The recent arrest of a terrorism suspect in Colorado is a sobering reminder of the continued threat to our nation. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have publicly declared their intention to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction against the United States.
Just last week, another media report highlighted how terrorists might join forces with global drug traffickers in order to take advantage of the traffickers' vast networks of tunnels, black markets, technology, and human intelligence. The terrorists have noted the ease with which traffickers smuggle illegal drugs across our nation's borders.
In the words of a former U.S. Embassy official in Afghanistan, "When you get to the point where you can smuggle tons of drugs through one border then you certainly have the capacity to smuggle in weapons of mass destruction or agents." Clearly, this threat is real, urgent and evolving.
On September 8, Chairman Lieberman and I introduced the Weapons of Mass Destruction Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2009 to help counter this threat. The bill would improve our nation's ability to prevent and respond to WMD attacks. It would enact many of the recommendations of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism -- a commission the Chairman and I helped establish in 2007.
I am certainly pleased to see the leaders of the commission and our former colleagues, Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent, here today. Their report warns us that it is "more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013."
The Commission's report is a call to action. Its findings reinforce the urgency felt by the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee during our many hearings regarding the terrorist threat to our nation. We have examined many deadly threats targeting the American people -- from terrorists dispersing anthrax spores to the detonation of a nuclear device in a major city.
To respond to these threats, this Committee has led numerous reform efforts since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Our work has strengthened intelligence-gathering efforts, tightened security at our ports and chemical facilities, and vastly improved our emergency preparedness. Nevertheless, the Commission's report provides a chilling reminder that "the terrorists have been active, too."
Nuclear proliferation and advances in biotechnology are giving terrorists new methods to commit mass murder. We must continue our efforts to identify risks and to increase security.
As the Commission explained, the most likely WMD threat to the United States is a biological weapon. It is easier to develop and disseminate bio-weapons and gain access to lethal pathogens. Furthermore, terrorists know that a bio-weapon can be a stealth attack. We may not immediately recognize such an attack until hundreds of people have died.
Despite this threat, some of the world's most dangerous pathogens are not secure. Within the United States, the Commission found serious flaws in the security of biological labs. Reinforcing these findings, the GAO recently reported alarming deficiencies in perimeter security at facilities that house the world's most dangerous biological agents -- diseases such as the Ebola virus and smallpox. The GAO also found that laboratory regulation "for the most part relies on self-policing."
Thousands of people in the United States have access to dangerous pathogens. More than 400 research facilities and nearly 15,000 individuals are on the "Select Agent List" -- an authorization to handle the most deadly pathogens. The FBI determined that a cleared scientist at a regulated research lab likely carried out the 2001 Anthrax attacks on the Senate and the U.S. postal system.
To counter this threat, the WMD Commission recommends increasing lab security. Our bill seeks to accomplish that goal by identifying those pathogens that terrorists are most likely to utilize and increasing the security standards at the biolabs that handle them. A negotiated rulemaking -- with federal agencies and research institutions at the table -- would develop these standards. This collaboration would ensure that the regulations that make our nation's biological labs more secure do not have the unintended consequence of deterring legitimate research. To help fund these enhancements, the bill would create a four-year grant program.
The Commission also found that the federal government is unaware of many research facilities that handle less strictly controlled, yet still dangerous, pathogens. To that end, our bill would require registration of these labs, and facility security requirements would be tiered based on the risk that terrorists might use a particular pathogen in a biological attack.
The bill would improve our ability to quickly distribute medical countermeasures and provide reliable, ongoing emergency response information to the public in the event of a WMD attack.
Finally, the bill also addresses international biosecurity threats, requiring the Director of National Intelligence to identify the security measures in place at those countries' high-risk labs.
I look forward to discussing this important legislation with our witnesses today. We must move swiftly to strengthen and improve our nation's biological defenses and security systems.