Hearing Of The Subcommittee Subcommittee On Economic Development, Public Buildings, And Emergency Management Of The House Committee On Transportation And Infrastructure - Risk-based Security In Federal Buildings: Targeting Funds To Real Risks And...

Statement

Hearing Of The Subcommittee Subcommittee On Economic Development, Public Buildings, And Emergency Management Of The House Committee On Transportation And Infrastructure - Risk-based Security In Federal Buildings: Targeting Funds To Real Risks And Eliminating Unnecessary Security Obstacles

Welcome to today's hearing, especially to our distinguished panels. I called this
hearing as chair of this subcommittee and as a member of the Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee. However, I also sit on the Homeland Security Committee and
represent the high-target, nation's capital. My committee work puts me in touch with the
nation's security needs at the highest levels. This work, and our experience since the
Oklahoma City bombing, leave no doubt that the complexities of risk-based security in
an open society continue to elude us.
Federal building security has little to do with risk-based threats today. The
General Accounting Office was recently able to get bomb-making equipment past
security at several federal buildings in the national-capital region, where much of the
new security has been focused. At the same time, tax-paying citizens are unable to
enter some buildings to use the restrooms or restaurant facilities. The security in
federal buildings is not uniform when it should be and, sadly, not professional or even
appropriately in the hands of the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal
Protective Service. Non-security personnel control much of the security for many
agencies.
I introduced HR 3555, the United States Commission on an Open Society with
Security Act on the eighth anniversary of 9/11, as an increasing variety of security
measures have proliferated throughout the country without any expert or uniform
guidance on evaluating risks to security and without much thought about the effect on
common freedoms and citizen access.
Federal facilities, where millions of federal employees work and citizens come for
services, have been the chosen targets for major terrorist attacks on our country.
After the attacks on the Pentagon and the Alfred P. Murrah Oklahoma City
federal building, terrorists have left no doubt that federal facilities, as symbols of the
United States government, are targets. Consequently, this documented pattern of
terrorist assaults on federal assets and consistent threats since 9/11 have required
continuing high levels of vigilance to protect both federal employees and visitors who all
use federal facilities.
When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was formed in 2002, the
Federal Protective service (FPS), charged with protecting federal sites, was transferred
from the General Services Administration (GSA) to the newly-created DHS and placed
within Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Although the Committee supported
the transfer, we insisted that FPS officers and guards be used exclusively by the FPS to
continue the necessary protection of federal sites. However, starting in February 2005,
the Chairman and I have had to send a series of letters to DHS, and this subcommittee
has held hearings questioning the placement of FPS within the ICE, inappropriate use
of funds, and a major shift from protection to inspection. These concerns have strong
bi-partisan support, with Chairman Oberstar and Ranking Member Mica both expressing
their own views about the gravity of the FPS situation.
Now comes a GAO report to confirm that the FPS, the nation's first federal police
force, established in 1790, and its contract guard force, have been rocked by
inadequate funding, staffing and training that cast doubt on its ability to carry out its core
missions to protect facilities, to complete building security assessments in a timely and
professional manner, and to monitor and oversee contract guards. GAO reports,
ominously, that proactive patrols have been eliminated at many GSA facilities, in spite
of the fact that "multiple governmental entities acknowledge the importance of proactive
patrol in detecting and preventing criminal incidents and terrorism-related activities."
Given these radical changes at FPS, at odds with its statutory mandate, who can
be surprised that today the GAO will testify today concerning how GAO testers were
able to get bomb-making equipment past security at several federal buildings? At the
same time, tax payers are unable to enter some federal buildings without escorts or
other obstacles to the access to which they are entitled. Surely, we are smart enough to
keep terrorists out without making it virtually impossible for U.S. taxpaying citizens to
get into federal buildings. Risk based security will be impossible as long as the
requirements are set by a hodge-podge group, who can choose their own security
requirements, without regard to evaluated risks and the big picture security concerns of
each region. What passes for federal security lacks the needed consistency, rationality
and accountability outside the particular agency. Non-security personnel are setting the
agenda and calling the shots building by building. We can do better, but only if we
recognize and then come to grips with the complexities associated with maintaining a
society of free and open access in a world characterized by unprecedented terrorism.
Following the terrorist attack on our country on 9/11, all expected additional and
increased security adequate to protect citizens against this frightening threat. However,
the American people also expect government to undertake this awesome new
responsibility without depriving them of their personal liberty. The place to begin is with
a high-level presidential commission of experts from a broad spectrum of relevant
disciplines -- not military and security experts alone - who can help chart the new course
that will be required to protect our people and our precious democratic institutions and
traditions at the same time. When we have faced unprecedented and perplexing issues
in the past, we have had the good sense to investigate them deeply in order to resolve
them. Examples include the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States (also known as the 9/11 Commission), and the Kerner Commission that
investigated the uprisings that swept American cities in the 1960s and 1970s. The
important difference in my bill is that the Commission would seek to act before a crisis-
level erosion of basic freedoms takes hold and becomes entrenched. Because global
terrorism is likely to be long-lasting, we cannot afford to allow the proliferation of security
that does not require and is not subject to expert oversight or analysis of technological
advances and other alternatives that can do the security job as well and without the
severe repercussions on freedom and commerce.
Following today's hearing I intend to move H.R. 3555 to help us find the
necessary balance by establishing a presidential commission of experts from a broad
spectrum of disciplines to investigate how to maintain democratic traditions of openness
and access while responding adequately to continuing substantial security threats
posed by global terrorism. The need for a high level commission is imperative to look
at issues, from makeshift security and make-work checkpoints that are posted in the
streets, even when there were no alerts, to the use of off-the-shelf technology used
without regard to effects on privacy and openness.
We are open to all suggestions and recommendations concerning the
still-developing work of keeping us safe and open. We have confidence that our people
and those in federal agencies can do both. We will listen carefully to how these agency
officials plan to balance keeping citizens safe in an open society. I intend to move this
bill following today's hearing. We welcome all the witnesses. Each of you is essential to
this hearing. We appreciate your time and effort in preparing testimony.

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