Hearing of the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee

Federal News Service March 25, 2004 Thursday

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: THE 2005 BRAC PROCESS

CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE JOEL HEFLEY (R-CO)

WITNESSES: PANEL I:

RAYMOND F. DUBOIS, JR., DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT; LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, DIRECTOR OF FORCE STRUCTURE, RESOURCES AND ASSESSMENT (J8), THE JOINT STAFF, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS;

PANEL II:

BARRY W. HOLMAN, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

LOCATION: 2118 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
REP. HEFLEY: Mr. Cole.

REP. TOM COLE (R-OK): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Just a few questions, if I might, because I find this always a very frustrating topic although I'm generally in agreement with what you're trying to accomplish. But let me just ask, for historical purposes, could you gentlemen give me your opinion of the base closing process before BRAC? How it worked? I mean, I can look at my particular state and we've got Clinton-Sherman Air Force Base. It's still got 13,000 feet of runway out there but not much else. Ardmore-in other words, we were able to close facilities, I'm sure, always at great trauma and great cost on a fairly regular basis and usually after mobilization, downsizing after-but Clinton-Sherman was closed down in the 1960s at the height of the Cold War. Large American military force, so it wasn't a reaction to downsizing after the Second World War.

So why is the current process superior today as opposed as to what we used to do because we clearly were able to close facilities in the past, however painful it might be.

MR. DUBOIS: Precisely because of the history, and the painful history, of base closure pre-BRAC is why I think the Congress embraced this particular process before us. As I remember, when I served with Secretary Rumsfeld in 1975 to '77, there was some considerations of bases to be realigned or closed and, at that point, the secretary of Defense-the secretary of Defense had, shall we call it, unfettered ability to close and realign.

But then the Congress restricted that authority through what we call Section 2687, 10 U.S. Code 2687. It, I think, was precipitated by-as I remember, Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense Weinberger in the '87 or 8 timeframe, came and made an announcement of, I think it was a handful or maybe six or seven, bases that he wished to realign and close. And the Congress reacted, as you might expect, with some reluctance to embrace his recommendations. And thereby was born the BRAC process, which then began. The first BRAC Commission was stood up in '88 and then '91, '93, '95. That's my recollection.

REP. COLE: So, from your point of view, is it fair to say this is the worst process except for all the others we used to have?

MR. DUBOIS: I think this is an accurate statement, Congressman.

REP. COLE: I think, from a member's standpoint, it is particularly-it's difficult because it's a process, frankly, that, as hard as you make it, it's never as transparent as we would like and, as honest as you are, is never a very easy one for us to deal with because we are essentially waiting in a powerless situation for an up or down vote that we don't think we can really affect in so far as our individual installations are concerned. And I don't know how we get out of that other than frankly try to structure a system that we collectively agree on is fair, try to constantly badger you and bring you up here before hearings and make you convince us on a regular basis that it's fair. And I think you've done a reasonably good job, quite frankly, at doing that.

But if you had to design the next one, what would you do differently? Anything?

MR. DUBOIS: I studied the first four in detail when, in February of 2001, the secretary said we must try to work with Congress to get this authorization. In that research, I talked to many of you and many of your colleagues in the other body and as well as communities who have been impacted by BRAC. I came up with a list of items that we needed to do differently and, I must say, one of them is the disposal process. The biggest problem that the community faces when it's faced with the closure is that it takes too long to move that heretofore military real property asset to economic redevelopment and new employment basis for the community.

Mr. Grone, sitting behind me, I've charged with the task to assess how we streamline the disposal process, telescope the disposal process, overcome the inevitable local impediments, be they economic, developmental, political, environmental, so that the community can move quickly to redevelopment. What we have suggested and what the Congress has authorized us to do is, in our view, the most fair and balanced and honest process ever entered into with respect to base closure.

REP. COLE: Let me ask you this, if I may. These decisions made, I would assume, become, in a military sense, progressively more difficult. That is you should have by now got the, quote, "low hanging fruit", if that's an appropriate phrase. Technology and the speed of transportation makes-there's a lot of places now you could deploy out of, particularly if you're talking about deploying into foreign theaters. It really doesn't matter that much if it's 500 miles this way or that way inside the United States in many cases.

When you get down to these decisions and they're close, in terms of military value and mission, then do things like community support, the impact on the community, how decisive do they become?

MR. DUBOIS: A two-part question and I truly appreciate you raising this issue because others have talked about, well, low hanging fruit '88, some more in '91, '93. There isn't any more. Well, in point of fact, there is and notwithstanding Congresswoman Wilson's remarks, the excess capacity analysis indicates strongly that continued excess capacity exists. In one particular way that didn't exist before, is that technology, as you pointed out, fast sealift, fast airlift, the appropriate strategic assets that we have funded, that you all have funded for those purposes, have changed the dynamics where installations necessary have to be and how they are configured.

Now, the second part of your question. If it comes down, what's the tie breaker? What could be tie breakers? I think tie breakers, to use that perhaps inappropriate or not exactly an exacting term, are contained in the considerations of the so-called 5, 6, 7, 8 criteria. The primacy of the first four criteria, focusing on military value, are just that. They hold primacy. When it comes down-were to come down between base A and base B, I think the criteria 5, 6, 7 and 8, to include the environmental impact, the impact of cost related to waste management, the ability of both existing and receiving communities to support missions and personnel, all of these issues will come into play.

And I think that Congressman Taylor made a very important observation. Many communities have consistently, year after year after year, out of their own tax base, done what was right for our military families and military community and it's reflected in the excellence of their schools and the transportation corridors and the infrastructure, spousal employment, which, when I was in the Army, many years ago, arguably was not nearly so important as it is today. These communities and their efforts are reflected ultimately, in my view, in the military value of that installation.

REP. COLE: The chairman has been generous as always.

Just last comment. I would ask you-one of the things that I know causes me a lot of problems-I'm sure other members of the committee-there are always magic lists that float out there and I promise you, once you have a facility that appears on a list, you know, then it really does drive the panic level enormously high in the locale as you can imagine. So, in so far as you can, not take people off but be very careful in terms of what you do and what you say and very emphatic that these lists, at this phase don't matter, or they're manufactured, that is helpful because it does get-those lists always create the sense that hey, the decision really has already been made, no matter what they say. It's just being postponed through some process, the outcome of which is already known by somebody magic in the Pentagon. That undermines the whole credibility of what you're trying to accomplish.

MR. DUBOIS: If there were such a list, I can assure you that I and General Cartwright, and the gentleman and lady behind me and so many others in the Pentagon, to include all the service secretaries, all the service chiefs and vice-chiefs, the senior leadership of the departments, civilian and military, would not be expending the enormous amount of time that they've already expended and will expend over the next year.

Just as a personal aside, the angst that associates with so- called lists, I once tried to add a little levity to a meeting, I walked in and I have a big clipboard and on the back of the clipboard in big red letters, it said B-R-A-C.

And I walked in and everybody-you could hear the wind sucking in, if you will, and I turned the clipboard around and said, There's nothing on it. I don't know yet.

REP. COLE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.