Engagement With Burma And The 2010 Elections

Floor Speech

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise today on the floor of the Senate to discuss events involving the troubled country of Burma.

Earlier this year, I encouraged Secretary of State Clinton to make Burma a priority and to see how the United States could better achieve its policy objectives toward the regime. Several weeks ago, the administration unveiled its review of existing Burma policy. The result is that the administration has undertaken a diplomatic effort with the State Peace and Development Council, SPDC, in pursuit of the fundamental U.S. goals of peace, democracy and reconciliation in Burma.

Let me say that I wish the administration well with its diplomatic efforts. I am hopeful this policy will meet with some success. In addition, I believe that this interaction should not be limited to talks merely with the SPDC but should also include discussions with the National League for Democracy, NLD, and representatives from Burma's ethnic minorities. That said, I am not sanguine about the prospects for engagement with the regime. The military junta has shown no inclination whatsoever to compromise on any issue that might jeopardize the regime's hold on power. According to news reports, in July of this year, just weeks before the unveiling of the new Burma policy, the State Department at the highest levels offered to drop the U.S. investment ban against Burma if the regime released Aung San Suu Kyi. This was a major test of how the regime would respond to diplomatic engagement, providing a golden opportunity for the SPDC to demonstrate that it had indeed changed its spots. Instead of accepting this offer and freeing Suu Kyi, the regime promptly sentenced her to an additional 18 months of imprisonment. That does not augur well for diplomatic engagement.

As part of its new strategy, the administration indicated that, while it will place a high priority on diplomatic engagement, it will maintain the economic sanctions in place against the regime. It seems to me that, as matters now stand, there are three significant tests of whether or not the junta's relationship with the United States has improved to the degree that we should even consider moving away from a policy of sanctions: No. 1, the release of all political prisoners, including Suu Kyi; No. 2, the free and fair conduct of the 2010 elections; and No. 3, Burma's compliance with its international obligations to end any prohibited military or proliferation related cooperation with North Korea. Short of tangible and concrete progress in these areas, the removal of sanctions seems to make little sense. It is after all the most significant leverage our government has over the SPDC. Sanctions make clear that the military junta has not achieved legitimacy in the eyes of the West.

It is that search for international legitimacy that has apparently driven the SPDC to hold elections next year. But the 2010 elections are fraught with problems. As a preliminary matter, for these elections to be meaningful, the new ``constitution'' should be amended to provide for truly open electoral competition and democratic governance. As it stands now under the junta's charter, if Suu Kyi's party the NLD won 100 percent of the contestable parliamentary seats in next year's election it would still not control the key government ministries: Defence and Home Affairs. No matter what they will remain firmly under military control. Moreover, the NLD cannot amend the constitution to improve the charter because the military is guaranteed a quarter of the parliament's seats. That means the junta can block any constitutional change. Finally, Suu Kyi may not even hold a position in the government; she is excluded from office by the charter. I would say to my Senate colleagues, this is hardly a prescription for democratic governance.

But putting the flaws in the constitution to one side, there would need to be a profound change in the political environment in Burma for next year's elections to be meaningful. For example, candidates would need to be permitted to freely speak, assemble, and organize. So far as I can tell, none of that has occurred. There would also need to be international election monitors allowed in the country well in advance of election day. This was not permitted during the 2008 ``referendum.'' Simply holding an election is not enough; the elections must pass muster.

With respect to next year's balloting, the NLD, the clear winner of the 1990 elections which the regime abrogated, faces a Hobson's choice. It can either participate in the elections which are almost certain to be unfair and thereby legitimize the flawed constitution or boycott the elections and be treated as a member of an unlawful organization. Participation means casting aside its 1990 victory; nonparticipation means becoming outlaws. I am likely to support the NLD in whatever decision the party makes in this regard though I am not blind to the profound dilemma it faces.

I would just close by paying special tribute to Aung San Suu Kyi. Her grace and courage are an inspiration not only to the people of Burma but to us all. Her imprisonment is a reminder of the paramount importance of the need for freedom and justice in her homeland. I want her to know that I stand with her in her efforts to bring freedom and reconciliation to the people of Burma.

Source