Today's hearing focuses on two fundamental questions: why was the
Christmas Day bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, allowed to travel to the
United States, and why wasn't his name included on the terrorist watchlist?
We know that Abdulmutallab's father had informed the American
Embassy in Nigeria of his Islamist extremist connections in Yemen more
than a month before he boarded the flight to Detroit. We also know that his
name was included in the broadest terrorist database, known as TIDE. But
despite this alarming information, the system failed to bar Abdulmutallab
from boarding Flight 253 to America.
This is a case of missed opportunities.
From my perspective, the State Department clearly had sufficient
information to revoke Abdulmutallab's visa. State Department officials
already had decided to question Abdulmutallab about his ties to extremists
if he chose to renew his visa. How he could have been a threat to the United
States in the future based on his extremist ties, but not a sufficient current
threat to suspend his visa defies both logic and common sense. Had the
State Department taken this action, it would have prevented him from
traveling to the United States. A missed opportunity.
Another missed opportunity occurred in Amsterdam, where
Abdulmutallab's flight originated. This airport is one of only nine foreign
airports where a small number of U.S. immigration advisory officers are
stationed. These officers can ask an airline not to board a passenger who
will be prohibited from entering our country upon arrival. They receive a
list of passengers of concern, including those whose visas have been
revoked or flagged by the State Department. This was another missed
opportunity to stop Abdulmutallab.
Recently, the Department of Homeland Security has expanded its
efforts to identify individuals who have revoked visas or who are on the
State Department's visa watch list before they board airplanes overseas,
rather than waiting until they have already arrived at U.S. airports. I would
like to know how successful these programs are at identifying high-risk
travelers.
Another missed opportunity to stop Abdulmutallab occurred at the
NCTC. The President has stated that there was ample intelligence on
Abdulmutallab to warrant his inclusion on the No Fly list. Yet that did not
occur, even after his father's warning. It did not occur because other
streams of intelligence were not connected until it was too late. Why did the
Intelligence Community fail to analyze all available information relating to
Abdulmutallab?
Some intelligence experts point to outmoded systems as a factor.
Despite vast improvements in information sharing, our Intelligence
Community continues to rely on internal systems that are relics from the
days before the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
These outdated systems do not effectively surface intelligence information
so that analysts and security officials can identify threats in real-time.
I would like to know the Administration's plans for upgrading systems
to allow for more effective searching of terrorist information. For starters,
identifying individuals in the terrorist databases who have valid U.S. visas
should not be a complicated task.
We also must examine how we can better identify individuals who
should be on watchlists for additional screening at airports. For example, we
know that Abdulmutallab was identified for additional screening once he
arrived in Detroit while his flight was in the air.
Why wasn't that same information used to identify him earlier, before
he boarded his flight? Another missed opportunity. As this case
demonstrates, waiting until a suspected terrorist arrives in the U.S. to
conduct additional screening is waiting too long.
We must continue to strengthen our watchlisting and screening
systems. Unless these systems work effectively, we will not be able to
prevent terrorists' from traveling to our nation.