Hearing Of The Senate Committee On Homeland Security - "Intelligence Reform: The Lessons And Implications Of The Christmas Day Attack, Part II"

Statement

Intelligence failures . . . . calls for reform . . . . lack of accountability . . .
. testimony by Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton. It sounds like
the aftermath of the 2001 attacks all over again, but in fact, there are
significant differences between now and then.
When our nation was attacked on the morning of September 11, 2001,
our intelligence community was hampered by an organizational structure
that undermined unity of effort. It was led by a Director that had little
authority over its various elements and little incentive to focus beyond the
mission of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was burdened with a culture
that promoted parochial agency interests over the intelligence needs of a
nation.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
fundamentally changed our intelligence community. Working with the
families of the victims and the 9/11 Commission, this Committee was able to
pass the most substantial reforms of our intelligence agencies in more than
50 years.
In the five years since the Intelligence Reform Act became law,
information sharing and collaboration among the 18 elements of the
intelligence community have improved dramatically. And, in 2009 alone,
the intelligence community, working with law enforcement and homeland
security agencies, has helped detect and disrupt numerous terrorist attacks
targeting our nation. Two of these successes were the arrests of David
Headley and Najibullah Zazi in two separate terrorist conspiracies. Other
successes also were made possible by the reforms this Committee
spearheaded in 2004.
But, standing alone, a law cannot accomplish transformation. At the
end of the day, even the most powerful laws are just words on paper. They
rely on the President and leaders within the executive branch to produce
reform. And, to fight the war on terrorism, the President, the Director of
National Intelligence, the Secretary of State, and other leaders must use the
laws passed by Congress to their fullest extent.
Unfortunately, the terrorist attack at Fort Hood and the failed
Christmas Day plot are stark reminders of what can happen when those
authorities are not used effectively.
Under the 2004 law, the DNI has the clear authority to "determine
requirements and priorities." Yet, the DNI failed to respond to the growing
threat that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula posed to the United States and
apparently failed to target sufficient resources at this threat.
The Intelligence Reform Act also provides ample authority "to ensure
maximum availability of and access to intelligence information within the
intelligence community." Yet, intelligence regarding the threat posed by
Major Nidal Malik Hasan remained stove-piped at an FBI Joint Terrorism
Task Force instead of being provided to officials within the Department of
Defense who might have been able to act to prevent the Fort Hood attacks.
The law directs the DNI to "ensure the development of information
technology systems that include . . . intelligence integration capabilities," yet
intelligence that may have identified Abdulmutallab as a terrorist remained
undiscovered in multiple intelligence community databases -- disseminated,
yet effectively unknown.
The law provides the Secretary of State with clear authority to revoke
a visa "at any time, in [her] discretion," yet Abdulmutallab's visa remained
valid when he boarded Flight 253 in Amsterdam. It remained valid despite
the fact that the State Department had already decided to question him
about his ties to extremists if he chose to renew his visa. How he could have
been a threat to the United States in the future based on these extremist ties,
but not a sufficient current threat to prudentially revoke his visa defies both
logic and common sense.
And, finally, despite the President's authority to hold Abdulmutallab
as an enemy belligerent and subject him to a thorough interrogation for
intelligence purposes, the Department of Justice unilaterally decided to treat
the foreign terrorist as a common criminal, advise him of the right to remain
silent, and grant him a lawyer at the taxpayer's expense. Our nation's top
intelligence officials were never even consulted on this decision.
I direct attention to these failures not to assign blame at this stage of
our inquiry, but to indicate that effective leadership may prevent similar
mistakes in the future.
The President must empower his senior officials to use every
authority available to them to defeat the terrorist threat.
These reforms do not require action by the Congress. They do not
require a 60-day review to consider. They should be implemented now by
the President. Nothing less than our security hangs in the balance.

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