Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE DUNCAN HUNTER (R-CA)

WITNESSES: GENERAL RICHARD MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; GENERAL PETER SCHOOMAKER, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF; AND GENERAL MICHAEL HAGEE, U.S. MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT

LOCATION: 2118 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
So, the next gentleman in our lineup here is the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Cole.

REP. TOM COLE (R-OK): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And let me begin, if I may, by associating myself very strongly with my colleague, Mr. Kline's remarks, and Mr. Franks. We are very appreciative of the job that each of you do, and more importantly, even the outstanding men and women that you lead. So, I think you've just conducted yourselves magnificently. And I know this is a particularly difficult and troubling and trying patch that we're going through, but you have enormous respect on this committee and certainly appreciation for what you do.

Let me, if I can, sort of switch the focus a little bit, because we spend a lot time, as we should, talking about ourselves and talking about our allies. I want to talk a little bit about our enemies and get your impressions on that, and make an observation and get a comment.

As I look at the enemy, you know, I break them down into three different categories. We've got foreign fighters, maybe even state- supported, but foreign fighters, al Qaeda types associated with terrorism are there. We've got the Saddamists, the remnants of the regime. We have maybe some folks like al-Sadr that are sort of Shi'a extremists. And they don't really have a common theme between them. I mean, they're all-we're having to contend with them, but they're not linked by a common ideology. They really have a very different vision, each one of them, for Iraq. I mean, some people want an eternal jihad. Some people want a sort of Shi'a theocracy like Iran. Other people want to go back to the old Saddam regime. And all the information we have is that none of those alternatives are particularly attractive to the Iraqi people, speaking broadly.

We have, for all the problems and difficulties that we face, a pretty attractive vision out there that we're working toward: a democratic country, a free country, a country that runs its own affairs, a country that at some point would be free of our direct involvement in any way, shape or form. I mean, I believe the president very firmly when he says we want to stay there as long as it takes to get it done and not a day longer. We want to come home as soon as we can, but not leave something behind us.

So I would like you to talk from your perspective, if you would-I'd love it if all three of you could address it-just describe the nature of the enemy as you see it, how it has evolved over the last year, because obviously it's changed, in some ways become more sophisticated; and how you assess how we line up with them, and how the Iraqi people view this conflict between us, Iraqi security forces as our allies, and these very different types of enemies that you're dealing with.

GEN. MYERS: Well, Congressman Cole, I think you've done a good job of pretty much outlining the threat that we face, and it does have different elements. We are seeing, I think, more coordination between them, coordination of convenience, not of end states or philosophical agreement, but tactical agreement that they can help one another, share weapons, and so forth. I think there's probably great dislike among the various elements for the other elements, but they're willing to cooperate to some degree. And I think we're seeing some of that. I think we saw some of that on the attacks on the major supply routes, some of that cooperation, again more of convenience, certainly not to be looked at as a popular uprising in Iraq-nothing like that, but at the tactical level, some cooperation.

And you're right, there's-in the Shi'a population there's not homogeneity in their view of how Iraq ought to go forward. There's lots of different thoughts in that community. We think Sadr and his thugs are more and more isolated. And again, the strategy there-we haven't talked much about that strategy, but the strategy there is to let Iraqis try to solve that problem. He is wanted in connection with the murder of one of the clerics, Khoei, and Iraqis need to bring him to court and determine what his involvement was. And I think they're interested in doing that. I think they know they have to do that. Our role is to make sure that his thugs aren't disrupting security in other parts of the country or in Karbala and Najaf, without being right there in their holy places. And so we've tried to work that much like Fallujah, with Iraqis. And so there's that part of it.

The foreign fighters, probably characterized-and Zarqawi, we can't ignore him. We think he's still in Iraq. He's working a different agenda, and it's the bigger agenda that is being worked in Iraq beyond the former regime elements-and I'll get to them in just a minute. And that agenda-if you go to the 30,000-foot view, that agenda is that extremism should win out. And part of the tenets there, as we've heard from Osama bin Laden and others-and Zarqawi, while not al Qaeda, is affiliated with them and has the same view, and many other extremists do as well, and that is that they want to bring down our way of life. They've said it and they want to do it.

They certainly do not want an Iraq that is in any way democratic, is in any way where the people have a say in their future. They would like to see it apparently in anarchy, because he's the one that talked about well, we can't make the coalition leave, I guess, so we'll start a civil war between the Sunni and the Shi'a here.

That view is the one that is going to threaten-that's threatened Europe, that's threatened us, that results in the Madrid bombings, that results in the bombings in Riyadh, that resulted in 9/11. That threat is still there. While we've been very successful in addressing it from a military standpoint, and in some cases diplomatic standpoint, and we've done away with safe havens, and a lot of the leadership has been rolled up, and we've stopped lots of attacks, it's still there. There are people that believe so strongly in it they're willing to commit suicide. And so there is that element, not only in Iraq but throughout the region, and for that matter, throughout the world. We know those cells --

REP. COLE: If I could ask you, would it be fair to say, General, we'd be dealing with those people whether we were in Iraq or not? In other words --

GEN. MYERS: In my view, that's absolutely right. This is a view of the world-and Iraq is a convenient place for them to be-but it's a view of the world that with or without our involvement in Iraq would be out there and would have to dealt with. Absolutely. And it pervades many, many countries, and you know the story. But that's the 30,000-foot view.

It's also why we in America and American people ought to care mightily about how successful we are in places like Afghanistan and Iraq-we've got about a thousand troops in the Horn of Africa and other places in the world-why we need to be successful and why it also can't be just a military-it's all instruments of national power that have to carry this fight to the former regime elements-or we've had various names over time for them, but the people that are part of the Ba'athist regime. Part of the solution there is to give them hope that they have a future in Iraq. And that hasn't done perfectly.

I think what you're seeing in Fallujah now is part of that process to give these people that provided a lot of the senior leadership to Saddam's regime-you're giving them hope that there is a way forward without just fighting the coalition, that there is economic hope, and that's why I mentioned that the Marine Expeditionary Force out there is perhaps the largest employer right now as they use their funds that our commanders have to help establish work for a lot of people that are out of work.

And then they have to be coaxed into the political process. It will not-I mean, these are not going to be their natural instincts, but they have to be coaxed into that process. And I think, in fact, the coalition forces can help; certainly the U.N. can help. The Iraqi interim government is going to have to help make them see that there's a future here, that they can be part of that decision-making process however it works out for their future. And that's a big part of it.

But I think you've named the threat. It's not the same throughout the country. If you look at the north, the north is relatively stable, relatively prosperous. Somebody brought up the fact that Petraeus-that the success General Petraeus had in the north was very high, and we saw that during these recent attacks in April.

There were lots of demonstrators that stormed up to the government buildings in Mosul, and who turned them away and who settled the issue there? It was the mayor, it was the police, and it was the Iraqi Civil Defense force that we trained. Iraqis took care of their own situation up in Mosul, which could have been a very dynamic one if they hadn't acted.

GEN. SCHOOMAKER: If I could very quickly add, I agree with the chairman and with your description in general of the foe. But I would-and I'm speaking, basically, from a past life here and some experience. I would caution that we rush too quick to-while it's very important for us to attempt to define and understand the threat, I would caution about rushing to judgment and closure on that, because I think this is a very dynamic threat. And I think there will be some surprises yet to come in the woodpile, so to speak, in terms of what might be some of the motivations and what might be some of the sources.

And I think, you know, depending upon how things go, we need to think about this in a broader context than just Iraq; that there are all kinds of other possible motivations. And we need to keep our aperture pretty wide, to recognize what-how this may develop in the future.

And in my view, when we talk about this, as I think about it, I think it is global. I think it's going to be long. I think it's not just defined by Iraq. And I think this is something that we're going to have to learn as we go and just be careful we don't end up stereotyping and buying into definitions here that may limit our understanding about what it is we should be doing.

I hope that doesn't overconfuse the issue. But I'm worried about our tendency to want to always come to closure and overdefine or stereotype and kind then stick our stake in the ground and miss the obvious for that reason.

I'm sorry. Go ahead, Mike.

GEN. HAGEE: Congressman Cole, I will try hard not to pile on, even though I agree with both of my colleagues here.

The elements that you described, I think, are out there. I sort of put them in one pile, call them hard-core. They're not really for anything, in my mind. They're against what Iraq is trying to do, what Afghanistan is trying to do, what a lot of other countries over in that area are trying to do.

And I think Tom Friedman called the-some of the other people over there individuals standing around. In other words, they're attracted to whoever they think is going to win.

And as the chairman talked about, I think that's where our focus needs to be. It's where our focus was in Fallujah, to separate this hard-core element from the average Iraqi, if you will, and give them something to fight for, rather than something to be against.

I think that's what you're seeing down with the great work that the 1st Armored Division has done. And you see the support waning for al- Sadr down there because they're starting to see that there is actually something that might be worth fighting for.

So I agree with him, look at it just a little bit differently.

REP. COLE: Just in closing-and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence-I think it's just really important we remember who the bad guys are and the good guys are in this particular confrontation. And we certainly have our difficulties and our challenges, but our people have done a tremendous job. And the elements that we're dealing with do not wish the United States of America well and do not wish the Iraqi people well, because the future that they would impose upon them, whether they're the hard-core Saddamists or the jihadists, would be a terrible fate for them.

So I just hope as we work our way through the challenges, we always remember that. I really do believe you gentlemen are associated with a very noble cause. You're doing great things for our country, and frankly, you're doing great things for people in other countries to provide them with some security, some freedom and some opportunity, some hope for a future.

So again, thank you for what you do.