Secure Existing Aviation Loopholes (SEAL) Act

SECURE EXISTING AVIATION LOOPHOLES (SEAL) ACT -- (Extensions of Remarks - February 12, 2004)

SPEECH OF
HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY
OF MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2004

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, more than two and one-half years after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, dangerous gaps still persist in the Nation's aviation security system. Today, I am introducing the Secure Existing Aviation Loopholes (SEAL) Act to address the pressing security problems that continue to threaten the safety of airline passengers and crew members. Inspection of Cargo Carried Aboard Passenger Aircraft

Twenty-two percent of all the cargo that is shipped by air in the United States is transported aboard passenger aircraft, amounting to about 2.8 million tons of cargo loaded aboard passenger airplanes each year. The Department of Homeland Security does not routinely inspect cargo transported on passenger planes. Instead, the Department relies on paperwork checks of manifests as part of the Department's flawed Known Shipper Program and random physical inspections that are randomly verified by the Department. This cargo loophole in aviation security has been repeatedly exploited. For example, in September 2003, a shipping clerk packed himself inside a wooden crate and shipped himself undetected from New York to Texas aboard a cargo plane, and Pan Am Flight 103 was brought down in 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland by a bomb contained in unscreened baggage.

The SEAL Act requires 100 percent physical inspection of cargo that is transported on passenger planes. The costs of physical screening, estimated to be comparable to the $1.8 billion funding level for screening checked baggage, would be offset by a cargo security fee, similar to the fee that passenger pay for security measures when they purchase airline tickets. Federal Air Marshals

Ten transatlantic flights were canceled over the weekend of January 31-February 1, 2004 due to heightened fears of a possible Al Qaeda attack, and 16 international flights were canceled or delayed over the Christmas and New Year's holidays as a result of specific intelligence that the flights might be terrorist targets. The cancellations resulted when some European carriers such as Air France and British Airways refused to place armed marshals onboard and instead opted to cancel the flights. There are no international standards to define what constitutes proper training for air marshals. Consequently, air marshals on flights that originate overseas and are bound for the U.S. may have different training that could be inconsistent with best practices.

The SEAL Act prohibits foreign air carriers from taking off or landing in the United States unless a Federal air marshal or an equivalent officer of the government of the foreign country is onboard, in cases when the Secretary of Homeland Security requests that an air marshal or officer of a foreign country travel on the flight.

Given intelligence indicating that terrorist may try to commandeer all-cargo planes and crash them into nuclear power plants and other critical infrastructure in the U.S., the SEAL Act provides authority for Federal Air Marshals to travel aboard cargo aircraft, as needed. The Federal Air Marshal Service does not currently have this authority. Improved Aviation Security Flight Attendants

Flight attendants do not have a discreet, secure and wireless method of communicating with pilots in the cockpit, with air marshals who may be onboard the aircraft or with authorities on the ground. Flight attendants must rely on telephones affixed to the interior of the passenger cabin if they need to communicate with pilots via phone or with authorities on the ground. These phones can be easily disabled. Flight attendants do not have a method of communicating via phone with air marshals onboard. On American Airlines Flight 11, which was crashed into the Pentagon on September 11th, flight attendants were unable to communicate by phone with the cockpit. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 included the directive that carriers' provide flight attendants with a secure, wireless method of communicating with pilots, but this provision was inserted in a voluntary section of the Aviation Transportation Security Act.

The SEAL Act makes mandatory the provision of wireless communication systems for flight crew and air marshals. Crew Training

Prior to the September 11th terrorist attacks, air carrier responsibilities for security and anti-hijacking training for flight crews were set forth in the Air Carrier Standard Security Program, also known as the Common Strategy. The Common Strategy was originally developed in the 1980s, and it emphasized accommodation of hijackers' demands, delaying tactics, and safely landing the airplane. It advised air crews to refrain from trying to overpower or negotiate with the hijackers. On September 11th, the Common Strategy offered no defense against the tactics employed by the hijackers of Flights 11, 77, 93, and 175.

Enacted on December 12, 2003, Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (PL 108-176) made voluntary many of the important elements of self-defense training for crew members that had been mandatory in Section 1403 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (PL 107-296). Training in the following tactics is voluntary under Section 603 of the 2003 aviation reauthorization, but had been mandatory in Section 1403 of the Homeland Security Act:

The SEAL Act will reinstate the requirement established in the Homeland Security Act to make counter-terror training for aircraft crew mandatory. International Cooperation on Aviation Security

The cancellation of more than two dozen international flights since December 2003 suggests significant disagreement between the U.S. and some foreign nations over the best way to respond to terrorist threats to aviation security. In January 2003, Asa Hutchinson, Undersecretary of Border and Transportation Security in the Department of Homeland Security, met with European officials to discuss aviation security measures, including the use of air marshals on international flights to the U.S. No agreement was reached with European governments on the placement of air marshals on U.S.-bound flights in cases when intelligence about terrorist threats against flights is received.

The SEAL Act directs the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to develop a well-constructed plan to improve coordination between the Department and its foreign counterparts in the area of aviation security. This plan includes development of air marshal programs for foreign governments and the provision of technical assistance in the formulation of strategies to tighten security measures at foreign airports. Comprehensive Pre-Flight Screening

Pre-flight security inspections of the passenger cabins and lavatories of commercial aircraft often are performed by low-wage, poorly trained contract employees. In September 2003, a college student named Nathaniel Heatwole placed box cutters, matches, bleach and simulated explosives on Southwest Airlines flights. These items were not discovered by airline officials until approximately one month later. Heatwole also placed dangerous items on two other Southwest flights in February 2003, and they remained undetected until April 2003. In October 2003, potentially dangerous items were also found on US Airways flights.

The Transportation Security Administration has issued a requirement effective in January 2004 for detailed documentation of security inspections performed by air carriers prior to each aircraft's first departure of the day. The directive affects the documentation of the inspections, but does not change the manner in which the security inspections are performed by the airline's contract cleaning crew or the level of verification that TSA provides to ensure the inspections are thoroughly conducted.

The SEAL Act sets a firm deadline for the improvement of pre-flight security inspections of the interior of passenger planes to increase the likelihood that any dangerous items hidden in the plane will be promptly discovered. The SEAL Act also includes new requirements that subject individuals who are performing the pre-flight inspections to additional security checks, including passage through a checkpoint to detect any metallic objects prior to accessing the plane; screening of any items to be carried aboard the plane to detect hazardous substances such as chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials; a criminal history background check, social security check and check against all terrorist watch lists maintained by the government. Control Over Access to Secured Areas of Airports

Airport workers with access to sensitive areas of airports, including the airplanes, are not required to pass through metal detectors or have their personal items x-rayed before reporting to work at each of the nation's commercial airports. Airport workers have taken advantage of lax security controls to commit crimes. For example, in November 2003, a massive narcotics smuggling operation that exploited airport security weaknesses was broken up at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York.

While criminal background checks are required under current law for employees with unescorted access to an airport's sensitive identification display area (SIDA), there are no uniform requirements applicable to all airport workers that mandate checks of Social Security numbers and checks against terrorist watch lists maintained by the government.

The SEAL Act directs the Department of Homeland Security to issue regulations within 180 days after the bill's enactment that improve control over access to secure areas in airports nationwide. The SEAL Act requires all airport workers with access to secure areas of airports, including aircraft, to pass through devices to detect for metallic objects and have any personal items screened to detect any hazardous chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials before entering these areas. In addition to criminal background checks, the SEAL Act requires that airport employees are checked against terrorist watch lists, that workers' Social Security numbers are checked against government databases to ensure the documents' legitimacy and verify that the Social Security number is assigned to the individual presenting it. Aircraft Maneuvers

In December 2003, a C-17 U.S. transport plane was hit by a missile shortly after take off from Baghdad. An engine exploded, but the plane returned safely with only one of its 16 people aboard slightly injured. In November 2003, an Airbus A300 cargo plane operated by the courier company DHL departing from Baghdad to Bahrain was struck by a SAM-7 ground-to-air missile. The plane's engine caught fire, and it was forced to make an emergency landing at Baghdad International Airport. None of the plane's crew was injured in the incident.

Pilots currently receive training on how to fly the aircraft and land it safely if engines fail. Pilots are required to receive training on how to maneuver and land a two-engine plane with only one functioning engine; a three engine plane with only two engines functioning; and a four engine plane with only two engines functioning. However, pilots do not receive recurrent training in how to maneuver and safely land the aircraft in the event of a complete failure of the hydraulic system in which normal flight controls are not available. If an aircraft is struck by a surface-to-air missile, it may experience such failures, as was the case when the DHL cargo plane was hit by a SAM-7 missile in Iraq last year.

The SEAL Act requires air carriers to provide pilots with training in flight deck procedures, aircraft maneuvers and best practices that enable pilots to respond if the aircraft is struck by a surface-to-air missile. The training is designed to increase the likelihood that pilots will be capable of safely landing the aircraft and will include components that simulate the complete failure of the aircraft's hydraulic system and loss of normal flight controls. Aggressive Flying Maneuvers

According to the FAA, aggressive flying techniques were not part of training provided pilots prior to passage of the 2003 FAA reauthorization. As of February 2004, a TSA working group is finalizing its training recommendations on fleck deck procedures or aircraft maneuvers to defend the aircraft. TSA does not expect to recommend any maneuvers that could be considered "aggressive."

The SEAL Act recognizes the need to balance the security benefits of maneuvers and procedures with the potential risks, in terms of passenger safety and the structural limitations of the aircraft. The SEAL Act requires the Secretary to issue regulations that require the carriers to provide, in conjunction with appropriate law enforcement authorities, crew members with training in procedures for communicating and coordinating effectively with Federal Air Marshals and law enforcement officers during unauthorized attempts to disrupt the normal operation of the aircraft. Securing Cockpit Doors

According to the Coalition of Airline Pilots, approximately 60 percent of cargo planes are not equipped with cockpit doors that separate the flight deck from the aircraft's cargo bay. In September 2003, a shipping clerk packed himself inside a wooden crate and shipped himself undetected from New York to Texas aboard a cargo plane. Fortunately, he was an industrious tourist, rather than an industrious terrorist.

Some cargo carriers have installed cockpit doors, but the majority of cargo planes still lack any door between cockpit and cargo bay.

The SEAL Act requires all cargo planes to have reinforced cockpit doors, including sturdy partitions surrounding the doors. Within 180 days after enactment of the legislation, the Secretary is directed to issue an order that all cargo aircraft must have, no later than 1 year from the date of issuance of the order, a reinforced, lockable door, including the surrounding partition, between the pilot and cargo compartments. Security Requirements for General Aviation

According to a November 5, 2003 GAO report, Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address Challenges (GAO-04-232T), "Since September 2001, TSA has taken limited action to improve general aviation, leaving general aviation far more open and potentially vulnerable than commercial aviation. General aviation is vulnerable because general aviation pilots and passengers are not screened before takeoff and the contents of general aviation planes are not screened at any point." There are more than 200,000 general aviation aircraft, which are located in every state at more than 19,000 airports. According to TSA's working group on general aviation, general aviation aircraft are responsible for 77 percent of all air traffic in the U.S.

TSA is taking some steps, such as developing a risk-based self-assessment tool for general aviation airports to use to identify security concerns, but these steps fall short of what is required.

The SEAL Act directs the Secretary to establish a no-fly zone around the following facilities whenever the threat level reaches Orange or at any other level the Secretary deems appropriate: sensitive nuclear facilities such as nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons materials production facilities, and chemical facilities identified by the Environmental Protection Agency at which a release of the facility's hazardous materials could threaten the health of over 1 million people, and any other facilities the Secretary shall so designate.

The SEAL Act requires the operators of general aviation airports and landing facilities to complete vulnerability assessments developed by TSA, which evaluate the facilities' physical security, procedures, infrastructure and resources. The SEAL Act also requires TSA to develop a plan for addressing vulnerabilities identified by these assessments no later than 1 year from the date of enactment.

Mr. Speaker, we can do better, and we must do more to improve our aviation security. I urge my colleagues to support
the SEAL Act, which will close dangerous loopholes in our airline security system.

END