Hearing Of The Senate Committee On Homeland Security And Governmental Affairs Committee - Business Meeting

Statement

I am pleased that we have returned today to continue the markup of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2009. This critical legislation would improve our nation's ability to prevent and respond to WMD attacks.
Last December, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism found that a WMD attack was more likely than not in the next five years and the most likely WMD was a biological agent. The WMD Commission also found that there were serious flaws in the security of biological labs. Reinforcing these findings, the GAO recently reported alarming deficiencies in perimeter security at facilities that house the world's most dangerous biological agents.
The WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act would add DHS's unique security expertise to improve the security of biolabs that handle pathogens that are the most likely to be used as bioweapons. The bill would require DHS to establish security standards for the most dangerous pathogens through a negotiated rulemaking -- with the Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services and research institutions at the table. The new security standards would be harmonized with the existing HHS- and USDA-issued biolab regulations that focus primarily on biosafety so that there is one comprehensive set of regulations.
This modest new role for DHS represents a compromise. In its comments on the bill, DHS has advocated for a greatly increased role -- even beyond what the compromise bill now provides. That would have been my preference, rather than the compromise before us.
I advocated for this increased role because HHS and USDA have failed to establish the security requirements we must expect from our nation's biolabs. The arguments that DHS should have only a limited role or no role at all smack of turf protection and are not an adequate response to the security failures we have seen.
The WMD Commission supported the overarching goal of increased security for biolabs. While the Commissioners have different views on the precise level of DHS involvement in the regulatory framework, at least one Commissioner, Robin Cleveland, testified last December before our Committee that, "an agency with [a] focus [on] the homeland security mission probably should be in charge."
As I said, the role for DHS in the bill is less than what I would have preferred, particularly in light of HHS' well-documented failures to regulate high-threat pathogens. But in a spirit of compromise, Senator Lieberman and I agreed to accept this more limited role for DHS because we believe so strongly in the need to act now.
Let me now turn to the timing of this bill. We have worked with other committees, agencies, and stakeholders for almost a year. We postponed reporting out this bill last week to allow the Administration more time to provide comments. While we have had useful discussions with the National Security Council's staff on Titles II through V, we still have not received formal comments on Title I. Because of the grave nature of the threat, we can wait no longer -- the time to act is now. We can report out the bill and continue to address Administration comments, if any, that are eventually provided.
There have been ongoing reviews of biolab security since 2007, but what we know from the four already completed is that they have resulted in more recommendations, and more opportunities to plan, but not concrete action. We should not wait for a fifth report, which has been overdue since June. The failure by the Executive branch to meet that June deadline demonstrates the lack of urgency in dealing with this growing threat. Now, we have been informed that any legislative proposals from the Administration likely will not be sent to Congress until next summer.
The security of these labs is too important to leave in the hands of departments that have already failed to respond to numerous examples of lax security. We cannot wait for another year to act. We must move swiftly to strengthen and improve our nation's biological defenses and security systems.

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