In investigating the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the
Commission led by Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton discovered vital information
scattered throughout the government, confined by agency silos, that might
have prevented the deaths and destruction of that terrible day if only the
dots had been connected.
In the wake of the mass murder at Fort Hood, we once again must
confront a troubling question: Was this another failure to connect the dots?
Much has been done since 9-11-01 to respond to the failures exposed
by those attacks. We created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC),
additional Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and fusion centers. We revised
information sharing policies and promoted greater cooperation among
intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
And the results have been significant. Terrorist plots, both at home
and abroad, have been thwarted. The recent arrest of Najibullah Zazi
demonstrates the benefits of information sharing and joint efforts by the
NCTC and other intelligence agencies, as well as federal, state, and local law
enforcement.
But the shootings at Fort Hood may indicate that communication
failures and poor judgment calls can defeat systems intended to ensure that
vital information is shared to protect our country and its citizens. This case
also raises questions about whether or not restrictive rules have a chilling
effect on the legitimate dissemination of information, making it too difficult
to connect the dots that would have allowed a clear picture of the threat to
emerge.
These are overarching questions that we will explore with our expert
witnesses today.
Our ongoing investigation will also seek answers to questions specific
to the Fort Hood case. For example, how did our intelligence community and
law enforcement agencies handle intercepted communications between
Major Hasan and a radical cleric and known al Qaeda associate? Did they
contact anyone in Major Hasan's chain of command to relay concerns? Did
they seek to interview Major Hasan himself?
When Major Hasan reportedly began to openly question the oath that
he had taken to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, did
anyone in his military chain of command intervene?
When Major Hasan, in his presentation at Walter Reed in 2007,
recommended that the Department of Defense allow "Muslim soldiers the
option of being released as conscientious objectors' to increase troop
morale and decrease adverse events," did his colleagues and superior
officers view this statement as a red flag?
Were numerous warning signs ignored because the Army faces a
shortage of psychiatrists and was concerned, as the Army Chief of Staff has
subsequently put it, about a "backlash against Muslim soldiers?"
These are all questions that we will seek to answer.
For nearly four years, this Committee has been investigating the threat
of homegrown terrorism. We have explored radicalization in our prisons,
the cycle of violent radicalization, and how the Internet can act as a "virtual
terrorist training camp." We have warned that individuals within the United
States can be inspired by al Qaeda's violent ideology to plan and execute
attacks even if they do not receive direct orders from al Qaeda to do so.
And we have learned of the difficulty of detecting "lone wolf" terrorists.
To prevent future homegrown terrorist attacks, we must understand
why our law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and our military personnel
system may have failed in this case.
Major Hasan's attack targeted innocent soldiers and civilians
regardless of their religious faith. These patriotic soldiers and civilians were
injured and killed not on a foreign battleground but rather on what should
have been safe and secure American territory.
With so many questions still swirling around this heinous attack, it is
important for the nation to understand what happened so that we may work
to prevent future incidents. We owe that to our troops, to their families and
communities, and to all Americans.