to withdraw from the treaty if we seek to increase our missile defense capabilities.
The remedy for this concern is for the Senate to strike the offensive preamble language. That is why I would wholeheartedly support an effort to strike the preamble as well as an amendment to strike paragraph 3 of article V of the treaty.
Now, with regard to delivery vehicle modernization, and I want to speak specifically in that regard to bombers, nearly 2 years ago I began to have serious concerns about the administration's commitment to developing a follow-on bomber aircraft and its overall commitment to the triad of nuclear delivery vehicles. These concerns were aggravated by the administration's decision to terminate the development program for a new bomber and reexamine the need, the requirement, and the technology.
I was also troubled by Secretary Gates's statement on April 6, 2009, that we will examine all of our strategic requirements in light of post-START arms control negotiations, which leads me to be concerned that this administration would allow the Russians to have a say in whether we would develop a new bomber.
I was gratified to see that the Nuclear Posture Review determined that the United States should sustain the nuclear triad for decades.
However, as the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recently stated in a report entitled, ``Sustaining America's Strategic Advantage in Long-Range Strike,'' the triad is in danger of becoming a dyad by default because nearly half of the bomber inventory of the United States, 47 percent, predates the Cuban missile crisis, and the only aircraft the United States possesses today with reach and survivability to have a chance of successfully executing missions more than 1,000 nautical miles into enemy territory from the last air-to-air refueling are 16 combat-ready B-2 bombers.
Madam President, the B-2 was designed in the 1980s and achieved initial operational capability over a decade ago, and they will eventually lose their ability to penetrate advanced air defense systems. The need, the requirement, and the technology for the next-generation bomber is well understood. The need for a new long-range strike capability is urgent because the conflicts of the future will likely feature heavily defended airspace due in large part to the proliferation of relatively inexpensive but extremely sophisticated and deadly air defense systems. We have heard testimony before the Armed Services Committee from intelligence officials that Russia is the developer of most of these advanced air defense systems and is exporting those systems both to China and to other countries in the world.
Various past and present combatant commanders of the Pacific Command, Strategic Command, and Joint Forces Command have each testified in support of the capability the next-generation bomber will provide.
As Senator McCain summarized in his letter to the Foreign Relations Committee on the treaty, the 1251 plan and even the updated plan lack critical details about decisions related to the follow-on ICBM, the next-generation bomber, or a follow-on air-launched cruise missile.
General Chilton, the most recent STRATCOM commander, has spoken about how conversations about these matters need to start now.
Development of replacement delivery vehicles for all three legs of the triad need to begin during the life of New START. Decisions need to be made and development needs to begin within the next 10 years or replacement systems will not be available when current systems reach the end of their service lives. There is no assurance that the next long-range bomber will be nuclear capable. Therefore, I plan to offer an amendment which will require the administration to certify that the President has made a commitment to develop a replacement heavy bomber that is both nuclear and conventionally capable.
With regard to delivery vehicle numbers, on July 9, 2009, at an Armed Services Committee hearing, I asked GEN James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, about the administration's commitment at that time to reduce our strategic delivery vehicles to somewhere in the range of 500 to 1,100 systems and to specify at what point in this range would he become concerned that delivery vehicle reductions would necessitate making our nuclear triad into a dyad. General Cartwright responded, ``I would be very concerned if we got down below those levels about midpoint,'' meaning he would be concerned if the negotiated number fell below 800 delivery vehicles. This treaty caps delivery vehicles at 700--substantially below the number General Cartwright stated a year and a half ago.
The administration makes this odd distinction between deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles and points out that the total cap for the treaty is 800 deployed and nondeployed systems. Of course, there is a letter from General Cartwright in the Record stating he is comfortable with the distinction between deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles and the overall limits to delivery vehicles. But the real number we are working with here is 700.
I think it is worth noting that former Defense Secretary Schlesinger testified to the Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 2010, that, ``as to the stated context of strategic nuclear weapons, the numbers specified are adequate, though barely so.''
With regard to this limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles, I find it very troubling that the administration has yet to articulate how it will deploy a nuclear force conforming to the number of 700. The administration has informed the Senate how it might field a force of 720 delivery vehicles, which Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen acknowledged in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 17, 2010, would still require further reductions to meet the treaty's central limits.
They went on to argue that because the United States will have 7 years to reduce its forces to these limits, they did not find it necessary to identify a final force structure at this point, meaning the Senate will commit the United States to a delivery vehicle force of 700 without knowing how that force will be composed. This problem is compounded by the fact that the treaty was so poorly negotiated, that for every ICBM or SLBM deployed with a conventional warhead, one less nuclear vehicle will be available to the United States.
The treaty essentially requires the United States to make unilateral reductions in delivery vehicles, as Russia is already well below the delivery vehicle limits and would drastically reduce its arsenal with or without this treaty. As the Congressional Research Service writes:
Russia currently has only 620 launchers, and this number may decline to around 400 deployed and 444 total launchers. This would likely be true whether or not the treaty enters into force because Russia is eliminating older missiles as they age and deploying newer missiles at a far slower pace than that needed to retain 700 deployed launchers.
Therefore, in light of all these facts, I will seek to offer an amendment or two regarding the delivery vehicle numbers in this treaty. I am also working on several other amendments that I may seek to offer regarding prompt global strike and other issues.
Ultimately, this is a very significant treaty that deserves full and fair consideration, and we should not be jamming the consideration of this treaty up against the Christmas break. As I have indicated, there are substantial issues here that need to be fully vetted, and we obviously do not have the time to consider these issues this year. We should wait until next year to fully consider this treaty and have a full, free, and wide-open debate on this matter, with no restrictions on amendments.
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