"I have been a vocal critic of the way the Intelligence Community interacts with other agencies outside of their community.
This is the sort of conversation I have heard, and I am confident you have heard it, too, when people are talking about sharing information:
* "What do you have?" "What do you need?"
* "How do I know what I need if you don't tell me what you have?"
* "How can I tell you what I have that can help you, if you don't tell me what you need in the first place?" And so on.
In the end, those outside of the Intelligence Community do not know what the Intelligence Community has and those inside the Intelligence Community do not have a clear idea of what everyone else needs.
The same thing seems to be happening inside DHS, with offices and agencies throughout the Department needing intelligence but not getting it from I&A -- and I&A having intelligence that could be useful to these offices and agencies, but not knowing that they need it.
The way I see it - as a leader - there are some commonsense actions that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis needs to take so that the Department can become more efficient.
First, you need to find out who needs what intelligence, and where they are getting it from, if anywhere.
The answer to that question is pretty clear when it comes to the other intelligence elements in the DHS components, but not so for the headquarters elements.
Second, you need to identify which DHS activities are lacking critical intelligence. I realize this sounds difficult, but it just means taking the time to get to know other people and other organizations, and helping them to see what you can provide.
Third, you need to open your own doors and allow others in, so they can see what you have and determine what might be useful.
I am not talking about sharing intelligence with people who may or may not have a need-to know. But I am talking about sharing enough information with people so that they can at least try to match their needs with your capabilities.
I do not believe this should be a very difficult outcome to achieve.
For example, every entity within the Department that creates a terrorism risk assessment (such as DHS S&T) should be getting intelligence from or through I&A.
The same holds true for those creating risk assessments and making risk-based decisions (such as the Office of Health Affairs deciding where BioWatch detectors should be emplaced throughout the Nation, based on risk).
I am sure you agree that words and phrases like "threat assessment," "terrorism risk assessment," "threat determination," and "intelligence policy" are pretty obvious indicators.
Under Secretary Wagner, I realize that this is not all on your shoulders. Granted, you have a lot of intelligence professionals working for you, but you should not need for them to have to use their spook skills to find out what is going on in the other headquarters elements.
Secretary Napolitano has a responsibility to act as well. She needs to require every entity in the Department that has any need for intelligence to work with I&A -- and for I&A to work with them.
But it is up to you and your peers to make it happen -- connecting the dots between intelligence and information sharing."