Opening Statement of Senator Carl Levin, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on the Situation in Afghanistan

Statement

Today the Committee receives testimony on the progress in Afghanistan from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy and General David Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command. General Petraeus, please extend the thanks of all of us on this Committee to the men and women serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout the area of responsibility you command, for their valor, dedication, and service to the country. They deserve our support and I know this Committee will do everything necessary to give them that support.

Last month a milestone was reached when it was announced that for the first time, more U.S. troops are serving in Afghanistan than Iraq. This month marks one year since General Stanley McChrystal took command of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF. The news from Afghanistan in recent weeks has been largely negative: the increase in casualties among U.S., coalition and Afghan security forces; the mixed results in Marja and the apparent return of Taliban intimidation and assassinations of local officials there; the failure of Afghan Government officials to deliver much-needed services to win local allegiances; the delay in the Kandahar campaign; the resignation of two senior Afghan security officials who seemingly were among the most competent members of the cabinet and had strong coalition support; the role of local powerbrokers, including members of the Karzai family, in Kandahar; the growth of militias and the counterproductive activities of some U.S.- hired private security contractors; and apparent differences with the Karzai regime over approaches to reconciliation with the Taliban. At a press conference last week, General McChrystal acknowledged these press reports, but emphasized that "you also have to step back and see the trend in direction." We want to hear from our witnesses this morning on how they see these trends.

My focus is, and always has been, on getting the Afghan National Security Forces trained and equipped to take over the responsibility for their country's security. Doing so is the key to success in Afghanistan. As General McChrystal said at a press briefing last week, the Afghan security forces are "the strategic main effort, and they're key to the long-term stability in" Afghanistan.

General McChrystal has repeatedly set out the goal of putting Afghans in the lead and making them responsible for their future, and Afghan leaders have said they want to be responsible for their own security and affairs. At the Consultative Peace Jirga held at the beginning of this month, the 1,600 Afghan delegates adopted a resolution calling on the international community "to expedite the process of equipping, training and strengthening the Afghan national security forces, so they can get the capability in taking responsibility to provide security for their own country and people." But progress toward the goal of Afghans taking the lead in operations has been unsatisfactory.

Today, operations in Afghanistan are excessively dependent on coalition forces. The campaign plan for Kandahar, which is under way, anticipates increases in Afghan and ISAF forces in and around Kandahar city to create a "rising tide" of security, but at a 1 to 2 ratio that is, one Afghan soldier or policeman for every 2 ISAF troops. That is not good enough. Our partnering goal should be a ratio of at least 1 to 1 in Kandahar, and Afghan troops should be in the lead in many if not most operations.

Having Afghan units in the lead is critical in Kandahar since the likelihood of success there is based on popular support. That support is at the heart of the counterinsurgency strategy. The Afghan Army has broad public support, and even the Afghan Government has more than twice the support that the United States does. Polling numbers from the New York Times indicate 90% of Afghans support the Kabul Government over the Taliban, while only 40% have a favorable view of the United States. The 100 or so elders we met at a local shura in southern Afghanistan last year, when asked what they wanted the U.S. to do, told us that we should train and equip the Afghan security forces to provide for their country's security, and then depart.

Last week, General McChrystal announced that ISAF would slow the expansion of the Afghan and coalition troop presence in Kandahar in order to allow time to secure the support of local tribal leaders for that effort. I trust General McChrystal's judgment on the timing. He's right that "It's more important we get it right than we get it fast," and that, "when you go to protect people, the people have to want you to protect them." I'd rather delay a few months and have more Afghan forces in the lead when the security presence is expanded and operations begin more forcefully, than have an ISAF-dominated force attempt to secure Kandahar a few months earlier.

Our top priority, then, must be the training, mentoring and partnering in the field with Afghan troops and placing them in the lead in operations against insurgents, backed by U.S. and coalition support. Currently, according to ISAF, the growth of the Afghan security forces is on track. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, or NTM-A, under Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell, reports that recruitment for the Afghan Army and police now actually exceeds monthly recruitment goals. These forces are above where they need to be to meet the end strength goals for October 2010 of 134,000 Army and 109,000 police personnel.

What is disturbing and hard to comprehend, however, is that the training mission still does not have enough trainers to process all the Afghan recruits who are signing up to join the security forces. The most recent available figures show that of the more than 5,200 trainers we need, only about 2,600 are on the ground. Secretary Gates has deployed 850 U.S. soldiers and Marines to Afghanistan to serve as a stopgap. According to a May 29th report from Lieutenant General Caldwell, the training mission has yet to receive 750 trainers pledged by NATO members. Further, last week NATO Secretary General Rasmussen announced that NATO members have yet to pledge an additional 450 trainers needed to meet training requirements. It's totally unacceptable that this shortfall persists. NATO members who, for whatever reason, do not send additional combat troops, or who intend to reduce their combat troop presence in the near future, should at least be willing to provide trainers, who operate away from the heavy fighting.

The question remains: Why are more Afghan forces not in the lead in Kandahar, using forces that are trained and ready? According to figures provided by the ISAF Joint Command, 25 Afghan battalions, or kandaks, are able to operate independently, and 42 Afghan kandaks can operate with coalition support. That is 67 of 113 total Afghan Army kandaks. More recent ISAF data on Afghan forces' capability casts some doubt on the accuracy of that assessment of the Afghan Army's capabilities, but they do not explain why it is U.S. or coalition forces that are usually leading operations, instead of the other way around. The Afghan army has about 125,000 troops available, more than we do. But it is our troops who are concentrated in the areas where the fighting is heaviest and where Afghanistan's future may well hang in the balance.

So, many questions regarding the Afghan national army remain unanswered. Perhaps we will hear answers today: Why aren't more Afghan army troops leading security operations in the south? How many Afghan combat battalions, and how many Afghan combat troops, are there in Kandahar? When will the Afghan units take the lead there? Why aren't large numbers of Afghan Army troops from other areas moving to Kandahar in preparation for the push? And why isn't the ratio of coalition to Afghan troops in Kandahar at least one to one, instead of 2 coalition troops to 1 Afghan?

I know American troops are better equipped and trained than Afghan troops. But the issue isn't force-on-force -- if it were, I would accept our taking the lead most often in Kandahar operations. The issue is who can best connect with and protect the population of Kandahar. As Afghan Defense Minister Wardak aptly described the situation in Kandahar, "It is a different type operation, it is not like Marja, it is not going to be that kinetic." The Afghan Army can handle the population protection mission adequately and is equipped to do so. It is the hearts and minds of Afghans, particularly the Pashtun population in Kandahar, that must be won over. That population wants security, and it wants that security provided by Afghans. Having Afghan troops among the Afghan people is more accepted by them, with coalition forces in the background providing support for those Afghan troops.

I am also concerned by evidence that our own contracting practices may be harming the counterinsurgency effort. Our reliance on private security contractors -- who often draw on militia forces -- is empowering local powerbrokers and warlords who operate outside the government's control. As stated in one recent military analysis of Kandahar, "what used to be called warlord militias are now Private Security Contractors."

The widespread hiring of private security contractors undermines the Afghan security forces' ability to recruit and retain personnel. Some private security contractors working under Defense Department contracts, actively recruit those with ANA or ANP experience. Our Committee's investigation into private security contractors in Afghanistan has revealed that they are frequently paid more than Afghan security forces. And a Department official recently testified that one reason for high attrition rates among Afghan National Civil Order Police officers, for example, is that "many of them are recruited by higher paying private security firms."

The threat that security contractors pose to mission success is not insignificant. In May 2010 the U.S. Central Command's Armed Contractor Oversight Directorate reported that there were more than 26,000 private security contractor personnel operating in Afghanistan. Last week, General McChrystal acknowledged the problems arising from our contracting practices, specifically private security companies, and said that ISAF will be looking at what needs to be done. I hope that review will lay out a path to phase out the use of private security contractors in Afghanistan and to integrate those personnel into the Afghan National Security Forces. In his November 2009 inaugural statement, President Karzai stated that within the next two years, he wanted "operations by all private, national, and international security firms to be ended and their duties delegated to Afghan security entities." We and the Afghan government need to take concrete steps to achieve that goal.

General McChrystal has emphasized repeatedly that the campaign in Afghanistan "is a process that takes time." The patience of the American people is not infinite, and their sacrifices have already been great. As Secretary Gates said ahead of a NATO defense ministerial meeting last week, all NATO members, for the sake of their publics, need to show by the end of this year that "our strategy is on track, making some headway." He added that "if we are making progress and it's clear that we have the right strategy, then…the people will be patient."

I agree with that assessment, but would add one thing. That is, that the Afghan government and people need to demonstrate a sense of urgency and commitment to succeed in building a lasting peace in Afghanistan. If the Afghan Government and people demonstrate a willingness to fight and assume increasing responsibility for their security and affairs, then the American people will be steadfast partners in that endeavor.

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