Letter to The Honorable Robert M. Gates Secretary of Defense
Letter
Senators Jim Webb and Mark Warner repeated their call for Secretary of Defense Gates to reveal the cost-benefit analysis and other analytical data justifying his recommendation to close the U. S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in Norfolk, Virginia. The Senators were responding to Sec. Gates's September 24, 2010, letter, which they said "provided no new insights or information."
"In the nearly seven weeks since your announcement, we have collectively sent multiple requests seeking answers to a variety of important questions, but our sustained efforts have been for naught," the Senators wrote. "This leads us to conclude there is no comprehensive analysis to support your recommendation to close JFCOM. The present lack of transparency and consultation stand in stark contrast to how decisions of this magnitude are typically made.
"The Department has yet to provide any analytical data to document projected savings that would result from the transfer of this essential responsibility to another entity. We also seek a cost-benefit analysis or other analytics that show what savings would be gained by closing JFCOM in its other principal mission areas and how they would outweigh the elimination of the missions that JFCOM currently performs and the capabilities it helps to develop."
Tomorrow at 10 a.m., the Senate Committee on Armed Services will hold a hearing on the full range of defense initiatives that Gates announced August 9, including his proposal to close JFCOM. The hearing will be streamed live from the Senate Committee on Armed Services website.
Full text of the letter is below:
September 27, 2010
The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Secretary of Defense
The Department of Defense
The Pentagon, Suite 319
Washington DC 20301
Dear Secretary Gates:
We are in receipt of your letter of September 24, 2010, regarding the closure of the U.S. Joint Forces Command. Regrettably, this letter provided no new insights or information that is responsive to the issues and concerns we raised with you last month.
Since you announced your decision August 9 to recommend to the President to close the U. S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and reduce service-support contracts as part of a series of initiatives designed to gain efficiencies in the Department of Defense (DoD), we have been troubled by the lack of transparency associated with your actions.
We have yet to receive a detailed analysis relating to your closure recommendation despite numerous requests for this information. While we commend your efforts to reduce overhead and to apply savings to force structure and modernization, the failure to consult more fully with Congress in a transparent way works against the Department's ultimate goal of becoming more cost-conscious and efficient in providing for our nation's defense.
DoD will have excellent opportunities this week to begin to address our concerns about the lack of transparency so far, and we strongly encourage the Department to participate in this discussion in a more significant and meaningful manner than we have seen to date.
In the nearly seven weeks since your announcement, we have collectively sent multiple requests seeking answers to a variety of important questions, but our sustained efforts have been for naught. This leads us to conclude there is no comprehensive analysis to support your recommendation to close JFCOM. The present lack of transparency and consultation stand in stark contrast to how decisions of this magnitude are typically made. We are concerned that the Department has yet to brief members of our congressional delegation, Governor McDonnell, or any local or community officials about the potential impacts this closure and the reduction in contract support will have on the Commonwealth and our military readiness as a whole.
As a result, we have no information that allows us to quantify the possible effects of your proposal in such areas as its fiscal and local economic implications. The Commonwealth has been a strong supporter of the military and its families, and every day officials in our communities interact on a multitude of decisions to coordinate actions relating to military facilities and related contract work. We are perplexed why the process guiding your proposal to disestablish this major unified combatant command is being conducted in such complete contrast with the Department's traditional approach to such matters.
As Virginia's U.S. Senate representatives, we are also concerned about the impact that JFCOM's disestablishment will have on the military's joint training, operations, concept development, and experimentation. JFCOM serves as a forceful advocate for our warfighters' joint capabilities, a function of growing importance as our military operates in conjunction with coalition forces around the world. As we learned from painful experience during the 1980s and early 1990s, joint readiness and interoperability are perishable qualities. JFCOM's performance of joint force and coalition training over the past 10 years has led to significant improvements in the ability of all branches of our armed forces to deploy together more effectively for joint operations.
Beyond the negative impact JFCOM's closure would have on our ability to operate jointly during combat operations, its elimination will risk falling back into the military departments' traditional "stovepipe" approach to force structure planning and acquisition. In addition, the Department has yet to explain how this decision will affect JFCOM's relationships with NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and the numerous agreements and commitments we have made to assist NATO partner nations in their ongoing efforts to transform their militaries.
Disestablishing JFCOM is the equivalent of abandoning a decades-long effort, initiated and supported by multiple secretaries of defense and chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ensure the maximum operational effectiveness of our armed forces. The ongoing turnover of personnel requires a continuous joint training program; the development of new systems and equipment requires continuous oversight to ensure joint interoperability; and emerging global challenges and threats require continuous development, testing, and implementation of new joint doctrine and tactics.
The vital nature of JFCOM's joint force training functions mandates that we preserve them even if an eventual decision is made to disestablish JFCOM. As such, we remain concerned about the relocation of these functions and the cost it will take to perform them elsewhere. The Department has yet to provide any analytical data to document projected savings that would result from the transfer of this essential responsibility to another entity. We also seek a cost-benefit analysis or other analytics that show what savings would be gained by closing JFCOM in its other principal mission areas and how they would outweigh the elimination of the missions that JFCOM currently performs and the capabilities it helps to develop. As you know, Joint Forces Command has been supported by every JCS chairman and secretary of defense since 1999. Since your August 9 announcement, a fundamental question remains unanswered: Who will perform these vital roles and missions if JFCOM is disestablished?
Further, you have proposed reducing service-support contracts by 10 percent a year for three years. Similarly, we believe it is crucial to have a cost-benefit analysis or other analytics that demonstrate that the Department can achieve predicted savings without jeopardizing mission success.
In closing, we note that during your press conference in August, you said you would seek ideas, suggestions, and proposals from outside normal official channels. We urge you to allow Congress the opportunity to review the Department's cost assessments, business case, and recommended courses of action prior to any decisions on JFCOM's fate or any reductions in its service-support contracts. We remain committed to open discussions with the Department of Defense concerning issues such as achieving greater contracting efficiencies and transforming the JFCOM mission, offsetting the impacts of such changes, and addressing any concerns that you may have about JFCOM's presence in the Commonwealth.
It is our hope that both the administration and the Department of Defense will give the Virginia delegation a chance to provide our input and recommendations as you develop your proposed courses of action for the future of the command.
Sincerely,
Jim Webb
Mark R.Warner
Source