Panel I of a Hearing of the House Committee on International Relations on the Bush Administration and Nonproliferation: A New Strategy Emerges

Federal News Service

HEADLINE: PANEL I OF A HEARING OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SUBJECT: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND NONPROLIFERATION: A NEW STRATEGY EMERGES

CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE HENRY HYDE (R-IL)

WITNESS: JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LOCATION: 2172 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BODY:

REP. HENRY HYDE (R-IL): The committee will come to order.

We live in a world and in a city where rumblings of warning blend into a familiar background, where fluency in the language of crises is widely shared, where doomsayers and Cassandras readily ply their trade. Some alarms are of an immediate nature and are drawn from the empirical world; others are distilled from more abstract projections. But I can think of no scenario more frightening, more disastrous, than that of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction, of which nuclear weapons are the transcendent example.

Few would disagree that combating this threat must be among our highest national priorities. And yet that resolution has not always been matched by concrete action.

I speak here not as a partisan, for the successes and failures in this area can be widely distributed among parties, factions, individuals, and schools of thought. But none would maintain that all that could be done, all that should be done to avert this unparalleled disaster, has in fact been done.

Over the decades, a number of policies, actions, programs, and efforts have been advanced to address the many challenges of this hydra-headed problem. The collective result of these labors constitutes an enormous success, but, nevertheless, our current defenses remain far from perfect. And yet our goal must be perfection, for our vessel is a leaky one, where even a single hole can be an opening to the Apocalypse.

Our regime of safeguards has taken shape in piecemeal fashion, often in a reactive response to correct problems that have been unexpectedly unearthed. Perhaps the best example is the revelation, in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, of the scale of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs, including the bone- chilling discovery that his nuclear ambitions were within an estimated six months from being realized. This and other providential discoveries underscored the gross inadequacy of the existing inspection procedures and led to the crafting of the so-called Additional Protocol, which mandates far more intrusive measures than those of the original Non-Proliferation Treaty.

But even these much-strengthened measures cannot compensate for other fatal shortcomings which may become evident only in retrospect. The sudden and recent exposure of Iran's longstanding efforts to acquire a nuclear capability, and its success in assembling key elements of a weapons program, have once again demonstrated the harvest of deadly consequences that complacency may sow.

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REP. BETTY MCCOLLUM (D-MN): Thank you, Madam Chair.

After September 11th, President Bush clearly stated his top priority was to prevent proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, rogue nations who sponsor terrorism, such as North Korea, Iran and Libya.

The threat of WMD proliferation led to the Bush doctrine of preemptive war to justify the U.S. military invasion and overthrow of the Iraqi regime. As we know it, no weapons of mass destruction have been found.

Meanwhile, one month after September 11th, President Bush lifted nuclear related sanctions against Pakistan and President Musharraf's government because it became a vital ally of the United States on the war on terrorism. We know now that nuclear transfers to North Korea and Pakistan military cargo flights took place as late as 2002. The ship that you spoke of in your testimony in the fall of 2003 in fact was industrial equipment for nuclear weapons from Pakistan that was being sent to Libya. Yet you make the statement that no high level officials knew of this transfer or Mr. Khan's profits of over $100 million from Libya possibly alone.

The U.S. invaded Iraq to prevent the spread of mass weapons of destruction. But Pakistan is the world's worst proliferator, and has been congratulated to this administration by its efforts. I'm not comforted, and the American people should not feel comforted. In fact, February 5th, 2004, the New York Times reported General Musharraf saying, quote, "Pakistan would hand over all documents from its investigation to the international nuclear inspectors. It would not order an independent investigation into the Pakistani army's role of proliferation, calling the idea, quote, "rubbish." He said he would never allow the United Nations supervision of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. This Sunday on television General Musharraf appeared unconcerned about the consequences of Pakistan's nuclear transfer saying, quote, "If I handed over a missile or a bomb to any extremist, believe me he can do nothing about it. He could not explode it"-end of quote.

Secretary Bolton, in light of Pakistan's expansive and dangerous network of nuclear proliferation to Iran, North Korea and Libya, should the Bush administration make billions of dollars of future U.S. assistance to the Pakistani government conditional on President Musharraf coming out of the nuclear shadow and entering the community of responsible nations by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty? Is the Bush administration going to continue to work to protect America's security and vital interests in nuclear proliferation by holding Pakistan accountable? Or is the administration comfortable in accepting President Musharraf's assurances that Pakistan alone can end its proliferation problem, and his believe that even if terrorists were to acquire nuclear weapons they would not be sophisticated enough to use them?

And, Mr. Bolton, I have in front of me a copy from the New Republic, dated March 27th, 2004, the title of it is "Daddy's Girl." And basically this article states that Khan's daughter has information in her possession that would be very embarrassing to the Pakistani government, because it implicates very high level officials. You say you are not aware of any information that might implicate officials, but I would think Mr. Khan's daughter would be a fairly credible source. Can you comment?

MR. BOLTON: I'm not going to comment on the last in public. You said in the midst of your statement that we lifted sanctions on Pakistan shortly after September 11th-that's true. And you're aware of course that we lifted the sanctions on India at the same time.

REP. MCCOLLUM: Yes, I am, but India was not involved in selling nuclear weapons technology.

MR. BOLTON: No, but the sanctions-well, what is your evidence that the government of Pakistan was involved in selling nuclear weapons technology?

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Can't tell you in open session.

MR. BOLTON: Okay, well, let's go into closed session.

REP. MCCOLLUM: No, every-maybe we could get --

MR. BOLTON: You know, if you-you make allegations and that's fine-I'm happy to discuss them.

REP. MCCOLLUM: I thought I lived in a democracy.

MR. BOLTON: But we're trying-we're trying-we're trying to base the relationship on evidence. Let me ask another question.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Will the gentle woman yield?

REP. MCCOLLUM: Madam Chair?

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Yes?

REP. MCCOLLUM: I asked questions. I have an election certificate. I would like some answers, and I do not wish to be grilled by Mr. Bolton.

MR. BOLTON: Well, I think --

REP. MCCOLLUM: He is here to testify in front of this committee. I have every right with the oath of office I took to ask questions, and I asked him respectfully, and I would respectfully ask for answers.

REP. ROS-LEHTINEN: Thank you, Ms. McCollum.