National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005

AMENDMENT NO. 3353

Mr. REED. I call up amendment No. 3353.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection the pending amendment is laid aside. The clerk will report.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I am wondering if my friend from Rhode Island would yield? He would get the floor as soon as Senator Dayton takes a minute to introduce a bill as in morning business. Will the Senator allow us to do that? We promised him some time yesterday.

Mr. REED. I have no objections. I understand Senator Sessions also-

Mr. REID. But you already have your amendment pending here. Has it been reported?

Mr. REED. It is being reported right now.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. REED], proposes an amendment numbered 3353.

The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To limit the obligation and expenditure of funds for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program pending the submission of a report on operational test and evaluation)

On page 33, after line 25, insert the following:

SEC. 224. LIMITATION ON OBLIGATION AND EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS FOR GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE PROGRAM PENDING SUBMISSION OF OPERATIONAL TEST REPORT.

Of the amount authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2005 by section 201(4) for research, development, test, and evaluation, Defense-wide, and available for the Missile Defense Agency for Ground-based Midcourse interceptors, and long-lead items for such interceptors, $550,500,000 may not be obligated or expended until the occurrence of each of the following:

(1) The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation has approved, in writing, the adequacy of the plans (including the projected level of funding) for operational test and evaluation to be conducted in connection with the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program in accordance with section 2399(b)(1) of title 10, United States Code.

(2) Initial operational test and evaluation of the program is completed in accordance with section 2399(a)(1) of such title.

(3) The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation has submitted to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional defense committees a report stating whether the test and evaluation performed were adequate and whether the results of the test and evaluation confirm that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system is effective and suitable for combat, in accordance with section 2399(b)(3) of such title.

(4) The congressional defense committees have received the report under paragraph (3).

Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent the Senator from Minnesota be recognized and be able to speak as in morning business for 5 minutes, and the Senator from Rhode Island then regain the floor to discuss his amendment.

Mr. WARNER. No objection, Mr. President.

Mr. REED. Thank you.

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AMENDMENT NO. 3353

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I understand my amendment has been reported and we are on the amendment now. Let me endeavor to explain the amendment and do it as quickly as possible.

The amendment I support today would provide a condition on the acquisition of interceptors 21 through 30 of the national missile defense. The condition would be that the operational testing would be completed-or initiated, at least-prior to the acquisition of these missiles.

In a sense, it embraces two issues. The first issue is the unwise acquisition of another 10 missiles beyond the 20 that already have been designed for this initial rudimentary deployment of the national missile defense system. That issue is one. The second issue, again, is the issue of making sure we have realistic operational testing.

Yesterday we engaged in a very vigorous debate. I believe the debate was productive. My legislation, as amended by that of Chairman Warner, would require realistic testing. In fact, it set a date of October 1, 2005, to complete such testing. But I do believe it is important to once again look at this issue of testing, particularly in the context of the acquisition of these additional missile systems.

Initially, when the administration talked about the rudimentary deployment of a national missile defense system, they conceived of a system with 20 interceptors. Suddenly, this year, they have moved forward and added an additional 10 interceptors, interceptors 21 through 30. More than that, they requested an additional long lead time funding for interceptors 31 through 40.

That is an unwise use of very scarce resources at a time when we are trying to expand the size of the Army, when we are trying to do so many things that are putting huge pressure on the bottom line of the Department of Defense. It is unwise. We are talking about an extremely premature acquisition of missiles before we have "proved out" the system.

I was struck yesterday when Senator Allard submitted a letter from Thomas Christie, Director of the Office of Director, Operational Test and Evaluation at the Pentagon. Dr. Christie said:

The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element is currently at a maturity level that requires continued developmental testing with oversight assistance from operational test personnel. Conducting realistic operational testing in the near-term for the GMD element would be premature and not beneficial to the program.

We have the chief testing official in the Department of Defense saying this system is so immature that we cannot even do operational tests. Yet in this proposal, the administration is asking to go ahead and buy additional interceptors that have not yet been adequately proven and adequately tested. Once again, it is a misuse of very scarce resources.

I have no qualm today with acquiring the 20 interceptors initially planned for the system. But to go beyond that is a mistake in terms of using scarce resources for, basically, unproven interceptors.

It is useful to review the situation of this midcourse ground system and where we are in terms of the system. First, as I mentioned yesterday, one of the key elements is a DSP satellite system that will monitor the initial launch of a missile. That is from a cold war legacy system. It is reliable; it is limited. You simply identify the lift-off of the aggression missile.

The second part of the system is the Aegis ships which have been pressed into service. They were originally designed simply to track and to defend against cruise missiles and aircraft. Now they have been given this extra task of trying to monitor the target as it rises out of the North Korean peninsula headed toward-we hope never but at least hypothetically-the United States.

A third element is the Cobra Dane radar, another system of 1970 vintage, designed not for missile defense but for looking at Russian missiles and their missile rangers. It is not even capable, most people concede, of tracking effectively a missile bound for Hawaii. It has been upgraded but still it is not the X-band radar, the big powerful radar originally designed for the system.

Then there is the interceptors element which is the subject of this amendment. Originally, as I indicated, the plan was to have 20. Now the administration is talking about 40. The interceptors have not been tested together with the new "kill" vehicle. In fact, the new kill vehicle, the warhead that sits on top, has not even been flight tested. As a result, we are rushing into this deployment. In fact, the whole system has not been tested. So bits and pieces have been tested. It is premature to go ahead now and ramp up production of these missiles.

If it turns out there is a systematic flaw in the missiles, and they have been acquired and deployed, if they have not been worked on in the silo, they will have to be removed from the silo and transported. It is very expensive.

I beg the obvious question. If we have not tested the system adequately, if we are planning for years now to have a 20-interceptor structure of our missiles, why are we rushing ahead now and buying additional missiles? My amendment says, at least before we get to this point of buying the additional missiles, we should be in the area of planning and carrying out realistic operational testing.

Yesterday, again, we had a very good debate. We were able to make some progress. But I point out again, the amendment proposed by Senator Warner, and adopted to change my language, moves the responsibility from the Office of Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Pentagon to the Secretary of Defense. It takes away that objective independent voice, which is the traditional way in which we evaluate any weapon system, not just the missile defense system.

I hope by the time we get around to making these acquisitions, acquiring interceptors 21 through 30 and 21 through 40, that we would not have the specialized testing regime under the Secretary of Defense, and that we would be back in a situation where we are doing operational testing the way it was designed and carried out.

That is the essence of my amendment. It would not in any way inhibit the deployment of the system. It would not in any way try to shrink the number below 20, which has been the plan for years. It would not decrease funding for missile defense. If this operational testing regime was in place, then these 21 through 30 interceptors could be acquired. It is really designed to first highlight and underscore the fact that we are rushing ahead, not just in terms of deployment but in actually building out this system way beyond what has been proven by testing; and, second, also, to emphasize the need for a thorough testing not beyond, frankly, what was required in yesterday's amendment.

Although I think yesterday's amendment was a good step forward, operational realistic testing by October 1 of 2005 is a very laudable goal. I hope we can follow through and carry it out.

Ultimately, we want to get the whole system back into the situation of practically every other major defense program; that is, before deploying the system, build the system, go to production, and that you have actually done operational testing, independent operational testing, supervised, conducted, monitored by Dr. Christie and his colleagues in the Defense Department Office of Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation.

One other point I make, in the discussion yesterday, there was some mention of how this system was going to protect us from threats around the world, including threats from Iran. This system is exclusively designed to protect from a missile launch from North Korea. It will provide no protection from a missile launch from any other point on the globe, as far as I can tell. It is not a comprehensive system defending the United States. It is a limited system focused on North Korea.

One can fairly ask, if North Korea is such a dangerous threat that requires this very hasty emergency deployment of a missile system, why are we withdrawing troops from North Korea, ground forces that could complement our diplomacy? We are we not taking aggressive diplomatic steps to try and disarm North Korea when they have made it clear they have nuclear material. They very well may have fashioned multiple nuclear weapons in the last year while we have been trying to negotiate but doing so unsuccessfully.

Again, this raises the whole question of how do you deal with these threats through this very expensive, very limited missile defense system or through other means complementing the development of the system. I argue, of course, that we have to be much more aggressive diplomatically with the North Korean situation; that we have to do it from a position of strength. That position is not enhanced when we take out troops.

I also suggest if we did that, we would have the time to develop this system properly, to declare it deployed-not now, but when we have had a test of the entire system, of all the elements, so that we know this system will work and it will work effectively.

An interesting final point I make is that in the discussion yesterday about operational testing, there was an example given about the Patriot system, which is the PAC-3 system. That is a complicated missile system, hit-to-kill technology, the same basic technology that will be employed in this national missile defense system.

We talk about this midcourse system. It did extremely well in all its developmental tests, and then it had operational tests. They had four consecutive operational test failures; that is the PAC-3.

Now, certainly we do not want a situation where the first operational test is the acquisition of an incoming missile from a hostile power, and we don't know if we are going to have the PAC-3 record of four failures in a row or we are going to do much better. I think that, essentially, is where we are today.

So my amendment, in summary, which will be disposed of next week, would condition the acquisition of interceptors 21 through 30-the new requirement that sprung up this year, after years of looking at 20-it would condition it on having operational testing according to the standard procedures that are in place in the Department of Defense.

With that, I yield the floor.

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Mr. REED. Madam President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. SESSIONS. I am delighted to yield.

Mr. REED. I want to understand and make sure that I am accurate. In reference to the system being deployed this September in Alaska, my understanding, which I stated, is that it would only provide coverage for essentially the North Korean threat. And then I heard you say the system-it might be in the future-but the system would cover all threats. My sense is that this system that will be deployed would cover North Korea.

Mr. SESSIONS. I believe it would cover at least a good bit of the United States against a Middle Eastern threat, and it could be effective against other threats. But, obviously, the main threat at this point-the ultimate goal is to provide a system that can protect us from all threats.

Mr. REED. I understand, as the system is eventually designed to be. But, if you will indulge me, I also understand that other radars have to be put in place beyond Cobra Dane, beyond the Aegis systems that they have not yet put in place. There are other elements that have to be in place for a more comprehensive system.

The other point on which I raise a question is the simple fact reflected in Mr. Christie's letter. This isn't a question of logic as much as technology. He seems to be saying the system is so premature or has a lack of maturity such that you can't do operational testing. I must say, I find it difficult, then, to say we can't do operational testing but we are going to put it in operation. That is the situation we face in September. But that is more of a comment than a question.

I thank the Senator for his kindness.