Sheldon Reflects on Situation in Afghanistan Following Overseas Trip

Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I have just returned from Afghanistan. I was there over the weekend. I wanted to take a moment and share a few impressions. I traveled with Senator Burr, who is a colleague of mine on the Intelligence Committee, and with Senator LeMieux of Florida. We visited Kabul, Jalalabad, and a military location further out in the field.

It was my third trip to Afghanistan. That makes me no expert. But I do hope my observations might be of some interest or use to my colleagues. Before I begin, our colleagues should know the perception in Kabul of how extremely valuable the efforts of our colleague Senator Kerry have been. It was clear the resolution that we saw to the election dilemma could not have happened without Senator Kerry.

The more our officials in Afghanistan knew about that situation, the stronger their views were about Senator Kerry's irreplaceable role. Even President Karzai commented on it in our meeting with him. So a well earned "well done'' to our colleague and friend.

While the situation in Afghanistan is obviously complex and difficult, the best news for us is that the Taliban remains very unpopular. The Taliban's strength comes from the fact, not unreasonably, that many Afghans are terrified of them.

If the Taliban are willing to ride into town and cut off the ears of the village elder's son in front of the whole village, it requires considerable courage and confidence on their part in us and the Afghan Government for that village to stand up to those Taliban.

The Afghan people do not lack courage. Indeed, their courage and resistance in standing up to the Soviet invasion are among the reasons the Cold War is over, and why America is largely out of the shadow of that nuclear threat. When we think of our role in Afghanistan, it is worth considering our obligations in the light of what their struggle against the Soviet Union has meant for our country, our safety and our liberty. So courage is not something that Afghans lack.

But there is a compelling need for the Afghan people to feel confidence in their government and confidence in us.

The best avenue to increasing Afghani confidence in their government will be reducing government corruption. It is a pernicious cancer throughout much of the Afghan Government.

Once this election is settled--and I will assume that President Karzai will emerge victorious--President Karzai can then turn his attention to his new administration. And then I think it is vital--and it is unanimously seen to be vital by the officials I spoke to--that vigorous efforts against corruption be a leading part of President Karzai's commitment to the Afghan people.

Confidence in us is equally important, but confidence in us must be measured against its counterweight, which is dependence on us. President Karzai, his ministers, and his challenger, Dr. Abdullah, are extremely grateful for the sacrifice that America has made for the benefit of their people, and they do not hesitate to say so. But at the same time, it is a realistic human impulse to be pleased if someone else will do something for you that you would otherwise have had to do yourself.

So, on the one hand, assuring the Afghan people of our reliable and enduring commitment to their struggle, while, on the other hand, ensuring that the Afghan Government meets its responsibilities, rather than just relying on us to fight their war, is the difficult balance we must achieve.

The more President Karzai--after this election is settled--can assume the mantle of a wartime President and accept responsibility that he is the military leader of this struggle, as well as the newly elected leader of Afghanistan, the better it will be. But it also seems to me that a strategic agreement with the Afghan Government, a strategic agreement that more clearly lays out the responsibilities and the commitments on either side, would be a good vehicle to set that balance.

The confidence of the Afghan people in our steadfastness is necessary to their willingness to fight this enemy, and the Afghan Government stepping up clearly to its responsibilities is necessary to our willingness to fight this enemy. Together, where those goals intersect, we can win. Divided, we cannot.

Sorting this out will not be easy. For too many years, we have been "muddling through'' in Afghanistan. President Obama's appointee, General McChrystal, has now called for a new strategy. I think the President is wise and patient to think this through carefully as he leads us out of the muddle and develops a winning strategy.

No one I spoke to in Afghanistan thought the need for new troops was immediate. The 21,000 additional troops President Obama sent are still being absorbed. Winter is coming with its seasonal lull in the violence. Questions about Pakistan's role supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan are unresolved, questions whose answers will make our challenge in Afghanistan either far more easy or far more difficult. This is not simple and should not suddenly be rushed now, after years of muddling.

In evaluating the decision that President Obama faces, it is worth considering the actual report that General McChrystal provided. We have heard a lot about it, and most of it has had to do with the immediate deployment of troops.

The report, if you look at it, has a slightly different cast. In his report, General McChrystal identified "two fundamental changes''--that is his quote--"two fundamental changes'' that are required. One is this--and I quote-- ISAF must focus on getting the basics right. ISAF is International Security Assistance Force. It is the international force that America leads in Afghanistan. Here is one: "ISAF must focus on getting the basics right."

Two: ISAF must also adopt a new strategy. Those are his one and two points--"getting the basics right" and "adopt a new strategy."

To continue quoting General McChrystal's report:

The key take away from this assessment is the major need for a systematic change to our strategy and the way we think and operate. Let me quote that again: The key -- this is the McChrystal report quoted verbatim--"The key take away from this assessment is the major need for a systematic change to our strategy and the way we think and operate."

That is the task on which the President has embarked, and after years of muddling, I think he is entitled to a reasonable time to get it right.

I would like to highlight three of the areas that General McChrystal emphasized in his report.

I will quote again. One: "Tour lengths should be long enough to build continuity and ownership of success."

Afghan society is deeply complex, personal, and it is governed by codes of conduct and honor. Our decisionmakers on the ground need to know the social terrain to be effective. That message has been loud and clear from my trips to that country. But the conclusion from the general is that "Tour lengths should be long enough to build continuity and ownership of success." This will be hard on our troops and their families, and it will also be hard on the back-office bureaucracies that have to accommodate this. But that is what he said. There it is.

This is another quote. Two: "ISAF must operate differently. Preoccupied with force protection, ISAF has operated in a manner that distances itself, both physically and psychologically, from the people they seek to protect."

An example of this is that the reconstruction of a bridge or a school is good and important and valuable, but if the convoy of MRAPs ran everybody off the road in all the villages that they went through on the way to that school or bridge, the signal that we are there to help is lost.

This is a hard point that General McChrystal has made: reducing the cocoon of force protection around our civilian and military personnel creates greater exposure to casualties. General McChrystal has faced this point squarely.

Third, and somewhat amazingly--I will quote again--"Major insurgent groups outperform GIROA and ISAF at information operations."

Again, ISAF is the International Security Assistance Force. GIROA is the acronym for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. So I plug that into the quote and it says: Major insurgent groups outperform the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the International Security Assistance Force at information operations.

I will tell you, for a country that invented Madison Avenue advertising and public relations, this is a bitter pill. And this was confirmed during our trip. Although we saw a few areas that gave us hope, overall, officials acknowledged that information operations appear to be operating with far less sophistication and energy than tactical military operations.

I have the impression that for too long this function has been seen really as information supply rather than information combat. Everybody in this Chamber has gotten here--or at least almost everybody has gotten here--after having won an election in which they had to engage in prolonged information combat against the other side to get their message across. Our information operations do need to be improved in Afghanistan, and it is commendable that General McChrystal has recognized it.

Let me be clear. This is not propaganda. This is not making up a lot of spin. This is getting the facts out faster and better. As General McChrystal noted in his report--and I quote again--"this is ‘a deeds-based' information environment," but we do have the deeds. We have villages peaceful. We have markets opened. We have Taliban fighters turning in their guns to seek reconciliation.

We have, on the negative side, horrific Taliban atrocities that offend Afghan culture as well as our own--so that we can tell a winning and truthful story to the Afghan people, but, as General McChrystal has acknowledged, we have to get better at this.

I will conclude with an expression of gratitude and a final observation. We should be extraordinarily grateful to our Americans serving in Afghanistan, not just for their courage and sacrifice, which are remarkable in themselves, but also for their skill to fight an enemy of lunatics, criminals, and fanatics for whom no brutality is too offensive, while, at the same time, protecting the civilian population within which the enemy operates--all while protecting the values we Americans hold dear. That is no small trick.

The men and women who have developed this to an unprecedented level of competence--even mastery--deserve our commendation: the Rangers, on long and arduous patrols through harsh terrain; the special operations teams, working by night to disable enemy leaders; the interrogators, working far from home to develop intelligence about this enemy, well within the bounds of decency and the norms of military conduct, and very successfully; the analysts, at work 24/7, processing that intelligence to maintain nearly immediate situational awareness for our forces; the pilots, delivering goods and personnel wherever and whenever required; and the vast support structure that keeps those aircraft operational in one of the harshest environments on Earth; the marines, clearing and rebuilding villages in Helmand Province, not just rebuilding villages but rebuilding trust and security for those families; our silent services, whose only reward is their success and the respect of their peers; the reconstruction teams, working to bridge barriers of culture and language, and our own bureaucratic barriers, to rebuild the infrastructure of civilized life: schools for girls, roads to market--that is all just a slice of the courage, devotion, and skill that Americans are bringing to this challenge.

My final observation is this: Wherever I have been on three visits now, American soldiers of all ranks have a tangible respect and affection for their Afghan counterparts. The Afghan soldier could be centuries behind us technologically, but he comes from a martial tradition lasting thousands of years, producing men who are brave, resourceful, hardy, principled, and willing to fight.

I remember a bearded Special Forces officer telling me about the commandoes he was training, that when he went out on patrol with them, he had no hesitation. They called each other brothers. And he said there was not a man in his group who would not lay down his life to protect him.

For all the difficulties we will face--and this is not easy--I think this aspect provides a platform for some optimism about growing an effective Afghan national military and police to assume its necessary role protecting Afghanistan's security and sovereignty and speeding our return home.

I thank the Presiding Officer. I yield the floor, and I note the absence of a quorum.

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