Conference Report on H.R. 2194, Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010

* Ms. MOORE of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the conference report accompanying H.R. 2194 but not without some reservations which I want to talk about.

* As you all know, when this bill first came before the House, I voted against it. I was concerned that provisions in the bill: (1) limited or did not provide the President the ability to waive sanctions to advance important national security goals through diplomacy, (2) impacted disproportionately the general population of Iran who had just courageously stood up to the regime after last year's fraudulent elections, (3) and imposed unilateral measures when almost everyone agrees that if you are to use sanctions, multilateral ones have the best chance of achieving their purpose.

* At that time, I said that it was my hope that as this legislation moved forward in the legislative process, further changes would be made to strengthen this bill in a way that would truly enhance, and not hobble, strong diplomatic efforts to diplomatically engage Iran as well as to enact multilateral sanctions.

* Today, we have before us a conference report that is better than the bill that came before the House in December. This conference report makes a number of changes to provide flexibility to ensure that the President can continue to engage in international diplomacy, adding elements that were missing from the version that passed the House. It would also include targeted sanctions--including the denial of U.S. visas and asset freezes--that isolate those in the Iranian government or who acted on behalf of that government, based on credible evidence, to order or direct the serious human rights abuses that occurred against Iranian protesters after the June 2009 elections. Such a provision achieves our policy goals without also broadly impacting and punishing the Iranian protestors who were the victims (and continue to be the targets) of that brutality.

* I would also state and local governments to divest their investments in companies doing business with Iran, if that is a course they choose to pursue. This authority is similar to that granted by Congress only a few years ago allowing a similar divestments regarding investments in Sudan.

* These changes are certainly improvements to the bill that passed the House over my opposition in December. As I have said before, the President's flexibility to conduct foreign relations and diplomatic efforts to achieve a strong international consensus against Iran is not a loophole that needs to be closed but a vital tool that needs to be supported. Diplomacy without flexibility is not diplomacy.

* Additionally, even as I vote to support improvements that I think will be useful to the Administration as it pursues an engagement strategy with Iran working in close partnership with our allies in the international community, I want to make clear that I am not interested in causing more suffering to the Iranian people. I am not foolish enough to think that we can impose ``crippling U.S. sanctions'' that ``go far beyond recently-enacted UN sanctions,'' according to the authors of this legislation, without causing suffering to the Iranian people. While the conference report before us states that the people of the U.S. ``have feelings of friendship for the people of Iran,'' unfortunately even with the most expansive waiver authority, they will still bear the brunt--rather than the reckless Iranian regime--of these policies.

* If we must do sanctions, they ought to be clearly targeted at the Government of Iran and individuals within that government rather than the Iranian society as a whole, in order to avoid creating hardship and inflicting harm on the Iranian people. That would send an even more unmistakable message to the people of Iran about our intentions. While not perfect, there appears to have been good faith efforts made in the conference on this bill to do that.

* I also hope very much that no one in the international community takes passage of this legislation today as a sign that diplomacy is off the table or that our only other option going forward to address very serious concerns with Iran's nuclear activities is a military strike.

* I join many who have expressed concerns that although sanctions when appropriately targeted can be an important tool for pressuring Iran, they are not a full policy and certainly not an end in themselves. We need to invest in these diplomatic efforts vigorously now and continue to work with our international allies and others interested in peace and stability in the region. The aim of those efforts aren't new sanctions, they are to achieve a verifiable end to Iran nuclear enrichment activities, get it to comply with its NPT and IAEA obligations, and prevent a volatile region from becoming even more combustible.

* The State Department's Under Secretary for Political Affairs, William Burns, made this point in testimony this week before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when he stated, ``Let me emphasize that sanctions are not an end in themselves. Our foremost objective--one that is shared by our international partners and our allies in the region--is a durable diplomatic solution to the world's concerns about the Iranian nuclear program and the broader issues at stake with Iran.''

* Treasury Secretary Geithner stated last week, ``to be truly effective in ending Iran's proliferation activities and Iran's support for terrorism, we need to have in place a concerted, international approach. This is not something the United States can do alone. We need other countries to move with us.''

* Sanctions--even the most effective ones--cannot and should not substitute nor supplant strong diplomacy. Sanctions should not signify an end to diplomacy or alternatively be seen as the last step before a military strike, which almost everyone agrees does not serve U.S. interests or that of the international community.

* Eight months ago, there was high degree of skepticism that the U.S. could push through a new U.N sanction regime particularly given known reluctance, if not outright opposition, from Russia and China to such a move. Yet two weeks ago, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1929 committing the international community to implement ``the most comprehensive sanctions'' that the Iranian Government has ever faced according to the Obama Administration.

* Diplomacy and engagement laid the ground work for such an effort but that doesn't mean it must stop now. United Nation's Security Council Resolution 1929 also emphasized ``the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes,'' an emphasis that is regrettably missing from the bill before us today.

* That resolution also affirmatively supported and I would say encouraged--at the same time it was authorizing stronger sanctions--continued willingness on the part of the P+5 nations (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the U.S.) to ``enhance diplomatic efforts to promote dialogue and consultations, including to resume dialogue with Iran on the nuclear issue without preconditions *.*.* with a view to seeking a comprehensive, longterm and proper solution of this issue'' and made very clear that the parties were ready to resume formal negotiations.

* Lastly, it has been pointed out that this bill before us today is overwhelming silent on this point except brief mentions when it talks about using diplomacy for new sanctions. This is a key oversight in the bill before us and one I hope neither our own Administration nor our key international allies read as an indication that it is okay to trim back their efforts at diplomatic outreach and engagement with Iran.

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