National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield myself 8 minutes.

My amendment would condition the acquisition of interceptors 21 through 30 for the ground-based midcourse national missile defense system on the implementation of operational evaluation and testing under the auspices of the director of testing in the Pentagon.

I will try to give a brief explanation of where we are with this system that is to be deployed. It is a combination of existing elements and some brandnew technology. The existing elements, first, the defense support system, a satellite system, is a cold war system designed to pick up the initial lift-off of missiles. That is in place. Then there is a group of Aegis ships that are out around the potential threat area of North Korea. That is a relatively new application of these ships. They were designed to intercept and detect cruise missiles and aircraft. Now we are attempting to expand that to track, at least partially, the flight path of an ICBM coming from a threat, specifically North Korea. Then there is the Cobra Dane radar, an older radar system. It is not particularly well adapted at discriminating, so it is therefore not the best radar we could have. The administration has canceled the X-band radar system, which is better. Then there are the interceptors with the kill vehicles on top.

The subject of this amendment is the interceptors. For many years, this ground-based system was designed to deploy 20 interceptors. Today, we are taking five for this deployment. But 20 was a rather significant number for technology that has not yet been proven. What the administration did this year is say, well, we want to go beyond that 20; we want 40. We want to buy 10 more, 21 through 30, and have long lead-time acquisition funds for 31 through 40. Well, the Congress in its wisdom already terminated the long lead time for 21 through 40, but we still have to budget this money for 21 through 30.

I don't propose to take that money away. I want to simply fence it, make as a condition to spend that money that this system will begin testing and evaluation. We had a vigorous debate about imposing this operational testing scheme. The result was now the Secretary of Defense is required to promulgate some criteria for operational testing and conduct these tests by October of 2005.

My amendment differs, and I think significantly so. It says we cannot depend upon the Defense Secretary's criteria and evaluation-a self-evaluation by the Missile Defense Agency. We need to get this program back into the traditional system of operational testing and evaluation, which is conducted by an independent agency in the Pentagon which designs, supervises the tests, and makes sure the tests will do what we want to do: deliver to the field a system that actually works. I don't think it is unreasonable. In fact, I think it is entirely appropriate to say that before we buy these additional interceptors-10 more-we are at least in a situation where this rudimentary system has been entered into operational testing.

Let me specifically highlight the issue of the interceptors. The operation of the interceptor and kill vehicle is brand new. Neither has been tested in an interceptor test. We have not tried to fly them with a kill vehicle even against a target. Yet we are buying 10 more of them. It would be prudent to say let's wait and at least do a few tests with these new interceptors and kill vehicles. The new version of the kill vehicle, by the way, where the warhead would actually impact the incoming enemy missile, has never even been flight tested. We don't know what it will look like. In fact, problems with the kill vehicle have delayed the scheduled flight test from March until July 31 of this year; and, frankly, we are weeks away from that and it is entirely plausible that this would be delayed even further. So we are deploying a system in which we have not yet even tested in flight one of the most critical aspects of the system, let alone the fact that the rest of the system has been cobbled together by existing pieces of technology being used in new ways.

That is a strong argument, in my mind, to say how serious are we about saying this is deployment. But it is more compelling, in my mind, to say at some point we have to get operational testing and evaluation-not some improvised form by the Secretary of Defense being implemented by the Missile Defense Agency but a traditional system where the director of test and evaluation at the Pentagon does evaluation and testing. This amendment would do that. It would take no money away. It would simply say we cannot spend the money on the next 10 interceptors-21 through 30-until we have entered the traditional mode of operational test and evaluation. This amendment makes a great deal of sense. There are examples of how useful operational testing is.

The Patriot PAC-3 system-probably the closest analogy to this, even though it is a theater missile system-is designed to go against targets that are not as fast and don't leave the atmosphere. But it is the same hit-to-kill technology. In fact, I was bemused years ago when they would show the film clips of how successful we are in this new technology, and they would use PAC-3 film clips about the hit-to-kill technology.

The PAC-3 system was being tested developmentally. Then it went into operational testing and it failed four consecutive operational tests against a realistic target, one in which you try to simulate the conditions of battlefield use. Even though it was successful in the developmental tests, it failed four consecutive operational tests.

Why are we buying missiles today that have the potential of duplicating the PAC-3 experience? Frankly, we could be in the unenviable position where the first time we try to fly this against a potentially real target, it fails. We have to have operational testing and the PAC-3 is a very good example. These operational tests are extremely useful in finally coming up with a system that is much more reliable.

So, as a result, I urge my amendment strongly. It doesn't take the money away. It simply lays out as a condition that we not spend it until we at least have operational testing. By the way, we are already buying 20 missiles.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

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Mr. REED. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first, I wish to ask the Senator from Rhode Island a question. The Patriot PAC-3 experience he described where I believe there were four failures, did that not, in fact, lead to changes in that system?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Rhode Island is recognized to respond.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Presiding Officer.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, it actually did lead to changes in the operational use of the system, and those changes were very valuable once deployed in a combat situation.

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Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 1 minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has been recognized.

Mr. WARNER. I will accommodate the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. REED. I ask unanimous consent for 1 minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. REED. I respect the chairman and the chairman of the subcommittee who have engaged in this debate. The question to me is: Will this system work? We really do not know if it will work. If we do not know it is going to work, why are we buying 10 additional interceptors at a price of about $500 million?

So this is not the same amendment, the amendment written over and over again. This is an amendment about scarce resources-will we devote them to these interceptors that are untested or will we devote them to other issues?

I point out that there is nothing in this amendment that slows up the program. There is nothing in this amendment that would take away funds. It simply says, let us get into an operational testing mode before we buy these additional systems.

Final point. This system has been plagued by delays, but they are technological delays. The reason we are not having a test-we did not have one in March, and we are having it in July-is because this kill vehicle is not ready for such testing. There is nothing about our amendment or about our procedures. This is a hard technology, but let us make sure it works.

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Mr. REED. I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.