Hearing of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs - 9/11 Commission Recommendations and Findings

Date: July 30, 2004
Location: Washington, DC


Federal News Service

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS (R-ME)

WITNESSES: THOMAS KEAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION; AND LEE HAMILTON, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION

LOCATION: 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BODY:
SEN. COLLINS: (Sounds gavel.) The committee will come to order.

Let me begin by thanking our committee members for rearranging their schedules on very short notice to be here today. I particularly want to acknowledge our Democratic members, all of whom raced down from Boston this morning and have accused me of depriving them of a good night's sleep. This is not a Republican plot. (Laughter.) We are very happy to have you here.

SEN. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN (D-CT): Madame chairman, if I may say so in a phrase that may have been familiar, on behalf of this side, we are reporting for duty. (Laughter, laughs.)

SEN. COLLINS: (Laughs.) I also want to welcome our two distinguished witnesses who join us today. I'm very grateful for their work and for their presence as well.

Today the Governmental Affairs Committee begins a series of hearings on the recommendations of the 9/11 commission calling for a restructuring of our intelligence organizations. The task that we've been assigned by the Senate leaders is to examine in depth the recommendations for reorganizing the executive branch and to report legislation by October 1st. We must act with speed, but not in haste. We must be bold, but we cannot be reckless. We must protect not just the lives of our citizens, but also those values that make life worth living.

All terrorism involves death and destruction, but the ultimate goal of terrorists is to destroy everything that we treasure and that defines us as Americans: our democracy, protection of the rights of all, adherence to the rule of law, economic opportunity, and religious and political freedom. Those who despise our way of life will stop at nothing to achieve this goal. Osama bin Laden has repeatedly said that al Qaeda makes no distinction between military and civilian targets. He has called the murder of any American anywhere on Earth "the duty of every Muslim."

The 9/11 commission makes numerous findings as to how we can better protect ourselves and our liberty. These recommendations, ranging from improving educational and economic opportunities in Muslim states, to implementing a biometric screening system to improve border security, will be considered by congressional committees in the weeks ahead. Today, however, our focus is on a key commission finding: that we must reform the structure of our intelligence community.

The commission makes two major recommendations to accomplish this end: the establishment of a national counterterrorism center to unify intelligence analysis and operational planing, and the creation of a new national intelligence director to lead our entire intelligence effort, which now involves 15 agencies scattered across the federal government.

The center as envisioned by the commission would not be another layer of bureaucracy but rather a means by which our intelligence agencies can share and integrate their expertise, their information and their institutional memories. The proposed intelligence director would have the authority to allocate resources and control budgets to ensure that the most important priorities are funded in keeping with the policies established by the president and his National Security Council. This reorganization would represent a fundamental overhaul of our intelligence structure and a sea change in our thinking.

The precise form and extent of reorganization remain to be determined, and we need to make clear, just as the 9/11 report does, that the intelligence failures were not the result of individual negligence but of institutional rigidity. Massive reorganizations of government are always controversial. They are often met with great resistance among those being reorganized. While turf battles abound in Washington, for the American people it is results that count. Power struggles for authority and responsibility, however well- motivated, cannot be allowed to doom needed reforms.

Our theme should be, as the commission report quotes one CIA official, "one fight, one team."

It can be done. Consider, for example, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. It centralized operational authority in the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Initially, this restructuring was vigorously opposed by those who clung to the independence of the service branches. The performance of our military since then-in the Gulf War, in Bosnia, and in Afghanistan and Iraq-is testament to the wisdom of that unifying reform.

The threat we face today requires the same willingness to innovate, to coordinate information, to share skills and talent, and to pursue the overriding mission that helped America meet the challenges of the 20th century. This committee must do everything in its power to see that America's intelligence structures are rebuilt to meet the challenges of the 21st.

Today we are honored to hear from the two leaders of the 9/11 commission-Chairman Thomas Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton. I thank them for their extraordinary service and welcome them here today.

Before calling on the commissioners, I would like to recognize my friend, Senator Lieberman, for any opening comments that he might have. In addition to possessing tremendous experience and insight, Senator Lieberman brings a decidedly nonpartisan approach to this urgent task. I very much appreciate his assistance in putting these hearings together so quickly, and I look forward to working with him and the other members of our committee as we strive to meet our October 1st goal.

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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you, Senator.

We'll start with Governor Kean.

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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you both for excellent statements.

We're now going to begin a 10-minute round of questions for each member. I would note that the only lights are right here and they're a little bit hard to see, but we'll try to help make sure that everybody gets the full 10 minutes.

Congressman Hamilton, I'd like to start my questioning with you because of the role that you played as chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence as well as the many other hats that you've worn. Some observers suggest that the overall effect of the intelligence reorganization that the 9/11 commission has recommended would be to diminish the influence of the CIA, to considerably increase the importance of the Pentagon, and to give the White House more direct control over covert operations.

Former CIA Director Robert Gates, for example, has said that the recommendation to place the new national director of intelligence within the executive office of the president troubles him because that official would oversee the intelligence operations both inside the United States and abroad. He cites the problems caused when the White House directly ordered covert activities, noting Oliver North's role in the Iran-Contra scandal as well as the Watergate scandal, where the CIA helped those who broke into Daniel Ellsberg's office. Would you-he's gone even further than that and said that the commission's recommendation in this regard reflects a lack of historic perspective.

I'd like to give you the opportunity to respond to those specific comment which, as you know, are shared by some others within the intelligence community.

MR. HAMILTON: Madame Chairman, we think that counterterrorism is the paramount national security concern of this nation today, and we think it will be that for as long as any of us are active-for a long time.

And we think it really is a unique kind of a challenge because it cuts across so many areas of our government and our nation's life.

We found that the principal problem leading to 9/11 was that the agencies simply did not share information, and so we have set up this structure to encourage that sharing.

Now, why do we put the national counterterrorism center in the Executive Office of the President? That's one of the questions you raised-you raised a lot of difficult questions. We do it for two principal reasons. One is that terrorism, as I've indicated, is our most important national security priority for this president or any president. And to be very candid about it, it is inconceivable to me that a president of the United States would want his highest national security priority handled somewhere else in the government that is not under his direct control.

Now keep in mind that counterterrorism policy involves so many different things; I mean, it's diplomacy, it's military action, its covert action, it's law enforcement, it's public diplomacy, it's tracing money flows in the Treasury Department. And we have to organize ourselves in such a way that we can integrate and balance all of these tools of American foreign policy to deal with the threat of counterterrorism. That kind of thing can only be coordinated and done in the White House under the president's direct control.

Where else would you put it? Do you want to put all of this authority in the CIA? Do you want to put it all in the Defense Department when you're dealing with all of these other aspects of counterterrorism policy? I don't think so.

Now, the second reason we put it in the Executive Office Building is that the national counterterrorism center, it's not just an intelligence center but it's a center for operations, and it is going to be directing agencies, many agencies of the government working together on counterterrorism. And those activities are going to involve the CIA, they're going to involve the FBI, they're going to involve the Defense Department, they're doing to involve the Department of State and other areas of the government as well. You cannot coordinate those activities from a single department, you have to do it in the White House, I believe. Now, all of us have a different idea of how this government works best, but we concluded that we had to put this authority in the White House just because it's such a cross-cutting kind of an issue.

Is there a danger to that? Oh, sure. That's the Iran-contra problem. I had a little experience with the Iran-contra problem.

SEN. COLLINS: I recall that.

MR. HAMILTON: So I'm alert to anything where you concentrate power. We do have to be careful about that.

Now, one answer to that is another part of our recommendations, is congressional oversight. It has to be robust.

And so everything kind of fits together here.

And incidentally, among other things-I think it's a small thing, perhaps; hadn't been too much noted in our report-we do recommend the establishment of a board in the executive branch to keep an eye on government intrusion, if you would. But there's no magic solution here with regard to the concentration of power, but I think we do have some real checks and balances in it.

And incidentally, Mr. Gates was an outstanding CIA director. Anything he has to say, even if he's critical of us -- (laughter) -- deserves a lot of attention, because he's a very knowledgeable person.

SEN. COLLINS: He is indeed, which is why I want to give you an opportunity to respond to his concern.

Governor, should the National Intelligence director have a term, as the FBI director does, to help insulate that individual from political pressure? Or should the director serve at the pleasure of the president? Because, after all, that individual would serve as the president's principal adviser on intelligence matters. What are your thoughts on that?

MR. KEAN: Well, we had left it that-and we talked about this some on the commission-we'd left it really as serve at the pleasure of the president, and I think for a number of reasons. First of all, if he served a term, you would, as you've just said-perhaps having somebody who is the president's chief adviser on intelligence, somebody the last president-who may not agree with that president-have picked. And that didn't make a lot of sense to us. It seemed to us that as long as you had the lever of confirmation, and the fact that this individual would report to the Congress and testify before the Congress, that it was probably better to let him serve at the pleasure of the president.

SEN. COLLINS: I support the concept of the National Intelligence director, and I agree with the committee's recommendation that that would be a much needed improvement over the current system. I was surprised, however, that the commission did not recommend that the director be a member of the Cabinet, or at least Cabinet-level. This individual is going to have to deal with the secretary of Defense, the secretary of State, the secretary of Homeland Security. Wouldn't it be helpful in dealing with Cabinet members for that individual to have the stature of a Cabinet member, Governor Kean?

MR. KEAN: Yeah, we basically decided, and again after a lot of discussion, that it should not be Cabinet-level, and the reason was that this is an operational position. This is not a policy position. This individual would be carrying out policy and carrying out directions and coordinating intelligence and moving policy. We believe that as you move through various government agencies that if this is the president's chief adviser in this area of counterterrorism, which is probably the most important priority that the next president or the president will have for some time, that his authority, as he moves among various government departments, will be pretty clear, because it will come directly from the president of the United States. But because it was not policy, it was operational, we did not make him a member of the Cabinet.

MR. HAMILTON: If I may add to that --

SEN. COLLINS: Please do.

MR. HAMILTON: The governor is absolutely right, of course. One feature in our thinking here is it just takes a long time to set up a department. If you look at the Department of Energy-some of us were around when that was set up a long time ago, 20, 25 years ago; it's still having problems in organizing and functioning as a department. The Department of Homeland Security is a major reorganization of government just getting under way, and it has excellent leadership, but it has growing pains. So we were reluctant to say, okay, let's come along and set up another whole department of government.

The Department of Homeland Security is a major reorganization of government just getting under way and it has excellent leadership, but it has growing pains. So we were reluctant to say, okay, let's come along and set up another whole department of government.

Intelligence is a support function, and it is a support function for the president. It's a support function for each of the key departments of government, all of them. And we did not think you should have a department of government supporting a support function. And that, as Tom has indicated, are the principal reasons.

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.

Senator Lieberman.

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SEN. LIEBERMAN: That's very helpful to us. Thank you very much. I think I can speak for the chairman and say that we're very honored that the Senate leadership has given us responsibility for the executive branch changes you recommended. We're very grateful that the Senate leadership has not given us responsibility for the legislative branch changes that you recommended. (Laughter.)

SEN. COLLINS: I concur. (Laughter, chuckles.)

Senator Voinovich.

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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.

Senator Levin.

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SEN. COLLINS: Senator Coleman.

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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.

Senator Durbin.

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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.

Senator Specter?

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SEN. ARLEN SPECTER (R-PA): Madame Chairwoman, I'd like this made a part of the record.

SEN. COLLINS: Without objection.

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Madame Chairwoman, I'd like this made a part of the record.

SEN. COLLINS: Without objection.

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SEN. COLLINS: Senator, your time has expired.

SEN. DAYTON: I'm just going to finish with this, if I may.

Yet incredibly, the NORAD commander did not pass that order on to the fighter planes because he was, quote, "unsure how the pilots would or should proceed with this guidance."

As you say Mr. Co-chairman, the situation is urgent when we don't get protected in those circumstances, and it's even worse when it's covered up.

Thank you.

SEN. COLLINS: Senator Fitzgerald.

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SEN. COLLINS: The senator's time has expired.

SEN. FITZGERALD: Well, thank you very much.

Thank you, Madame Chairman.

SEN. COLLINS: You bet.

Senator Carper.

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SEN. COLLINS: The senator's time has expired and our witnesses are on a really tight time frame.

SEN. CARPER: Madame Chair, could I just ask them just a word on rail security? We have all this emphasis on air security, and I know your report touches that. If I could, just one quick word on rail security, if you would, please.

SEN. COLLINS: Sure.

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SEN. COLLINS: Senator Lautenberg.

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SEN. COLLINS: Senator Pryor.

SEN. MARK PRYOR (D-AR): Thank you, Madame Chairman.

Before I get started, earlier did you announce that senators could put their opening statements in the record?

SEN. COLLINS: Without objection, any statements will be submitted.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.

And last, but certainly not least, the senator from Hawaii.

SEN. DANIEL AKAKA (D-HI): Thank you very much, Madame Chairman.

I'd like to take the time to commend you-our chairman and ranking member-for acting so swiftly in calling hearings on the 9/11 commission report. You did it so swiftly, it took me this long to get here. (Laughter.)

I would ask permission, Madame Chairman, that my statement be placed in the record.

SEN. COLLINS: Without objection.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.

SEN. AKAKA: My time has expired.

Thank you, Madame Chairman.

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you, Senator.

I want to thank our distinguished witnesses for being with us today. You have performed an invaluable service to your country, and your service continued today by your rearranging your schedules to be here. I know that the hearing went longer than your schedules really allowed, and I appreciate your patience with that as well. It's been extremely helpful to the committee to have you here today, and I appreciate your participation and the participation of the committee members.

The record is going to remain open for five days, and our next hearing will be on Tuesday, August 3rd at-starting at 10:00 a.m.

Senator Lieberman, do you have any brief closing comments as well?

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Thanks very much, Madame Chairman.

Let me add my thanks to Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton. It's been a very good hearing. It's the beginning of the next stage in this process. Some understandable direct questions were asked about some of the proposals. I, for one, think you stood your ground -- (chuckles) -- very convincingly, certainly to me. And you know, what comes back to me is what was said earlier on, which is that your conclusion is that, when it comes to intelligence, there's still no one in charge. It's fine to say the president is, but it's not fair to this president or any president to expect him to be in charge on a daily basis, 24/7, of intelligence.

So I think the urgent need is there. You've made very strong proposals. And I thank the chairman for the pace of our consideration. We look forward to coming back next week for more detailed consideration.

Thank you very much.

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.

This hearing is now adjourned. (Sounds gavel.)

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