Federal News Service February 26, 2004 Thursday
HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION
CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE JIM SAXTON (R-NJ)
LOCATION: 2212 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.
WITNESSES:
VICE ADMIRAL ARTHUR K. CEBROWSKI, UNITED STATES NAVY (RET.), DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FORCE TRANSFORMATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN M. CURRAN, UNITED STATES ARMY, DIRECTOR, FUTURES CENTER, UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND;
REAR ADMIRAL KEVIN J. COSGRIFF, UNITED STATES NAVY, DIRECTOR OF WARFARE INTEGRATION (OPNAV N7F);
LIEUTENANT GENERAL DUNCAN J. MCNABB, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PLANS AND PROGRAMS (AF/XP);
LIEUTENANT GENERAL EDWARD HANLON, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT, COMMAND GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND;
LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT W. WAGNER, UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND
BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
REP. RICK LARSEN (D-WA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First question is for Admiral Cebrowski. Transformation efforts certainly seem to focus on warfighting. Over the last 12 years, though, we've been-you mentioned we've been involved in at least six different nation building efforts. Some successful, some not, some jury is still out. But since one element of our national security strategy is the establishment of democratic institutions and we're seeking certainly to diminish the role of failing states and failed states in creating havens for terrorists and potential terrorist organizations, what role and what discussion is taking place as regards to establishing some level of permanent post-conflict stability operation within the military to account for this-so far it's been an every other year exercise, on average, over the last 12 years.
And I don't mean, sort of, you know, cleaning up after major operations, but getting in there and making sure things are stable and getting things in place. I'm not trying to make a statement here, as much I'm trying to see it as a reality that we're continually trying to deal with after every time we deploy our military. And what are we doing then, within transformation to try to create some stability within our own military, some certainty within our own military that this is part of what we have to do in the future?
ADM. CEBROWSKI: There is a robust discussion of this going on within the Pentagon leadership. The view that many of us have, and I certainly advance is that these missions, say, stabilization missions, are important, difficult and very dangerous. It's-those are not second team missions. That's not for some constabulary force, that's for real soldiers and Marines to be doing and so this is-so we're talking about first tier people with first tier training, that in order to do these kinds of things.
It also invites attention once again to the active Reserve component mix. Because frequently skills are available elsewhere, and so this then also becomes an area of review. It invites attention into supporting technologies. For example, non-lethal efforts, to what extent do they need to be furthered developed specifically for the kinds of missions that you have in mind? There-also social and cultural intelligence, language skills. When we review the service roadmaps we see an elevated interest in those. But an important feature is that these missions, and I think you alluded to it, are not necessarily after-just for after major conflict. They are generally useful, generally valuable to have in the force.
Furthermore, like so many of the things we do, they hinge on the relationships that we develop. Hence, it's really not appropriate for say, a pickup team to do these things because then you won't have developed over time before the event, the relationships which are necessary, you know, for success. So those are all in the mix of the elements that are being discussed. Those are largely my views, how that will be implemented in its particular, that remains for the various components in the leadership to work out.
REP. LARSEN: Is that-as you mentioned, it's a robust discussion. Then is your office part of that discussion, that robust discussion, making that part of transformation?
ADM. CEBROWSKI: We have made an input to it, you might say, a catalytic input. We had sponsored a study on the subject several months ago and that has been briefed around quite verily.
REP. LARSEN: General Curran and General-I can't read that far.
REP. SAXTON: Hanlon.
REP. LARSEN: Hanlon, sorry, I apologize. Since a lot of these operations tend to fall on the Army and the Marines, not to exclude others, but they tend to fall on your folks. Do you want to provide any comment to the question about transformation and the role of post ability operations?
GEN. CURRAN: Just merely to reinforce what Admiral Cebrowski pointed out, there are a number of initiatives and areas where we are looking to improve the capability of the land force to conduct these kinds of operations. And so from a military perspective, from the particular roles and missions that we have from the military, we continue to focus on how can we fill in the gaps that our forces may have in that piece. But it is-when you get into these kinds of operations, and I believe this is also what Admiral Cebrowski was alluding to, is that it is a country team that is an issue that is interagency, spans-you know in addition to the military.
REP. LARSEN: Sure.
GEN. CURRAN: So these are discussions that need to-and are, I believe, are expanding beyond military capabilities, it's looking at what the whole team needs to provide in these kinds of environments.
REP. LARSEN: Sure. I appreciate that.
GEN. HANLON: Sir, I would just dovetail on that by saying traditionally in these kinds of operations, it's usually been the Army that's had to bear the brunt of that. I mean, the Marines have always been lucky enough to be in up front, and then when it's time to do the peacekeeping, peacemaking it's usually-you know, like in the Balkans usually the Army is the one that's had to bear that burden.
Iraq has been interesting, it's been a change because the Perstempo, op tempo has been so tough on the Army that we've had to-you know, we're sending 25,000 Marines back in to back-fill and assist in that regard. We've had to go back and we've had to re-look at some things, sir. I've got to tell you, in fact, the Marine Corps University is part of my AOR down at Quantico, we have a major event taking place in April which is going to look at exactly what you just asked.
We've gone into the books and we've done this before. Vietnam, for example, is an example we used to use as simply CAP, the Civil Action Program, which was very successful. And we brought back some of the individuals that were involved in that to take a look at how we might apply the lessons learned from that into Iraq. Not exactly the same situation, they are different in a way, but there are similarities.
So, we're all relearning. We have a ongoing effort through our warfighting lab as well, to capture as many of the lessons learned that we're gathering from both the Army experience, our own experience and how we can turn that into day to day peace keeping techniques. So, your question is a very valid one, I will just say one thing to you though.
I think if you start with a well trained soldier or a well trained marine, well led, they can adapt and do the mission. I really believe that. Thank you, sir.
REP. LARSEN: Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.